A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents
A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents
Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer.
bargaining, game theory, evolutionary algorithms, software agents, e-commerce
187-205
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N.R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
April 2005
Fatima, S.
63e6d4ad-830e-4b14-baf4-90d7d34eca30
Wooldridge, M.
955b6c39-0d07-430e-b68d-b9a96d6e14e7
Jennings, N.R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, S., Wooldridge, M. and Jennings, N.R.
(2005)
A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents.
Artificial Intelligence Review, 23 (2), .
(doi:10.1007/s10462-004-6391-1).
Abstract
Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer.
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Published date: April 2005
Keywords:
bargaining, game theory, evolutionary algorithms, software agents, e-commerce
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 261146
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/261146
PURE UUID: 44e7e13d-6f0b-4458-8426-a7b39f0b9c1a
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Date deposited: 11 Aug 2005
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 06:48
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Author:
S. Fatima
Author:
M. Wooldridge
Author:
N.R. Jennings
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