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Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting

Meir, Reshef, Polukarov, Maria, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2010) Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting At Proc 24th National Conference on AI (AAAI), United States. , pp. 823-828.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Other)


Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' individual preferences over available alternatives may vary, and they may try to reconcile these differences by voting. Based on the fact that agents may have incentives to vote strategically and misreport their real preferences, a number of recent papers have explored different possibilities for avoiding or eliminating such manipulations. In contrast to most prior work, this paper focuses on convergence of strategic behavior to a decision from which no voter will want to deviate. We consider scenarios where voters cannot coordinate their actions, but are allowed to change their vote after observing the current outcome. We focus on the Plurality voting rule, and study the conditions under which this iterative game is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium (i.e., to a decision that is stable against further unilateral manipulations). We show for the first time how convergence depends on the exact attributes of the game, such as the tie-breaking scheme, and on assumptions regarding agents' weights and strategies.

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Published date: July 2010
Venue - Dates: Proc 24th National Conference on AI (AAAI), United States, 2010-07-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity


Local EPrints ID: 270852
PURE UUID: 1fa29d0d-1c15-4a63-b367-b6e343019723

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Date deposited: 19 Apr 2010 14:48
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 06:50

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Author: Reshef Meir
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

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