Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem s.n.
The mind/body problem is really just the feeling/function problem: How and why are some functional states felt states? Dan Dennett's instrumentalism addresses only function: It leaves feeling completely untouched. The feeling/function problem is not merely "hard," as Chalmers suggests: it is insoluble -- except on pain of a telekinetic dualism ("mind over matter") that assigns feeling a causal role that all empirical evidence contradicts.
||Quote/Comments on Dan Dennett's paper, "The Fantasy of First-Person Science," based on his recent debate with Dave Chalmers about consciousness http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm
||Web & Internet Science
||02 Apr 2002
||17 Apr 2017 23:04
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