Trusted kernel-based coalition formation
Trusted kernel-based coalition formation
We define Trusted Kernel-based Coalition Formation as a novel extension to the traditional kernel-based coalition formation process which ensures agents choose the most reliable coalition partners and are guaranteed to obtain the payment they deserve. To this end, we develop an encryption-based communication protocol and a payment scheme which ensure that agents cannot manipulate the mechanism to their own benefit. Moreover, we integrate a generic trust model in the coalition formation process that permits the selection of the most reliable agents over repeated coalition games. We empirically evaluate our mechanism when iterated and show that, in the long run, it always chooses the coalition structure that has the maximum expected value and determines the payoffs that match their level of reliability.
989-996
Blankenburg, B.
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Dash, R.K.
688bf118-f42f-42bc-80f7-e915330f85d5
Ramchurn, S.D.
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Klusch, M.
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Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2005
Blankenburg, B.
32a63448-33f1-4c71-b581-dad2aa9dbba6
Dash, R.K.
688bf118-f42f-42bc-80f7-e915330f85d5
Ramchurn, S.D.
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Klusch, M.
335b3c7a-9960-46a5-919f-96a8627d7505
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Blankenburg, B., Dash, R.K., Ramchurn, S.D., Klusch, M. and Jennings, N. R.
(2005)
Trusted kernel-based coalition formation.
Proc. 4th Int Joint Conf on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Utrecht, Netherlands.
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We define Trusted Kernel-based Coalition Formation as a novel extension to the traditional kernel-based coalition formation process which ensures agents choose the most reliable coalition partners and are guaranteed to obtain the payment they deserve. To this end, we develop an encryption-based communication protocol and a payment scheme which ensure that agents cannot manipulate the mechanism to their own benefit. Moreover, we integrate a generic trust model in the coalition formation process that permits the selection of the most reliable agents over repeated coalition games. We empirically evaluate our mechanism when iterated and show that, in the long run, it always chooses the coalition structure that has the maximum expected value and determines the payoffs that match their level of reliability.
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Published date: 2005
Venue - Dates:
Proc. 4th Int Joint Conf on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Utrecht, Netherlands, 2005-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 260808
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/260808
PURE UUID: 62d00224-05c5-48fd-8c06-e1eb6215e08b
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Date deposited: 29 Apr 2005
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:22
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Contributors
Author:
B. Blankenburg
Author:
R.K. Dash
Author:
S.D. Ramchurn
Author:
M. Klusch
Author:
N. R. Jennings
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