On a game in manufacturing
On a game in manufacturing
We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.
game theory, Nash equilibrium, game of timing, non-zero sum game
237-249
Baston, V.J.
d6955a5c-e9e9-4ef8-a7d0-70aa54afe998
Garnaev, A.Y.
141a7f4c-075e-456a-a9a0-0aa651b683ef
2000
Baston, V.J.
d6955a5c-e9e9-4ef8-a7d0-70aa54afe998
Garnaev, A.Y.
141a7f4c-075e-456a-a9a0-0aa651b683ef
Baston, V.J. and Garnaev, A.Y.
(2000)
On a game in manufacturing.
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 52 (2), .
(doi:10.1007/s001860000075).
Abstract
We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.
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Published date: 2000
Keywords:
game theory, Nash equilibrium, game of timing, non-zero sum game
Organisations:
Operational Research
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 29733
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/29733
ISSN: 1432-2994
PURE UUID: 9f3a5fb4-40d5-4ce4-913a-86d30a5a23e8
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Date deposited: 20 Jul 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:34
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Author:
V.J. Baston
Author:
A.Y. Garnaev
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