Mechanism Design for Federated Sponsored Search Auctions
Mechanism Design for Federated Sponsored Search Auctions
Recently there is an increase in smaller, domain-specific search engines that scour the deep web finding information that general-purpose engines are unable to discover. These search engines play a crucial role in the new generation of search paradigms where federated search engines (FSEs) integrate search results from heterogeneous sources. In this paper we pose, for the first time, the problem to design a revenue mechanism that ensures profits both to individual search engines and FSEs as a mechanism design problem. To this end, we extend the sponsored search auction models and we discuss possibility and impossibility results on the implementation of an incentive compatible mechanism. Specifically, we develop an execution-contingent VCG (where payments depend on the observed click behavior) that satisfies both individual rationality and weak budget balance in expectation.
Ceppi, Sofia
d6dd2f1c-c7a4-4ec1-b3d7-82b433ca5bf8
Gatti, Nicola
aceed282-d524-4b1d-9ad8-0685eac20d3a
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
August 2011
Ceppi, Sofia
d6dd2f1c-c7a4-4ec1-b3d7-82b433ca5bf8
Gatti, Nicola
aceed282-d524-4b1d-9ad8-0685eac20d3a
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Ceppi, Sofia, Gatti, Nicola and Gerding, Enrico
(2011)
Mechanism Design for Federated Sponsored Search Auctions.
The Twenty-Fifth Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-11), San Francisco.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Other)
Abstract
Recently there is an increase in smaller, domain-specific search engines that scour the deep web finding information that general-purpose engines are unable to discover. These search engines play a crucial role in the new generation of search paradigms where federated search engines (FSEs) integrate search results from heterogeneous sources. In this paper we pose, for the first time, the problem to design a revenue mechanism that ensures profits both to individual search engines and FSEs as a mechanism design problem. To this end, we extend the sponsored search auction models and we discuss possibility and impossibility results on the implementation of an incentive compatible mechanism. Specifically, we develop an execution-contingent VCG (where payments depend on the observed click behavior) that satisfies both individual rationality and weak budget balance in expectation.
More information
Published date: August 2011
Additional Information:
Event Dates: August 2011
Venue - Dates:
The Twenty-Fifth Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-11), San Francisco, 2011-08-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 272261
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272261
PURE UUID: 3fe7de5e-872b-4689-ae9d-06d53b9da3ed
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Date deposited: 06 May 2011 10:00
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Contributors
Author:
Sofia Ceppi
Author:
Nicola Gatti
Author:
Enrico Gerding
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