On a game in manufacturing

Baston, V.J. and Garnaev, A.Y. (2000) On a game in manufacturing Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 52, (2), pp. 237-249. (doi:10.1007/s001860000075).


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We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1007/s001860000075
ISSNs: 1432-2994 (print)
Keywords: game theory, Nash equilibrium, game of timing, non-zero sum game
Organisations: Operational Research
ePrint ID: 29733
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:21
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/29733

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