The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Avoiding Omnidoxasticity in Logics of Belief: A Reply to MacPherson

Avoiding Omnidoxasticity in Logics of Belief: A Reply to MacPherson
Avoiding Omnidoxasticity in Logics of Belief: A Reply to MacPherson
In recent work MacPherson argues that the standard method of modeling belief logically, as a necessity operator in a modal logic, is doomed to fail. The problem with normal modal logics as logics of belief is that they treat believers as "ideal" in unrealistic ways (i.e., as omnidoxastic); however, similar problems re-emerge for candidate non-normal logics. The authors argue that logics used to model belief in artificial intelligence (AI) are also flawed in this way. But for AI systems, omnidoxasticity is impossible because of their finite nature, and this fact can be exploited to produce operational models of fallible belief. The relevance of this point to various philosophical views about belief is discussed.
belief logics, artificial intelligence, omnidoxasticity, modal logic, epistemic logic, operational models of belief
475-95
O'Hara, Kieron
0a64a4b1-efb5-45d1-a4c2-77783f18f0c4
Reichgelt, Han
40c442e9-3d94-4444-abf8-2318f8034e74
Shadbolt, Nigel
5c5acdf4-ad42-49b6-81fe-e9db58c2caf7
O'Hara, Kieron
0a64a4b1-efb5-45d1-a4c2-77783f18f0c4
Reichgelt, Han
40c442e9-3d94-4444-abf8-2318f8034e74
Shadbolt, Nigel
5c5acdf4-ad42-49b6-81fe-e9db58c2caf7

O'Hara, Kieron, Reichgelt, Han and Shadbolt, Nigel (1995) Avoiding Omnidoxasticity in Logics of Belief: A Reply to MacPherson Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36, (3), pp. 475-95.

Record type: Article

Abstract

In recent work MacPherson argues that the standard method of modeling belief logically, as a necessity operator in a modal logic, is doomed to fail. The problem with normal modal logics as logics of belief is that they treat believers as "ideal" in unrealistic ways (i.e., as omnidoxastic); however, similar problems re-emerge for candidate non-normal logics. The authors argue that logics used to model belief in artificial intelligence (AI) are also flawed in this way. But for AI systems, omnidoxasticity is impossible because of their finite nature, and this fact can be exploited to produce operational models of fallible belief. The relevance of this point to various philosophical views about belief is discussed.

PDF ohara-omnidoxasticity.pdf - Other
Download (118kB)

More information

Published date: 1995
Additional Information: Commentary On: B. MacPherson, 'Is it possible belief isn't necessary?' Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34, 12-28
Keywords: belief logics, artificial intelligence, omnidoxasticity, modal logic, epistemic logic, operational models of belief
Organisations: Web & Internet Science

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 254157
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/254157
PURE UUID: 426547c3-f84d-478a-a7ea-db68e21e376c

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 04 Nov 2000
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 09:54

Export record

Contributors

Author: Kieron O'Hara
Author: Han Reichgelt
Author: Nigel Shadbolt

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×