An agenda based framework for multi-issues negotiation
An agenda based framework for multi-issues negotiation
This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent’s information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal.
1-45
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M
711a6c61-aec7-492d-bcf6-e08cb07d9286
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2004
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M
711a6c61-aec7-492d-bcf6-e08cb07d9286
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, S., Wooldridge, M and Jennings, N. R.
(2004)
An agenda based framework for multi-issues negotiation.
Artificial Intelligence, 152 (1), .
Abstract
This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent’s information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal.
More information
Published date: 2004
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 258578
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/258578
PURE UUID: ff72fa00-cb93-4596-9055-0ca0fa84655f
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Date deposited: 17 Nov 2003
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 06:11
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Contributors
Author:
S. Fatima
Author:
M Wooldridge
Author:
N. R. Jennings
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