Optimal negotiation strategies for agents with incomplete information
Optimal negotiation strategies for agents with incomplete information
This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters-including the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy. Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Moreover, we list the conditions for convergence when both agents use their respective optimal strategies and study the effect of time on negotiation outcome.
53-68
Fatima, S. S.
a3be4436-a9e9-4e6f-9238-0feaa10dc34c
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2001
Fatima, S. S.
a3be4436-a9e9-4e6f-9238-0feaa10dc34c
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, S. S., Wooldridge, M. and Jennings, N. R.
(2001)
Optimal negotiation strategies for agents with incomplete information.
8th Int Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures and Languages (ATAL), Seattle, United States.
.
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters-including the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy. Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Moreover, we list the conditions for convergence when both agents use their respective optimal strategies and study the effect of time on negotiation outcome.
More information
Published date: 2001
Venue - Dates:
8th Int Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures and Languages (ATAL), Seattle, United States, 2001-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 256151
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/256151
PURE UUID: f11625a7-9a39-4a9a-a209-b1aa13328bd3
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 01 Nov 2002
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 05:39
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Contributors
Author:
S. S. Fatima
Author:
M. Wooldridge
Author:
N. R. Jennings
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