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The evolution of cooperation on correlated payoff landscapes

Brede, Markus (2011) The evolution of cooperation on correlated payoff landscapes Artificial Life, 17, (4), Autumn Issue, pp. 365-373. (doi:10.1162/artl_a_00044).

Record type: Article


We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner?s dilemma game on time-invariant heterogeneous payoff landscapes on regular and heterogeneous networks. Correlations in the landscape structure and their implications for the evolution of cooperation are investigated. On regular networks we find that negatively and neutrally correlated payoff landscapes strongly enhance cooperation, while positively correlated landscapes may suppress the evolution of cooperation. On heterogeneous networks, cooperation is facilitated if payoff stochasticity is positively correlated with network heterogeneity and may be suppressed otherwise.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 19 September 2011
Published date: 2011
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity


Local EPrints ID: 272861
PURE UUID: 596bf3d2-3049-4c18-a5d1-06ecea8ad4fb

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Date deposited: 26 Sep 2011 16:27
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 06:19

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