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Bargaining with incomplete information

Bargaining with incomplete information
Bargaining with incomplete information
This paper analyses the process and outcomes of competitive bilateral negotiation for a model based on negotiation decision functions. Each agent has time constraints in the form of a deadline and a discounting factor. The importance of information possessed by participants is highlighted by exploring all possible incomplete information scenarios - both symmetric and asymmetric. In particular, we examine a range of negotiation scenarios in which the amount of information that agents have about their opponent's parameters is systematically varied. For each scenario, we determine the equilibrium solution and study its priorities. The main results of our study are as follows. Firstly, in some scenarios agreement takes place at the earlier deadline, while in others it takes place near the beginning of negotiation. Secondly, in some scenarios the price surplus is split equally between the agents while in others the entire price surplus goes to a single agent. Thirdly, for each possible scenario, the equilibrium outcome possesses the properties of uniqueness and symmetry - although it is not always Pareto optimal. Finally, we also show the relative impacts of the opponent's parameters on the bargaining outcome.
Negotiation, Game Theory, Incomplete Information
207-232
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Fatima, S., Wooldridge, M. and Jennings, N. R. (2005) Bargaining with incomplete information. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 44 (3), 207-232.

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper analyses the process and outcomes of competitive bilateral negotiation for a model based on negotiation decision functions. Each agent has time constraints in the form of a deadline and a discounting factor. The importance of information possessed by participants is highlighted by exploring all possible incomplete information scenarios - both symmetric and asymmetric. In particular, we examine a range of negotiation scenarios in which the amount of information that agents have about their opponent's parameters is systematically varied. For each scenario, we determine the equilibrium solution and study its priorities. The main results of our study are as follows. Firstly, in some scenarios agreement takes place at the earlier deadline, while in others it takes place near the beginning of negotiation. Secondly, in some scenarios the price surplus is split equally between the agents while in others the entire price surplus goes to a single agent. Thirdly, for each possible scenario, the equilibrium outcome possesses the properties of uniqueness and symmetry - although it is not always Pareto optimal. Finally, we also show the relative impacts of the opponent's parameters on the bargaining outcome.

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Published date: 2005
Keywords: Negotiation, Game Theory, Incomplete Information
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 258579
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/258579
PURE UUID: 763c8d38-850b-4882-ae4b-80538faf1b71

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Date deposited: 17 Nov 2003
Last modified: 24 Mar 2020 17:51

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