The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Setting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces: An Equilibrium Analysis

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

In this paper, we analyse competing double auction marketplaces that vie for traders and need to set appropriate fees to make a profit. Specifically, we show how competing marketplaces should set their fees by analysing the equilibrium behaviour of two competing marketplaces. In doing so, we focus on two different types of market fees: registration fees charged to traders when they enter the marketplace, and profit fees charged to traders when they make transactions. In more detail, given the market fees, we first derive equations to calculate the marketplaces' expected profits. Then we analyse the equilibrium charging behaviour of marketplaces in two different cases: where competing marketplaces can only charge the same type of fees and where competing marketplaces can charge different types of fees. This analysis provides insights which can be used to guide the charging behaviour of competing marketplaces. We also analyse whether two marketplaces can co-exist in equilibrium. We find that, when both marketplaces are limited to charging the same type of fees, traders will eventually converge to one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed, traders may converge to different marketplaces (i.e. multiple marketplaces can co-exist).

PDF AMEC.pdf - Other
Download (1MB)

Citation

Shi, Bing, Gerding, Enrico H., Vytelingum, Perukrishnen and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2010) Setting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces: An Equilibrium Analysis At 12th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2010), Canada. , pp. 85-98.

More information

Published date: 10 May 2010
Additional Information: Event Dates: 10 May
Venue - Dates: 12th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2010), Canada, 2010-05-10
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 268589
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/268589
PURE UUID: 9d7f22c6-f886-4702-8e2b-a441a8881a4b

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 11 Mar 2010 16:33
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 06:52

Export record

Contributors

Author: Bing Shi
Author: Enrico H. Gerding
Author: Perukrishnen Vytelingum
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

University divisions


Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×