A Scoring Rule-Based Mechanism for Aggregate Demand Prediction in the Smart Grid
A Scoring Rule-Based Mechanism for Aggregate Demand Prediction in the Smart Grid
This paper presents a novel scoring rule-based strictly dominant incentive compatible mechanism that encourages agents to produce costly estimates of future events and report them truthfully to a centre. Whereas prior work has assumed a fixed budget for payment towards agents, this work makes use of prior information held by the centre and assumes a budget that is determined by the savings made through the use of the agents' information over the centre's own prior information. This mechanism is compared to a simple benchmark mechanism wherein the savings are divided equally among all home agents, and a cooperative solution wherein agents act to maximise social welfare. Empirical analysis is performed in which the mechanism is applied to a simulation of the smart grid whereby an aggregator agent must use home agents' information to optimally purchase electricity. It is shown that this mechanism achieves up to 77% of the social welfare achieved by the cooperative solution.
661-668
Rose, Harry
48024eb8-587d-423e-962f-c581a069921c
Rogers, Alex
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
June 2012
Rose, Harry
48024eb8-587d-423e-962f-c581a069921c
Rogers, Alex
f9130bc6-da32-474e-9fab-6c6cb8077fdc
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Rose, Harry, Rogers, Alex and Gerding, Enrico H.
(2012)
A Scoring Rule-Based Mechanism for Aggregate Demand Prediction in the Smart Grid.
The 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), Valencia, Spain.
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
This paper presents a novel scoring rule-based strictly dominant incentive compatible mechanism that encourages agents to produce costly estimates of future events and report them truthfully to a centre. Whereas prior work has assumed a fixed budget for payment towards agents, this work makes use of prior information held by the centre and assumes a budget that is determined by the savings made through the use of the agents' information over the centre's own prior information. This mechanism is compared to a simple benchmark mechanism wherein the savings are divided equally among all home agents, and a cooperative solution wherein agents act to maximise social welfare. Empirical analysis is performed in which the mechanism is applied to a simulation of the smart grid whereby an aggregator agent must use home agents' information to optimally purchase electricity. It is shown that this mechanism achieves up to 77% of the social welfare achieved by the cooperative solution.
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AAMAS_2012_poster.pdf
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Published date: June 2012
Venue - Dates:
The 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), Valencia, Spain, 2012-06-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 273139
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/273139
PURE UUID: c10bf68f-ca5d-4285-8470-a652a9a0a736
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Date deposited: 23 Jan 2012 14:39
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Contributors
Author:
Harry Rose
Author:
Alex Rogers
Author:
Enrico H. Gerding
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