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Cooperatives of Distributed Energy Resources for Efficient Virtual Power Plants

Cooperatives of Distributed Energy Resources for Efficient Virtual Power Plants
Cooperatives of Distributed Energy Resources for Efficient Virtual Power Plants
The creation of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) has been suggested in recent years as the means for achieving the cost-efficient integration of the many distributed energy resources (DERs) that are starting to emerge in the electricity network. In this work, we contribute to the development of VPPs by offering a game-theoretic perspective to the problem. Specifically, we design cooperatives (or “cooperative VPPs”—CVPPs) of rational autonomous DER-agents representing small-to-medium size renewable electricity producers, which coalesce to profitably sell their energy to the electricity grid. By so doing, we help to counter the fact that individual DERs are often excluded from the wholesale energy market due to their perceived inefficiency and unreliability. We discuss the issues surrounding the emergence of such cooperatives, and propose a pricing mechanism with certain desirable properties. Specifically, our mechanism guarantees that CVPPs have the incentive to truthfully report to the grid accurate estimates of their electricity production, and that larger rather than smaller CVPPs form; this promotes CVPP efficiency and reliability. In addition, we propose a scheme to allocate payments within the cooperative, and show that, given this scheme and the pricing mechanism, the allocation is in the core and, as such, no subset of members has a financial incentive to break away from the CVPP. Moreover, we develop an analytical tool for quantifying the uncertainty about DER production estimates, and distinguishing among different types of errors regarding such estimates. We then utilize this tool to devise protocols to manage CVPP membership. Finally, we demonstrate these ideas through a simulation that uses real-world data.
energy and emissions, coalition formation, simulation, incentives for cooperation
787-794
Chalkiadakis, Georgios
50ef5d10-3ffe-4253-ac88-fad4004240e7
Robu, Valentin
36b30550-208e-48d4-8f0e-8ff6976cf566
Kota, Ramachandra
a2b6c536-fa54-4d9e-8f3d-c3fb66f79b86
Rogers, Alex
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Chalkiadakis, Georgios
50ef5d10-3ffe-4253-ac88-fad4004240e7
Robu, Valentin
36b30550-208e-48d4-8f0e-8ff6976cf566
Kota, Ramachandra
a2b6c536-fa54-4d9e-8f3d-c3fb66f79b86
Rogers, Alex
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Chalkiadakis, Georgios, Robu, Valentin, Kota, Ramachandra, Rogers, Alex and Jennings, Nick (2011) Cooperatives of Distributed Energy Resources for Efficient Virtual Power Plants. The Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Taiwan. 02 - 06 May 2011. pp. 787-794 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

The creation of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) has been suggested in recent years as the means for achieving the cost-efficient integration of the many distributed energy resources (DERs) that are starting to emerge in the electricity network. In this work, we contribute to the development of VPPs by offering a game-theoretic perspective to the problem. Specifically, we design cooperatives (or “cooperative VPPs”—CVPPs) of rational autonomous DER-agents representing small-to-medium size renewable electricity producers, which coalesce to profitably sell their energy to the electricity grid. By so doing, we help to counter the fact that individual DERs are often excluded from the wholesale energy market due to their perceived inefficiency and unreliability. We discuss the issues surrounding the emergence of such cooperatives, and propose a pricing mechanism with certain desirable properties. Specifically, our mechanism guarantees that CVPPs have the incentive to truthfully report to the grid accurate estimates of their electricity production, and that larger rather than smaller CVPPs form; this promotes CVPP efficiency and reliability. In addition, we propose a scheme to allocate payments within the cooperative, and show that, given this scheme and the pricing mechanism, the allocation is in the core and, as such, no subset of members has a financial incentive to break away from the CVPP. Moreover, we develop an analytical tool for quantifying the uncertainty about DER production estimates, and distinguishing among different types of errors regarding such estimates. We then utilize this tool to devise protocols to manage CVPP membership. Finally, we demonstrate these ideas through a simulation that uses real-world data.

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More information

Published date: May 2011
Additional Information: Event Dates: 2-6 May 2011
Venue - Dates: The Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Taiwan, 2011-05-02 - 2011-05-06
Keywords: energy and emissions, coalition formation, simulation, incentives for cooperation
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 271950
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/271950
PURE UUID: 028a2188-79c7-4149-ad9f-cf38fffbe91f

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Date deposited: 27 Jan 2011 00:07
Last modified: 11 Nov 2019 21:04

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