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Optimal strategies for bidding agents participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes

Optimal strategies for bidding agents participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes
Optimal strategies for bidding agents participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes
We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Finally, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market.
939-982
Gerding, Enrico
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Dash, Rajdeep
6c83d6ec-5b7d-4fd9-ab62-0394a8181ff4
Byde, Andrew
cdfddb83-7ad2-4274-a048-343b1c0783d8
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Dash, Rajdeep
6c83d6ec-5b7d-4fd9-ab62-0394a8181ff4
Byde, Andrew
cdfddb83-7ad2-4274-a048-343b1c0783d8
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Gerding, Enrico, Dash, Rajdeep, Byde, Andrew and Jennings, Nick (2008) Optimal strategies for bidding agents participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 32, 939-982. (doi:10.1613/jair.2544).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Finally, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market.

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Published date: 8 August 2008
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 266075
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/266075
PURE UUID: c7fcb881-cb62-4896-8fff-5b954d3a796a
ORCID for Enrico Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X

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Date deposited: 08 Jul 2008 18:27
Last modified: 20 Jul 2019 00:56

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Contributors

Author: Enrico Gerding ORCID iD
Author: Rajdeep Dash
Author: Andrew Byde
Author: Nick Jennings

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