The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

On the sale of production rights and firm organization

Ireland, Norman J. and Stewart, Geoff (1995) On the sale of production rights and firm organization Journal of Comparative Economics, 21, (3), pp. 289-307.

Record type: Article


It is argued that the owner of production rights may not be indifferent across organizational structures of producers. In particular, the owner may prefer to grant some or all of the rights to labor-managed firms. The reason is that such firms adopt a less competitive strategy and so generate more industry rent, which the owner can capture as fee payments. A mixed duopoly may be particularly attractive. The conflict between revenue-raising and the pursuit of efficiency as objectives of government privatization programs is highlighted, and the relevance to East European reform discussed.

Full text not available from this repository.

More information

Published date: December 1995


Local EPrints ID: 33033
ISSN: 0147-5967
PURE UUID: bf41ecb0-6471-46d3-9d96-93346f444963

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 12 Dec 2007
Last modified: 17 Aug 2017 10:01

Export record


Author: Norman J. Ireland
Author: Geoff Stewart

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton:

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.