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Proportional representation with citizen candidates

Proportional representation with citizen candidates
Proportional representation with citizen candidates
We construct a simple model incorporating both citizen-candidates and proportional representation and investigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and pure policy motivations, and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences. The idea of citizen-candidates, developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate(1997), endogenises the decision to stand as a candidate and allows explicit study of the number and type of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea of proportional representation allows a more flexible relationship between the pattern of votes cast and the final policy outcome, and also provides a richer model of political representation. Our discussion points to the widespread possibility of equilibria involving non-median policy outcomes; provides insights into the relationship between proportional representation and the equilibrium number of candidates; and also provides an explicit account of the trade-off between candidate benefits distributed on a winner-take-all basis and those that are mediated through proportional representation
0048-5829
205-230
Hamlin, Alan
f7d1bc67-817f-4c69-b8a0-6ea5725e664f
Hjortlund, Michael
07ba7ce5-8549-41e8-9368-9962ead2c1ad
Hamlin, Alan
f7d1bc67-817f-4c69-b8a0-6ea5725e664f
Hjortlund, Michael
07ba7ce5-8549-41e8-9368-9962ead2c1ad

Hamlin, Alan and Hjortlund, Michael (2000) Proportional representation with citizen candidates. Public Choice, 103 (3-4), 205-230. (doi:10.1023/A:1005086519491).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We construct a simple model incorporating both citizen-candidates and proportional representation and investigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and pure policy motivations, and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences. The idea of citizen-candidates, developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate(1997), endogenises the decision to stand as a candidate and allows explicit study of the number and type of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea of proportional representation allows a more flexible relationship between the pattern of votes cast and the final policy outcome, and also provides a richer model of political representation. Our discussion points to the widespread possibility of equilibria involving non-median policy outcomes; provides insights into the relationship between proportional representation and the equilibrium number of candidates; and also provides an explicit account of the trade-off between candidate benefits distributed on a winner-take-all basis and those that are mediated through proportional representation

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Published date: June 2000

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 32944
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32944
ISSN: 0048-5829
PURE UUID: 3e204d4b-b7f1-4e8a-b582-389655f126fc

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Date deposited: 18 Jul 2006
Last modified: 19 Jul 2018 16:31

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Contributors

Author: Alan Hamlin
Author: Michael Hjortlund

University divisions

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