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Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and Beyond

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Many scenarios where participants hold private information require payments to encourage truthful revelation. Some of these scenarios have no natural residual claimant who would absorb the budget surplus or cover the deficit. Faltings proposed the idea of excluding one agent uniformly at random and making him the residual claimant. Based on this idea, we propose two classes of public good mechanisms and derive optimal ones within each class: Faltings' mechanism is optimal in one of the classes. We then move on to general mechanism design settings, where we prove guarantees on the social welfare achieved by Faltings' mechanism. Finally, we analyze a modification of the mechanism where budget balance is achieved without designating any agent as the residual claimant.

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Citation

Guo, Mingyu, Naroditskiy, Victor, Conitzer, Vincent, Greenwald, Amy and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2011) Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and Beyond At The 7th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Singapore. 11 - 14 Dec 2011. , pp. 158-169.

More information

Submitted date: 28 September 2011
Published date: 2011
Additional Information: Event Dates: December 11 - December 14, 2011
Venue - Dates: The 7th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Singapore, 2011-12-11 - 2011-12-14
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 272897
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272897
PURE UUID: 23eea1a0-a6b7-4905-b92d-afcc57bcbb91

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 30 Sep 2011 10:55
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 06:19

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Contributors

Author: Mingyu Guo
Author: Victor Naroditskiy
Author: Vincent Conitzer
Author: Amy Greenwald
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

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