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Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium

Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium
Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium
Recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a non-empty core in majority voting games in two dimensional policy spaces. We generalise this result to the n-dimensional case, and provide a discussion of multi-cameralism. Bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria by institutionalising opposition between mutually oriented median voters, this provides a clear link with the standard median voter model and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism.
An earlier version of this paper (Brennan and Hamlin, 1990), written in ignorance of the work of Hammond and Miller (1987, 1990), benefited from comments at the Public Choice Society meetings, Tucson; the European Public Choice Society meetings, Meersburg; the Center for Study of Public Choice, and the Universities of Chicago and Oxford. Hamlin is grateful for the support of visiting fellowships at ANU and All Souls College, Oxford.
0048-5829
169-179
Brennan, Geoffrey
f5def8d6-7caf-4304-80a6-9ca276ee91b6
Hamlin, Alan
f7d1bc67-817f-4c69-b8a0-6ea5725e664f
Brennan, Geoffrey
f5def8d6-7caf-4304-80a6-9ca276ee91b6
Hamlin, Alan
f7d1bc67-817f-4c69-b8a0-6ea5725e664f

Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan (1992) Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium. Public Choice, 74 (2), 169-179. (doi:10.1007/BF00140765).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a non-empty core in majority voting games in two dimensional policy spaces. We generalise this result to the n-dimensional case, and provide a discussion of multi-cameralism. Bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria by institutionalising opposition between mutually oriented median voters, this provides a clear link with the standard median voter model and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism.
An earlier version of this paper (Brennan and Hamlin, 1990), written in ignorance of the work of Hammond and Miller (1987, 1990), benefited from comments at the Public Choice Society meetings, Tucson; the European Public Choice Society meetings, Meersburg; the Center for Study of Public Choice, and the Universities of Chicago and Oxford. Hamlin is grateful for the support of visiting fellowships at ANU and All Souls College, Oxford.

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Published date: September 1992

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 32954
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32954
ISSN: 0048-5829
PURE UUID: c0f2aa91-389b-41da-ba27-ac558e1342de

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Date deposited: 11 Dec 2007
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:54

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