On the Incommensurability of Feeling and Doing: The Illusion of Free Will. (Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.)
On the Incommensurability of Feeling and Doing: The Illusion of Free Will. (Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.)
Wegner’s book is on perceptual and motor illusions of free well and agency, but free will is much more profoundly illusory than any of the phenomena reported in his book. We never do anything because we feel like it, even it is feels as if we do, because feelings cannot have any independent causal power, on pain of telekinetic dualism.
consciousness, free will, causation, explanation, correlation, volition, movement, agency
Harnad, Stevan
442ee520-71a1-4283-8e01-106693487d8b
March 2003
Harnad, Stevan
442ee520-71a1-4283-8e01-106693487d8b
Harnad, Stevan
(2003)
On the Incommensurability of Feeling and Doing: The Illusion of Free Will. (Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.)
Record type:
Monograph
(Project Report)
Abstract
Wegner’s book is on perceptual and motor illusions of free well and agency, but free will is much more profoundly illusory than any of the phenomena reported in his book. We never do anything because we feel like it, even it is feels as if we do, because feelings cannot have any independent causal power, on pain of telekinetic dualism.
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Published date: March 2003
Additional Information:
Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press. Multiply reviewed in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2004) 27: 649-692
Keywords:
consciousness, free will, causation, explanation, correlation, volition, movement, agency
Organisations:
Web & Internet Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 263811
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/263811
PURE UUID: cf1637a7-f951-4f50-83d6-7bf600861422
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Date deposited: 29 Mar 2007
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 02:48
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Author:
Stevan Harnad
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