

# Data provenance in a distributed calculus



# Motivation



- ❖ (Meta)data is almost entirely neglected in the process calculi literature
- ❖ Track data provenance both for its important applications and as an challenging exercise in modelling (meta)data. We aim at simplicity:
  - ❖ data annotations representing provenance
  - ❖ structure, interpretation and management of provenance information
  - ❖ provenance tracking
- ❖ Provenance-based security (aspects: trust + data confidentiality and privacy)
  - ❖ Example: photography competition
- ❖ The overall ambition is to underpin practical development, like trust-policy languages and protocols, and provenance-middleware

# Provenance model

Annotated data



$v : K$

# Provenance model

Annotated data



Annotated value




# Provenance model

Annotated data



Annotated value



$v : K$

Value


Actual data

# Provenance model

Annotated data



Annotated value



Value

Actual data

Provenance

Meta information  
describing the origin  
of the value

# Provenance model

Structure and interpretation of provenance


$$v : \varepsilon ; a!K_1 ; b?K_2 ; b!(\varepsilon ; c!K_3, b?K_4) ; \dots$$

# Provenance model

Structure and interpretation of provenance




Value

Provenance

$$v : \varepsilon ; a!K_1 ; b?K_2 ; b!(\varepsilon ; c!K_3, b?K_4) ; \dots$$

# Provenance model

Structure and interpretation of provenance



“Operations” that were performed on the value. They record the principals that “influenced” the value and how.

# Provenance model

Structure and interpretation of provenance



$\varepsilon$  (empty provenance)

denotes value  $v$  originated here

$v : \varepsilon$

# Provenance model

Structure and interpretation of provenance



$\varepsilon$  (empty provenance)

denotes value  $v$  originated here

$v : \varepsilon ; a!K_1$

It was sent by  $a$  on a  
channel with  
provenance  $K_1$

# Provenance model

Structure and interpretation of provenance



$\varepsilon$  (empty provenance)

denotes value  $v$  originated here

$v : \varepsilon ; a!K_1 ; b?K_2$

It was sent by  $a$  on a  
channel with  
provenance  $\kappa_1$

Was then received by  $b$  on a  
channel with provenance  $\kappa_2$

# Provenance model

## Structure and interpretation of provenance



$\varepsilon$  (empty provenance)  
denotes value  $v$  originated here

And then sent by  $b$  on a channel  
that  $b$  received from  $c$ ...

$v : \varepsilon ; a!K_1 ; b?K_2 ; b!(\varepsilon ; c!K_3, b?K_4) ; \dots$

It was sent by  $a$  on a  
channel with  
provenance  $\kappa_1$

Was then received by  $b$  on a  
channel with provenance  $\kappa_2$

# Confidentiality in provenance systems



- ❖ Data may be public, yet its provenance confidential, or vice versa
- ❖ Principals who may access data are not necessarily the same as those who may access its provenance
- ❖ In general, fine grained access control over provenance “histories” is needed as different parts of it have different sensitivity


Security requirements of  
data

$\neq$

Security requirements of its  
provenance

# Hiding provenance trees


Example: photography competition



c: Contestant  
a: Administrator  
j: Judge

# Hiding provenance trees


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
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
# Hiding provenance trees

Example: photography competition




# Hiding provenance trees

Example: photography competition




# Hiding provenance trees

Example: photography competition




# Hiding provenance trees

Example: photography competition



# Hiding provenance trees

Example: photography competition



# Confidentiality in provenance systems

## a promising approach



- ❖ One value, multiple **views**
- ❖ Different principals have different views of the same provenance list based on their privileges

$$entry : \varepsilon; c!K_s; a?K'_s; a!K'_r; j?K''_r; j!K''_n; a?K'_n; a!K'_m$$

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
*a*

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*j*

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