Optimal Design Of English Auctions With Discrete Bid Levels
Optimal Design Of English Auctions With Discrete Bid Levels
In this paper we consider a common form of the English auction that is widely used in online Internet auctions. This discrete bid auction requires that the bidders may only submit bids which meet some predetermined discrete bid levels and, thus, there exists a minimal increment with which a bidder may raise the current price. In contrast, the academic literature of optimal auction design deals almost solely with continuous bid}auctions, and, as a result, there is little practical guidance as to how an auctioneer, who is seeking to maximise his revenue, should determine the number and value of these discrete bid levels. Consequently, in current online auctions, a fixed bid increment is commonly implemented, despite this having been shown to be optimal in only limited cases. Given this background, in this paper, our aim is to provide the optimal auction design for an English auction with discrete bid levels. To this end, we derive an expression that relates the expected revenue of the auction, to the actual discrete bid levels implemented, the number of bidders participating, and the distribution from which the bidders draw their private independent valuations. We use this expression to derive numerical and analytical solutions for the optimal bid levels in the general case. To compare these results with previous work, we apply these solutions to an example, where bidders' valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution. In this case, we prove that when there are more than two bidders, a decreasing bid increment is optimal and we show that the optimal reserve price of the auction increases as the number of bidders increases. Finally, we compare the properties of an auction in which optimal bid levels are used, to the standard auction approach which implements a fixed bid increment. In so doing, we show that the optimal bid levels result in improvements in the revenue, duration and allocative efficiency of the auction.
Discrete bids, English auction, optimal auction design
1-59593-049-3
98-107
David, Esther
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Rogers, Alex
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Schiff, Jeremy
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Kraus, Sarit
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Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2005
David, Esther
f26eef58-473c-451b-bbd7-ae39ebb09496
Rogers, Alex
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Schiff, Jeremy
e0b14e0e-0c8e-4f7f-94d7-0f7be3904095
Kraus, Sarit
2fc42767-f018-454e-b76c-bcbc86d48bfa
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
David, Esther, Rogers, Alex, Schiff, Jeremy, Kraus, Sarit and Jennings, N. R.
(2005)
Optimal Design Of English Auctions With Discrete Bid Levels.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), Vancouver, Canada.
05 - 08 Jun 2005.
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
In this paper we consider a common form of the English auction that is widely used in online Internet auctions. This discrete bid auction requires that the bidders may only submit bids which meet some predetermined discrete bid levels and, thus, there exists a minimal increment with which a bidder may raise the current price. In contrast, the academic literature of optimal auction design deals almost solely with continuous bid}auctions, and, as a result, there is little practical guidance as to how an auctioneer, who is seeking to maximise his revenue, should determine the number and value of these discrete bid levels. Consequently, in current online auctions, a fixed bid increment is commonly implemented, despite this having been shown to be optimal in only limited cases. Given this background, in this paper, our aim is to provide the optimal auction design for an English auction with discrete bid levels. To this end, we derive an expression that relates the expected revenue of the auction, to the actual discrete bid levels implemented, the number of bidders participating, and the distribution from which the bidders draw their private independent valuations. We use this expression to derive numerical and analytical solutions for the optimal bid levels in the general case. To compare these results with previous work, we apply these solutions to an example, where bidders' valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution. In this case, we prove that when there are more than two bidders, a decreasing bid increment is optimal and we show that the optimal reserve price of the auction increases as the number of bidders increases. Finally, we compare the properties of an auction in which optimal bid levels are used, to the standard auction approach which implements a fixed bid increment. In so doing, we show that the optimal bid levels result in improvements in the revenue, duration and allocative efficiency of the auction.
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Published date: 2005
Additional Information:
Event Dates: June 5-8, 2005
Venue - Dates:
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), Vancouver, Canada, 2005-06-05 - 2005-06-08
Keywords:
Discrete bids, English auction, optimal auction design
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 260441
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/260441
ISBN: 1-59593-049-3
PURE UUID: 3962f935-dba1-41f8-9785-6447c828f383
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Date deposited: 04 Feb 2005
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 06:38
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Contributors
Author:
Esther David
Author:
Alex Rogers
Author:
Jeremy Schiff
Author:
Sarit Kraus
Author:
N. R. Jennings
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