Path-dependence and learning from neighbors

Anderlini, L. and Ianni, A. (1996) Path-dependence and learning from neighbors Games and Economic Behavior, 13, (2), pp. 141-177. (doi:10.1006/game.1996.0032).


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We study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive learning systems. A finite set of players at fixed locations play a two-by-two symmetric normal form game with strategic complementarities, with one of their “neighbors” selected at random. Because of the endogenous nature of experimentation, or “noise,” the systems we study exhibit a high degree of path dependence. Different actions of a pure coordination game may survive in the long-run at different locations of the system. A reinterpretation of our results shows that the local nature of search may be a robust reason for price dispersion in a search model.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1006/game.1996.0032
ISSNs: 0899-8256 (print)
ePrint ID: 32966
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2007
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:18
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