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Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs

Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs
Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs
We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coalitional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coalition structures. For simple games without coalition structures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core nonemptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.
85-90
Chalkiadakis, Georgios
50ef5d10-3ffe-4253-ac88-fad4004240e7
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Chalkiadakis, Georgios
50ef5d10-3ffe-4253-ac88-fad4004240e7
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Chalkiadakis, Georgios, Elkind, Edith and Jennings, Nick (2009) Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs. Proc 21st Int. Joint Conf on AI (IJCAI), United States. pp. 85-90 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coalitional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coalition structures. For simple games without coalition structures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core nonemptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.

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Published date: 2009
Venue - Dates: Proc 21st Int. Joint Conf on AI (IJCAI), United States, 2009-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 267260
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/267260
PURE UUID: 3c6419bd-3314-4ebd-a68a-105b0130dfd6

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Date deposited: 07 Apr 2009 15:11
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 07:06

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