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Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games

Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games
Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games
Weighted threshold games are coalitional games in which each player has a weight (intuitively corresponding to its voting power), and a coalition is successful if the sum of its weights exceeds a given threshold. Key questions in coalitional games include finding coalitions that are stable (in the sense that no member of the coalition has any rational incentive to leave it), and finding a division of payoffs to coalition members (an imputation) that is fair. We investigate the computational complexity of such questions for weighted threshold games. We study the core, the least core, and the nucleolus, distinguishing those problems that are polynomial-time computable from those that are NP-hard, and providing pseudopolynomial and approximation algorithms for the NP-hard problems.
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Goldberg, Leslie Ann
3620f64c-541d-4f41-a763-e23f50acf4c3
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Wooldridge, Michael
94674704-0392-4b93-83db-18198c2cfa3b
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Goldberg, Leslie Ann
3620f64c-541d-4f41-a763-e23f50acf4c3
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Wooldridge, Michael
94674704-0392-4b93-83db-18198c2cfa3b

Elkind, Edith, Goldberg, Leslie Ann, Goldberg, Paul W. and Wooldridge, Michael (2007) Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games. Twenty-Second Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-07), Vancouver, BC, Canada. 22 - 26 Jul 2007.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Weighted threshold games are coalitional games in which each player has a weight (intuitively corresponding to its voting power), and a coalition is successful if the sum of its weights exceeds a given threshold. Key questions in coalitional games include finding coalitions that are stable (in the sense that no member of the coalition has any rational incentive to leave it), and finding a division of payoffs to coalition members (an imputation) that is fair. We investigate the computational complexity of such questions for weighted threshold games. We study the core, the least core, and the nucleolus, distinguishing those problems that are polynomial-time computable from those that are NP-hard, and providing pseudopolynomial and approximation algorithms for the NP-hard problems.

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More information

Published date: 2007
Additional Information: Event Dates: July 22 - Jully 26, 2007
Venue - Dates: Twenty-Second Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-07), Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2007-07-22 - 2007-07-26
Organisations: Electronics & Computer Science

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 264315
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/264315
PURE UUID: d5bf703e-0e2e-4b32-b8f3-b76657fa77a7

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 17 Jul 2007
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 07:47

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Contributors

Author: Edith Elkind
Author: Leslie Ann Goldberg
Author: Paul W. Goldberg
Author: Michael Wooldridge

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