Sceptical Overkill: On Two Recent Arguments Against Scepticism

O'Hara, Kieron (1993) Sceptical Overkill: On Two Recent Arguments Against Scepticism Mind, 102, (2), pp. 315-27.


[img] PDF ohara-scepticism.pdf - Other
Download (661kB)


This paper is a discussion of a recent attempt by Crispin Wright to force at least some varieties of external world scepticism to succumb to a "head-on, rational response", contrary to well-known expressions of pessimism by, for example, Sir Peter Strawson and Barry Stroud. The varieties of scepticism in question are those that involve positing a "purportedly undetectable but cognitively disabling state", such as the state imposed by Descartes' malicious demon, in which a sufferer is unable to tell whether or not his or her experiences are caused by items in his or her perceptible environment, as opposed to some disassociated cause; the argument is completed by noticing that, if such a state were possible, then no-one could have complete confidence that he or she were not in such a state. This paper argues that this lack of confidence also fatally undermines Wright's argument.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Commentary On: Wright, C. 1991: "Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon". Mind, 100
ISSNs: 0026-4423 (print)
Keywords: scepticism malicious demon dreaming maundering
Organisations: Web & Internet Science
ePrint ID: 254162
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2000
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 23:18
Further Information:Google Scholar

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item