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Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting

Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting
Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.
129-142
Spriver-Verlag
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Somefun, D.J.A.
3667271d-f167-40b0-9b82-7f393324262b
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
Faratin, Peyman
Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A.
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Somefun, D.J.A.
3667271d-f167-40b0-9b82-7f393324262b
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
Faratin, Peyman
Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A.

Gerding, E.H., Somefun, D.J.A. and La Poutre, J.A. (2006) Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting. In, Faratin, Peyman and Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A. (eds.) Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, Springer Lecture Notes in AI, vol. 3435. Spriver-Verlag, pp. 129-142.

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.

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Published date: 2006
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 265623
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/265623
PURE UUID: d471f44e-cf02-4168-b505-9cd14bae4955
ORCID for E.H. Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X

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Date deposited: 28 Apr 2008 14:26
Last modified: 26 Jun 2020 00:29

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Contributors

Author: E.H. Gerding ORCID iD
Author: D.J.A. Somefun
Author: J.A. La Poutre
Editor: Peyman Faratin
Editor: Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar

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