Heidegger and the supposition of a single, objective world
Heidegger and the supposition of a single, objective world
Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.
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McManus, Denis
95bb0718-d3fa-4982-9cde-05ac00b5bb24
June 2015
McManus, Denis
95bb0718-d3fa-4982-9cde-05ac00b5bb24
Abstract
Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.
Text
Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single Objective World.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
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e-pub ahead of print date: 17 April 2012
Published date: June 2015
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 208895
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/208895
ISSN: 0966-8373
PURE UUID: f192a108-00b4-43e7-8bf8-ebd8b53f2b81
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Date deposited: 31 Jan 2012 12:23
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:44
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