Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings
Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponent’s. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda–procedure combinations and the optimal agenda–procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure.
1080-1087
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2004
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, S., Wooldridge, M. and Jennings, N. R.
(2004)
Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings.
3rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, New York, United States.
.
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Abstract
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponent’s. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda–procedure combinations and the optimal agenda–procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure.
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Published date: 2004
Additional Information:
Event Dates: 2004
Venue - Dates:
3rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, New York, United States, 2004-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 259552
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/259552
PURE UUID: 648c5693-c8bf-496b-bc05-906ea663ddee
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Date deposited: 29 Jul 2004
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 06:26
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Contributors
Author:
S. Fatima
Author:
M. Wooldridge
Author:
N. R. Jennings
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