Efficient Mechanisms for the Supply of Services in Multi-Agent Environments
Efficient Mechanisms for the Supply of Services in Multi-Agent Environments
Auctions provide an efficient way of resolving one-to-many negotiations. This is particularly true for automated agents where delays and long communications carry negative externalities. A properly designed auction, tailored to the specific needs of the relevant multi-agent system, can significantly improve its performance. In this paper we focus on the specific problem of service allocation amongst autonomous, automated agents, within the ADEPT project which concerns the BT (British Telecom) business process of providing a quote for designing a network for a customer. The main contributions of this paper are threefold: First, we show how an English auction can be modified for for services, which are multi-dimensional private value objects. Second we show how, under certain conditions, auctions can be arranged by the service providing agents, in the cases where the service seeking agents fail to do so. We consider the incentives of all participants, and show how such an arrangement can be in their best interest. Finally, by examining our results for what is, essentially, an application of game-theory and mechanism design to an existing application, we draw some general conclusions on how such concepts can be operationalized in automated agents.
1-10
Vulkan, N.
ee7eabda-666d-4ebe-b4bc-66b09be0c0f1
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
1998
Vulkan, N.
ee7eabda-666d-4ebe-b4bc-66b09be0c0f1
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Vulkan, N. and Jennings, N. R.
(1998)
Efficient Mechanisms for the Supply of Services in Multi-Agent Environments.
1st Int. Conf. on Information and Computation Economies, Charlestown, South Carolina, United States.
.
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Conference or Workshop Item
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Abstract
Auctions provide an efficient way of resolving one-to-many negotiations. This is particularly true for automated agents where delays and long communications carry negative externalities. A properly designed auction, tailored to the specific needs of the relevant multi-agent system, can significantly improve its performance. In this paper we focus on the specific problem of service allocation amongst autonomous, automated agents, within the ADEPT project which concerns the BT (British Telecom) business process of providing a quote for designing a network for a customer. The main contributions of this paper are threefold: First, we show how an English auction can be modified for for services, which are multi-dimensional private value objects. Second we show how, under certain conditions, auctions can be arranged by the service providing agents, in the cases where the service seeking agents fail to do so. We consider the incentives of all participants, and show how such an arrangement can be in their best interest. Finally, by examining our results for what is, essentially, an application of game-theory and mechanism design to an existing application, we draw some general conclusions on how such concepts can be operationalized in automated agents.
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Published date: 1998
Venue - Dates:
1st Int. Conf. on Information and Computation Economies, Charlestown, South Carolina, United States, 1998-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 252166
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/252166
PURE UUID: 5347c583-22c2-47af-9c4b-81168c379f07
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Date deposited: 03 Dec 2002
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 05:17
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Author:
N. Vulkan
Author:
N. R. Jennings
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