The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Asynchronous Congestion Games

Asynchronous Congestion Games
Asynchronous Congestion Games
We introduce a new class of games---asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. Each player's aim is to minimize his expected cost which is the sum of two terms---the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ACGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ACG.
1605-1608
Penn, Michal
4b303716-075a-4f19-8889-a45120885942
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, Moshe
59ece0e5-2a43-411c-a491-3994bd42063e
Penn, Michal
4b303716-075a-4f19-8889-a45120885942
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, Moshe
59ece0e5-2a43-411c-a491-3994bd42063e

Penn, Michal, Polukarov, Maria and Tennenholtz, Moshe (2008) Asynchronous Congestion Games. AAMAS-08. pp. 1605-1608 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We introduce a new class of games---asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. Each player's aim is to minimize his expected cost which is the sum of two terms---the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ACGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ACG.

Text
ACG_30Jan2008_AAMAS_short.pdf - Version of Record
Download (133kB)

More information

Published date: May 2008
Venue - Dates: AAMAS-08, 2008-05-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 267876
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/267876
PURE UUID: 3962c901-08e7-4732-9a7b-2e3e545a3741

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 16 Sep 2009 19:07
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 09:01

Export record

Contributors

Author: Michal Penn
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Moshe Tennenholtz

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×