Automated Bilateral Bargaining about Multiple Attributes in a One to Many Setting
Automated Bilateral Bargaining about Multiple Attributes in a One to Many Setting
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller agent negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyer agents in a bilateral fashion. In this setting, "fairness", which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller agent, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining is bilateral.
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Somefun, D.J.A.
3667271d-f167-40b0-9b82-7f393324262b
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
2004
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Somefun, D.J.A.
3667271d-f167-40b0-9b82-7f393324262b
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
Gerding, E.H., Somefun, D.J.A. and La Poutre, J.A.
(2004)
Automated Bilateral Bargaining about Multiple Attributes in a One to Many Setting.
6th International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC'04), Delft, The, Netherlands.
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Abstract
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller agent negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyer agents in a bilateral fashion. In this setting, "fairness", which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller agent, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining is bilateral.
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autombarg2004a.pdf
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Published date: 2004
Venue - Dates:
6th International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC'04), Delft, The, Netherlands, 2004-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 265624
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/265624
PURE UUID: 34bcac2f-e9a4-4f26-95d7-4d01e2a1bbbf
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Date deposited: 28 Apr 2008 15:13
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Author:
E.H. Gerding
Author:
D.J.A. Somefun
Author:
J.A. La Poutre
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