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Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions

Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions
Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions
When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of these issues have been examined individually for single-unit sealed-bid auctions. In this paper, we extend this analysis to the multi-unit case, and also analyze the multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in which a combination of these issues are present, for unit-demand bidders. This analysis constitutes the main contribution of this paper. We then demonstrate the usefulness in practice of this analysis; we show in simulations that taking into account all these issues allows the bidders to maximize their utility. Furthermore, using this analysis allows a seller to improve her revenue, i.e. by selecting the optimal reserve price. Introduction
182-189
Vetsikas, Ioannis A.
597e6abd-652c-4bd8-9c9c-62c8723fa3a2
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Vetsikas, Ioannis A.
597e6abd-652c-4bd8-9c9c-62c8723fa3a2
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Vetsikas, Ioannis A. and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2008) Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions. 23rd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), United States. 13 - 17 Jul 2008. pp. 182-189 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of these issues have been examined individually for single-unit sealed-bid auctions. In this paper, we extend this analysis to the multi-unit case, and also analyze the multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in which a combination of these issues are present, for unit-demand bidders. This analysis constitutes the main contribution of this paper. We then demonstrate the usefulness in practice of this analysis; we show in simulations that taking into account all these issues allows the bidders to maximize their utility. Furthermore, using this analysis allows a seller to improve her revenue, i.e. by selecting the optimal reserve price. Introduction

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More information

Published date: 15 April 2008
Additional Information: Event Dates: July 13-17, 2008
Venue - Dates: 23rd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), United States, 2008-07-13 - 2008-07-17
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 265652
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/265652
PURE UUID: ded7d4cf-ff37-4c40-ba0a-cf6cf33d4f7d

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Date deposited: 29 Apr 2008 16:14
Last modified: 19 Jul 2019 22:23

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Contributors

Author: Ioannis A. Vetsikas
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

University divisions

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