On the sale of production rights and firm organization

Ireland, Norman J. and Stewart, Geoff (1995) On the sale of production rights and firm organization Journal of Comparative Economics, 21, (3), pp. 289-307. (doi:10.1006/jcec.1995.0002).


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It is argued that the owner of production rights may not be indifferent across organizational structures of producers. In particular, the owner may prefer to grant some or all of the rights to labor-managed firms. The reason is that such firms adopt a less competitive strategy and so generate more industry rent, which the owner can capture as fee payments. A mixed duopoly may be particularly attractive. The conflict between revenue-raising and the pursuit of efficiency as objectives of government privatization programs is highlighted, and the relevance to East European reform discussed.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1006/jcec.1995.0002
ISSNs: 0147-5967 (print)
ePrint ID: 33033
Date :
Date Event
December 1995Published
Date Deposited: 12 Dec 2007
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:18
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33033

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