Balancing Conflict and Cost in the Selection of Negotiation Opponents
Balancing Conflict and Cost in the Selection of Negotiation Opponents
Within the context of agent-to-agent purchase negotiations, a problem that has received little attention is that of identifying negotiation opponents in situations where the consequences of conflict and the ability to access resources dynamically vary. Such dynamism poses a number of problems that make it difficult to automate the identification of appropriate opponents. To that end, this paper describes a motivation-based opponent selection mechanism used by a buyer-agent to evaluate and select between an already identified set of seller-agents. Sellers are evaluated in terms of the amount of conflict they are expected to bring to a negotiation and the expected amount of cost a negotiation with them will entail. The mechanism allows trade-offs to be made between conflict and cost minimisation, and experimental results show the effectiveness of the approach.
Munroe, S
6fe0bb4e-b796-4ef1-bfd3-bb32b38019e0
Luck, M
a1457127-1c37-42d3-95a1-0cdef830f611
2005
Munroe, S
6fe0bb4e-b796-4ef1-bfd3-bb32b38019e0
Luck, M
a1457127-1c37-42d3-95a1-0cdef830f611
Munroe, S and Luck, M
(2005)
Balancing Conflict and Cost in the Selection of Negotiation Opponents.
The First International Workshop on Rational, Robust, and Secure Negotiations in Multi-Agent Systems, Utrecht, Netherlands.
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Within the context of agent-to-agent purchase negotiations, a problem that has received little attention is that of identifying negotiation opponents in situations where the consequences of conflict and the ability to access resources dynamically vary. Such dynamism poses a number of problems that make it difficult to automate the identification of appropriate opponents. To that end, this paper describes a motivation-based opponent selection mechanism used by a buyer-agent to evaluate and select between an already identified set of seller-agents. Sellers are evaluated in terms of the amount of conflict they are expected to bring to a negotiation and the expected amount of cost a negotiation with them will entail. The mechanism allows trade-offs to be made between conflict and cost minimisation, and experimental results show the effectiveness of the approach.
More information
Published date: 2005
Venue - Dates:
The First International Workshop on Rational, Robust, and Secure Negotiations in Multi-Agent Systems, Utrecht, Netherlands, 2005-01-01
Organisations:
Electronics & Computer Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 261789
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/261789
PURE UUID: 3764df2f-15ca-44f5-843c-8894787eaa7b
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Date deposited: 10 Feb 2006
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 06:59
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Contributors
Author:
S Munroe
Author:
M Luck
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