O'Hara, Kieron, Reichgelt, Han and Shadbolt, Nigel
Avoiding Omnidoxasticity in Logics of Belief: A Reply to MacPherson
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36, (3), .
In recent work MacPherson argues that the standard method of modeling belief logically, as a necessity operator in a modal logic, is doomed to fail. The problem with normal modal logics as logics of belief is that they treat believers as "ideal" in unrealistic ways (i.e., as omnidoxastic); however, similar problems re-emerge for candidate non-normal logics. The authors argue that logics used to model belief in artificial intelligence (AI) are also flawed in this way. But for AI systems, omnidoxasticity is impossible because of their finite nature, and this fact can be exploited to produce operational models of fallible belief. The relevance of this point to various philosophical views about belief is discussed.
||Commentary On: B. MacPherson, 'Is it possible belief isn't necessary?' Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34, 12-28
||belief logics, artificial intelligence, omnidoxasticity, modal logic, epistemic logic, operational models of belief
||Web & Internet Science
||04 Nov 2000
||17 Apr 2017 23:18
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