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A theory of signalling during job turnover, employment efficiency and stigmatised jobs

A theory of signalling during job turnover, employment efficiency and stigmatised jobs
A theory of signalling during job turnover, employment efficiency and stigmatised jobs
This paper discusses why redundant skilled workers may be reluctant to accept interim unskilled jobs. If skilled work is more satisfying or less arduous for highly productive workers, then such workers invest more in moving quickly between skilled jobs. Thus, high productivity workers tend to search on-the-job, and if unemployed will specialise in job search, rather than take an interim position. If individual differences in productivity are known to the worker but not the potential employer, then search strategy may be used as a productivity signal, with more than the efficient proportion of workers searching on-the-job and too few accepting interim unskilled jobs. Optimal policy requires a subsidy on interim unskilled jobs.
0034-6527
299-313
McCormick, Barry
6030c745-bb61-4e93-ab8f-91e676281e08
McCormick, Barry
6030c745-bb61-4e93-ab8f-91e676281e08

McCormick, Barry (1990) A theory of signalling during job turnover, employment efficiency and stigmatised jobs. Review of Economic Studies, 57 (2), 299-313. (doi:10.2307/2297383).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper discusses why redundant skilled workers may be reluctant to accept interim unskilled jobs. If skilled work is more satisfying or less arduous for highly productive workers, then such workers invest more in moving quickly between skilled jobs. Thus, high productivity workers tend to search on-the-job, and if unemployed will specialise in job search, rather than take an interim position. If individual differences in productivity are known to the worker but not the potential employer, then search strategy may be used as a productivity signal, with more than the efficient proportion of workers searching on-the-job and too few accepting interim unskilled jobs. Optimal policy requires a subsidy on interim unskilled jobs.

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More information

Published date: April 1990
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33016
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33016
ISSN: 0034-6527
PURE UUID: 4d60838b-0bfd-4154-adf9-c9b4606f1a8d

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Date deposited: 12 Dec 2007
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:41

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