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A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations

A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations
A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations
This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish, rational agents and develop an auction mechanism which is efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational.We first discuss the necessary assumptions that any mechanism developed for this scenario should satisfy so as to achieve the aforementioned properties. We then present our mechanism and show how it is a generalisation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
3-540-29737-5
15-29
Springer
Dash, R. K.
422ba0d2-e8a4-445b-8c6b-c9c69702c6a1
Rogers, A.
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A.
Faratin, Peyman
Dash, R. K.
422ba0d2-e8a4-445b-8c6b-c9c69702c6a1
Rogers, A.
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A.
Faratin, Peyman

Dash, R. K., Rogers, A. and Jennings, N. R. (2004) A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations. Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A. and Faratin, Peyman (eds.) In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, AMEC 2004, New York, NY, USA, July 19, 2004, Revised Selected Papers. Springer. pp. 15-29 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish, rational agents and develop an auction mechanism which is efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational.We first discuss the necessary assumptions that any mechanism developed for this scenario should satisfy so as to achieve the aforementioned properties. We then present our mechanism and show how it is a generalisation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.

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More information

Published date: 2004
Additional Information: Event Dates: 2004
Venue - Dates: 6th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated E-Commerce (AMEC VI), United States, 2004-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 259551
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/259551
ISBN: 3-540-29737-5
PURE UUID: 46f8b585-cc10-4df5-91e1-aca639e93f5b

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 Jul 2004
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 09:21

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