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The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium

The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium
The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium
This paper studies the influence of the agents' information states on the negotiation equilibrium. This analysis is undertaken by examining a range of negotiation scenarios in which the amount of information that agents have about their opponent's parameters is systematically varied. For each such scenario, we show that a unique equilibrium exists and we investigate how the information states of agents influence the distribution property of the equilibrium solution. Our study shows the relative impacts of the opponent's parameters on the negotiation outcome. The results obtained are useful for decision making in situations where an agent has the option of choosing whom to negotiate with, from among a set of bargainers, on the basis of its information state. Our analysis also indicates which of its opponent's parameters an agent should learn in order to maximize its utility.
Fatima, S. S.
a3be4436-a9e9-4e6f-9238-0feaa10dc34c
Wooldridge, M. J.
68e00b8d-2a43-4b5c-b0b9-329304892d9e
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, S. S.
a3be4436-a9e9-4e6f-9238-0feaa10dc34c
Wooldridge, M. J.
68e00b8d-2a43-4b5c-b0b9-329304892d9e
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Fatima, S. S., Wooldridge, M. J. and Jennings, N. R. (2002) The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium. 4th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Italy.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of the agents' information states on the negotiation equilibrium. This analysis is undertaken by examining a range of negotiation scenarios in which the amount of information that agents have about their opponent's parameters is systematically varied. For each such scenario, we show that a unique equilibrium exists and we investigate how the information states of agents influence the distribution property of the equilibrium solution. Our study shows the relative impacts of the opponent's parameters on the negotiation outcome. The results obtained are useful for decision making in situations where an agent has the option of choosing whom to negotiate with, from among a set of bargainers, on the basis of its information state. Our analysis also indicates which of its opponent's parameters an agent should learn in order to maximize its utility.

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Published date: 2002
Venue - Dates: 4th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Italy, 2002-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 256874
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/256874
PURE UUID: bb05832d-4981-4ff3-a2db-9f4dd3988613

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Date deposited: 27 Jun 2003
Last modified: 25 Nov 2019 21:09

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