

# Explaining Cooperative Groups via Social Niche Construction

Simon T. Powers, Jason Noble,  
Jordi Arranz and Manuel de Pinedo

Natural Systems group, University of  
Southampton  
Departamento de Filosofía I, Universidad de  
Granada

# *The Problem of Cooperation*

- Cooperative behaviours: benefit others, at an apparent cost to self (weak and strong altruism).
- Public goods production, e.g., alarm calls in birds, extracellular substance production by micro-organisms.
- Problem: Selfish Cheats – individuals that reap the benefits of others' cooperation, without themselves paying the cost.

# *Population Structure is the Key to Cooperation*

- If interactions are not freely-mixed, individually costly cooperative behaviours can evolve.
- Relatedness, or between-group variance, measures deviation from random interactions.
- Key is group structure: trait-groups, sibling groups, demes...

# *The Evolution of Cooperation*

- Most models of cooperation assume a fixed population structure, i.e., a fixed relatedness
  - Fixed group size
  - Fixed migration rate
- They then show the level of cooperation that is evolutionarily stable given this structure.
- So cooperation is simply the adaptation of organisms' social behaviour to the social environment they find themselves in.

# Does this really explain the origin of cooperation?

- Cooperation depends upon population structure, but where does this population structure come from?
- Some population structure is provided by the physical environment:
  - Viscous populations
  - Rocky shores
- But, population structure is also the product of individual genetic traits, so can itself evolve:
  - Group size preference
  - Dispersal distance
  - Degree of polygamy

# *The Origin of Sociality*

Pre-transition population structure	Post-transition structure
Replicating molecules	Replicators encapsulated in protocells
Independent replication of genes	Whole chromosomes replicated
Single cells	Multicellular organisms
Solitary organisms	Sociality


- Maynard Smith & Szathmáry's (1995) "Major Transitions"
- The origin of sociality involves a change in both social behaviour and population structure.
- How do organisms create higher levels of selection?
- So we cannot just model the evolution of cooperation on the back of a fixed structure.

# *Social Niche Construction*

- So the strength of kin / group selection can itself evolve.
- Organisms can create a population structure that selects for cooperative or selfish behaviour: Social Niche Construction.



**Positive feedback  
between social  
behaviour and  
population  
structure**




# *An Illustrative Model: the evolution of group size*


- Individuals live in social groups founded by a number of individuals sampled randomly from the global population.
- Small groups have higher between-group variance and favour cooperation.
- Large groups have lower between-group variance and favour selfish behaviour.
- Consider organisms that have genetic traits for both group size preference and social behaviour.
- No direct selection on group size preference.

# *The Coevolution of Group Size and Social Behaviour*

**Evolution of Population Structure**



**Evolution of Social Behaviour**



# *Why Does Population Structure Evolve to Support Cooperation?*

- Small groups select for greater cooperation than large groups.
- Because the individuals in small groups are those with the small size preference allele, positive linkage disequilibrium is generated between the **cooperative** and **small size** alleles.
- Since cooperation raises mean fitness, direct selection on social behaviour creates indirect selection for small group size.
- Positive feedback: As small groups increase in frequency, they create greater selection for cooperation.

# *Generality*

- Argument applies to any heritable trait that affects its bearers population structure, if:
  - individuals with a heritable population structure preference are able to live in that population structure.
  - the population structures select for different amounts of cooperation.
- This component of selection on population structure, arising from social behaviour, must always favour structures that support cooperative rather than selfish behaviour.

# *Philosophical Implications*

- Explaining within-group social behaviours becomes part of the same project as explaining the origin of the groups themselves.
- We cannot understand social behaviour in humans without understanding human population-structuring traits.
- The creation of cooperative groups by the evolving individuals parallels negotiation of a social contract.
- Multiple levels of explanation.

# *Conclusion: Cooperation Drives Population Structure*

- Most theories of cooperation assume a static population structure.
- But to explain the origin of cooperation, we need to explain the origin of the structures that support it.
- Not only do some population structures select for cooperation, but cooperative behaviour drives indirect selection for the structures that support it.

# References

- Powers S.T. (2010), Social Niche Construction: Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperative Group Formation, Ph.D. thesis, University of Southampton
- Powers S.T. and Watson R.A. (2009), Evolution of individual group size preference can increase group-level selection and cooperation, Proceedings of ECAL 2009, Springer.