Asynchronous Congestion Games
Asynchronous Congestion Games
We introduce a new class of games---asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. Each player's aim is to minimize his expected cost which is the sum of two terms---the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ACGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ACG.
1605-1608
Penn, Michal
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Polukarov, Maria
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Tennenholtz, Moshe
59ece0e5-2a43-411c-a491-3994bd42063e
May 2008
Penn, Michal
4b303716-075a-4f19-8889-a45120885942
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, Moshe
59ece0e5-2a43-411c-a491-3994bd42063e
Penn, Michal, Polukarov, Maria and Tennenholtz, Moshe
(2008)
Asynchronous Congestion Games.
AAMAS-08.
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We introduce a new class of games---asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. Each player's aim is to minimize his expected cost which is the sum of two terms---the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ACGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ACG.
Text
ACG_30Jan2008_AAMAS_short.pdf
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Published date: May 2008
Venue - Dates:
AAMAS-08, 2008-05-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 267876
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/267876
PURE UUID: 3962c901-08e7-4732-9a7b-2e3e545a3741
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Date deposited: 16 Sep 2009 19:07
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 09:01
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Contributors
Author:
Michal Penn
Author:
Maria Polukarov
Author:
Moshe Tennenholtz
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