Social Reward Shaping in the Prisoner's Dilemma


Babes, Monica, Munoz de Cote, Enrique and Littman, Michael L. (2008) Social Reward Shaping in the Prisoner's Dilemma At Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS).

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Description/Abstract

Reward shaping is a well-known technique applied to help reinforcement-learning agents converge more quickly to near-optimal behavior. In this paper, we introduce \emph{social reward shaping}, which is reward shaping applied in the multiagent-learning framework. We present preliminary experiments in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma setting that show that agents using social reward shaping appropriately can behave more effectively than other classical learning and non-learning strategies. In particular, we show that these agents can both lead ---encourage adaptive opponents to stably cooperate--- and follow ---adopt a best-response strategy when paired with a fixed opponent--- where better known approaches achieve only one of these objectives.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Poster)
Venue - Dates: Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2008-01-01
Keywords: Reinforcement Learning, leader/follower strategies, iterated prisoner's dilemma, game theory, subgame perfect equilibrium
Organisations: Electronics & Computer Science
ePrint ID: 266919
Date :
Date Event
2008Published
Date Deposited: 17 Nov 2008 14:36
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 18:56
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/266919

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