

# **A Distributed Calculus for Role-Based Access Control**

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# Contents

- the *RBAC96* model
- a *formal framework* for concurrent systems running under a RBAC policy: an extension of the  $\pi$ -calculus
- a *type system* ensuring that the specified policy is respected during computations
- a *bisimulation* to reason on systems' behaviours
- some useful applications of the theory:
  - finding the '*minimal*' *schema* to run a given system
  - *refining a system* to be run under a given schema
  - *minimize the number of users* in a given system.


# Access Control Models

*“Techniques used to define or restrict the rights of individuals or application programs to obtain data from, or place data onto, a storage device”*  
(American National Standard, Telecom Glossary)

3 well-known models:

- *Discretionary access control*
- *Mandatory access control*
- *Rôle-based access control*

# The Basic RBAC model



# RBAC

Role-Based Access Control is attracting increasing attention because:

- it reduces complexity and cost of security administration;
- permission's management is less error-prone;
- it is flexible (rôle's hierarchy, separation of duty, etc.);
- it is *least privilege*-oriented.

# Our work

Formalize the behaviour of concurrent and distributed systems under security policies defined in a RBAC fashion.

This is similar to

- the types developed in  $D\pi$  and  $KLAIM$  to implement discretionary access control
- the types developed for Boxed Ambients to implement mandatory access control

# The starting point: $\pi$ -calculus

Concurrent processes communicating on *channels*.

PROCESSES:  $P, Q ::= a(x).P \mid u\langle v \rangle.P \mid [u = v]P \mid (\nu a : R)P$   
 $\mid \mathbf{nil} \mid P|Q \mid !P$

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USER SESSIONS:  $r\{P\}_\rho$

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Channels are **allocated to users** to enable a distributed implementation

# Dynamic Semantics

It is given in the form of a *reduction relation*

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$$r\{\mathbf{yield} \ R.P\}_\rho \longmapsto r\{P\}_{\rho - \{R\}}$$

# RBAC schema

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- In our framework, the *RBAC schema* is a pair of finite relations  $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$ , such that

$$\mathcal{U} \subseteq_{\text{fin}} (\mathcal{N}_u \cup \mathcal{C}) \times \mathcal{R} \qquad \mathcal{P} \subseteq_{\text{fin}} \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{A}$$

# An Example

A banking scenario:

- two users, the client  $r$  and the bank  $s$
- cashiers are modelled as channels  $c_1, \dots, c_n$  of user  $s$
- the rôles available are `client` and `cashier`.

$$\begin{aligned} r\{\mathbf{role\ client}.enqueue^s\langle r\rangle.dequeue(z).z\langle req_1\rangle.\dots.z\langle req_k\rangle.z\langle stop\rangle.\mathbf{yield\ client}\}\rho \quad || \\ s\{(\nu free)(!enqueue(x).free(y).dequeue^x\langle y\rangle \quad | \quad \Pi_{i=1}^n free^s\langle c_i^s\rangle \quad | \\ \Pi_{i=1}^n !c_i(x).( [x = withdraw\_req] < handle withdraw request > \quad | \\ [x = dep\_req] < handle deposit request > \quad | \dots \quad | \\ [x = stop]free^s\langle c_i^s\rangle) )\}\rho' \end{aligned}$$

# Static Semantics - Types

- The syntax of types:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \textit{Types} & T ::= UT \mid C \\ \textit{User Types} & UT ::= \rho[a_1 : R_1(T_1), \dots, a_n : R_n(T_n)] \\ \textit{Channel Types} & C ::= R(T) \end{array}$$

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- $\Gamma; \rho \vdash_r^{\mathcal{P}} P$  states that  $P$  respects  $\Gamma$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  when it is run in a session of  $r$  with rôles  $\rho$  activated

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- A typing environment is a mapping from user names and variables to user types that respects the assignments in  $\mathcal{U}$

# Static Semantics - The Type System

An example: performing input actions.

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} (\text{T-INPUT}) \\ \Gamma \vdash a : R(T) \quad R \in \mathcal{P}(\rho) \quad \Gamma, x \mapsto T; \rho \vdash_r^{\mathcal{P}} P \end{array}}{\Gamma; \rho \vdash_r^{\mathcal{P}} a(x).P}$$



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**Type Safety:** Let  $A$  be a well-typed system for  $(u; \mathcal{P})$ . Then, whenever  $A \equiv (\nu \widetilde{a^r : R})(A' \parallel r\{b(x).P\}_\rho)$ , it holds that

- either  $b^r : S \in \widetilde{a^r : R}$  and  $S^? \in \mathcal{P}(\rho)$ ,
- or  $b^r \notin \widetilde{a^r}$  and  $S^? \in \mathcal{P}(\rho)$ , where  $\{S\} = u(b^r)$

# The Example Again

- The banking scenario again:
  - now each available operation is modelled as a different channel (*wdrw* = withdraw, *opn* = open account, *cc* = credit card request)
  - the communication among different channels requires different rôles
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$\vdash r\{\mathbf{role\ rich\_client}.enqueue^s\langle r\rangle.dequeue(z).z\langle creditcard\_req\rangle.cc^s\langle signature\rangle.z\langle stop\rangle\}\{\mathbf{rich}\}$

# LTS Semantics

- The labels of the LTS are derived from those of the  $\pi$ -calculus:

$$\mu ::= \tau \mid a^r n \mid a^r n : R \mid \bar{a}^r n \mid \bar{a}^r n : R$$

- the LTS relates *configurations*, i.e. pairs  $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright A$  made up of a RBAC schema  $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$  and a system  $A$ .
- Example:

$$\frac{\text{(LTS-F-INPUT)} \quad \mathcal{U}(a^r) = \{R\} \quad R^? \in \mathcal{P}(\rho) \quad n \notin \text{dom}(\mathcal{U})}{(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright r\{[a(x).P]\}_\rho \xrightarrow{a^r n : S} (\mathcal{U} \uplus \{n : S\}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright r\{[P[n/x]]\}_\rho}$$

# Bisimulation Equivalence

- We can define a standard bisimulation over the LTS
- **(Bisimulation)** It is a binary symmetric relation  $\mathcal{S}$  between configurations such that, if  $(D, E) \in \mathcal{S}$  and  $D \xrightarrow{\mu} D'$ , there exists a configuration  $E'$  such that  $E \xrightarrow{\hat{\mu}} E'$  and  $(D', E') \in \mathcal{S}$ . *Bisimilarity*,  $\approx$ , is the largest bisimulation.
- the bisimulation is adequate with respect to a standardly defined (typed) barbed congruence.

# Some Algebraic Laws

- if an action is not enabled, then the process cannot evolve:

$$r\{\alpha.P\}_\rho \approx \mathbf{0} \quad \text{if } \mathcal{P}(\rho) \text{ does not enable } \alpha$$

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- the user performing an output action is irrelevant; the only relevant aspect is the set of permissions activated when performing the action:

$$r\{b^s\langle n \rangle.\mathbf{nil}\}_\rho \approx t\{b^s\langle n \rangle.\mathbf{nil}\}_\rho$$

# Finding the “Minimal” Schema

- **Goal:** to look for a ‘minimal’ schema to execute a given system  $A$  while maintaining its behaviour w.r.t.  $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$
- **Algorithm:**
  - fix a *metrics* (number of rôles in the schema, permissions associated to each rôle, etc.)
  - define the set  $CONF_A = \{(\mathcal{U}'; \mathcal{P}') \triangleright A : (\mathcal{U}'; \mathcal{P}') \text{ is a RBAC schema}\}$  of configurations for  $A$
  - partition  $CONF_A$  w.r.t.  $\approx$  and consider the equivalence class containing  $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright A$
  - choose the minimal schema according to the chosen metrics

# Refining Systems

- **Goal:** to add rôle activations/deactivations within a system in such a way that the resulting system can be executed under a given schema  $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$
- we want a rôle to be active only when needed
- the refining procedure replaces any input/output prefix  $\alpha$  occurring in session  $r \{ \dots \}_\rho$  with the sequence of prefixes  $\text{role } \vec{R}. \alpha. \text{yield } \vec{R}$  where  $\vec{R}$  is formed by rôles assigned to  $r$ , activable when having activated  $\rho$  and enabling the execution of  $\alpha$
- the refining procedure adapts the type system
- **Improvement:** we can give an algorithm to minimize the number of these actions added

# Relocating Activities

- **Goal:** to transfer a process from one user to another without changing the overall system behaviour, in order to minimize the number of users in a system
- it is possible to infer axiomatically judgments of the form:

$$(u; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright r\{P\}_\rho \approx (u; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright s\{P\}_\rho$$

This judgment says that the process  $P$  can be executed by  $r$  and  $s$  without affecting the overall system behaviour.

- Thus, the session  $r\{P\}_\rho$  can be removed. If no other session of  $r$  is left in the system, then  $r$  is a useless user and is erased.

# Conclusion

- We have defined a **formal framework** for reasoning about concurrent systems running under an RBAC schema;
- a number of papers deal with the specification and verification of RBAC schema;
- **Future Works:**
  - extend the framework to deal with more complex RBAC models;
  - prove that bisimilarity is complete for barbed congruence;

<http://www.dsi.uniroma1.it/~gorla/publications.htm>