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Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

In this paper, we examine the behavior of bidding agents that are in direct competition with the other participants in an auction setting. Thus the agents are not simply trying to maximize their own utility, rather they wish to maximize a weighted difference of their own gain to that of their competitors. By so doing, this work significantly extends the existing state-of-the-art results on single unit auctions, by generalizing to the multi-unit case. Specifically, our main result is the derivation of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria for these agents in both mth and (m+ 1)th price sealed bid auctions. Subsequently, we use these equilibria to examine the profits of different agents and show that aiming to beat the competition is more effective than pure self interest in any competitive setting. Finally, we examine how the auctioneer’s revenue is affected and find that the weight that agents place in minimizing the opponents’ profit determines whether the mth or the (m + 1)th price auction yields a higher revenue.

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Citation

Vetsikas, I.A. and Jennings, N. R. (2007) Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions. At 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems., United States. , pp. 702-709.

More information

Published date: 2007
Venue - Dates: 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems., United States, 2007-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 264227
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/264227
PURE UUID: 98e96b59-48e7-4661-a25a-dfea2b27f936

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 22 Jun 2007
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 07:38

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Contributors

Author: I.A. Vetsikas
Author: N. R. Jennings

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