Protecting Secret Keys in a Compromised Computational System
Protecting Secret Keys in a Compromised Computational System
Software applications which run in a compromised environment and perform sensitive operations, such as providing a secure communication channel between two individuals, require protection in order to prevent them being run by an unauthorised adversary. This paper looks at how to build in some protection against an adversary who wishes to modify an application so that it no longer authenticates the user before running. This protection works against a casual observer, that is someone who has access only to standard debugging tools, visualisation tools, and decompilers. The tricks given in the paper do not work against an all powerful adversary. The paper treats the problem of protecting the code fragments dealing with authentication as equivalent to encrypting plaintext without revealing the secret key.
448-462
Mitchell, Bill
5d045751-9ef4-4375-9e89-dbae07c90049
2000
Mitchell, Bill
5d045751-9ef4-4375-9e89-dbae07c90049
Mitchell, Bill
(2000)
Protecting Secret Keys in a Compromised Computational System.
Third International Workshop, IH’99, Dresden, Germany.
29 Sep - 01 Oct 1999.
.
(doi:10.1007/10719724_31).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Software applications which run in a compromised environment and perform sensitive operations, such as providing a secure communication channel between two individuals, require protection in order to prevent them being run by an unauthorised adversary. This paper looks at how to build in some protection against an adversary who wishes to modify an application so that it no longer authenticates the user before running. This protection works against a casual observer, that is someone who has access only to standard debugging tools, visualisation tools, and decompilers. The tricks given in the paper do not work against an all powerful adversary. The paper treats the problem of protecting the code fragments dealing with authentication as equivalent to encrypting plaintext without revealing the secret key.
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Published date: 2000
Additional Information:
Event Dates: September 29 - October 1, 1999
Venue - Dates:
Third International Workshop, IH’99, Dresden, Germany, 1999-09-29 - 1999-10-01
Organisations:
Electronics & Computer Science, IT Innovation
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 266056
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/266056
PURE UUID: 569633d6-f618-485d-914d-43e6c2cb50be
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Date deposited: 04 Jul 2008 16:22
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 08:20
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Author:
Bill Mitchell
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