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A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation in Anonymity Networks

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation in Anonymity Networks
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation in Anonymity Networks
Anonymity systems are of paramount and growing importance in communication networks. They rely on users to cooperate to the realisation of an effective anonymity service. Yet, existing systems are marred by the action of ‘selfish’ free-loaders, so that several cooperation incentives are being proposed. We propose a game-theoretic model of incentives in anonymity networks based on parametric utility functions, which make it flexible, adaptable and realistic.We then use the framework to analyse the cost of cooperation and the performance of the gold-star incentive scheme in the Crowds protocol.
anonymity privacy security
Yang, Mu
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Sassone, Vladimiro
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Hamadou, Sardaouna
a3681473-229f-423a-8113-b466cd1b5e98
Degano, Pierpaolo
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Guttman, Joshua
547236ea-a129-4afb-b94b-05ffd197a47e
Yang, Mu
5b63ff7c-7560-423e-ac2c-e8e19396da7c
Sassone, Vladimiro
df7d3c83-2aa0-4571-be94-9473b07b03e7
Hamadou, Sardaouna
a3681473-229f-423a-8113-b466cd1b5e98
Degano, Pierpaolo
c1de55c6-adbb-411c-b2c2-bd7f97781a33
Guttman, Joshua
547236ea-a129-4afb-b94b-05ffd197a47e

Yang, Mu, Sassone, Vladimiro and Hamadou, Sardaouna , Degano, Pierpaolo and Guttman, Joshua (eds.) (2012) A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation in Anonymity Networks. Proceedings of Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2012 (a member of ETAPS 2012), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (ARCoSS). (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

Anonymity systems are of paramount and growing importance in communication networks. They rely on users to cooperate to the realisation of an effective anonymity service. Yet, existing systems are marred by the action of ‘selfish’ free-loaders, so that several cooperation incentives are being proposed. We propose a game-theoretic model of incentives in anonymity networks based on parametric utility functions, which make it flexible, adaptable and realistic.We then use the framework to analyse the cost of cooperation and the performance of the gold-star incentive scheme in the Crowds protocol.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 3 January 2012
Additional Information: Event Dates: March 2012
Venue - Dates: Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2012 (member of ETAPS 2012), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ARCoSS, Tallin, Estonia, 2012-03-01
Keywords: anonymity privacy security
Organisations: Web & Internet Science

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 273091
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/273091
PURE UUID: 48e27f63-b443-442c-a712-e521349299c4

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Date deposited: 04 Jan 2012 11:34
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 10:19

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Contributors

Author: Mu Yang
Author: Vladimiro Sassone
Author: Sardaouna Hamadou
Editor: Pierpaolo Degano
Editor: Joshua Guttman

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