Labour-managed firms and monopsony power

Stewart, Geoff (1984) Labour-managed firms and monopsony power International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2, (1), pp. 63-74. (doi:10.1016/0167-7187(84)90033-X).


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Monopsony power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisons between an Illyrian labour-managed firm (LMF) and a profit-maximising capitalist firm (CF) operating in the same markets with the same technology. If the CF earns positive profits then workers earn more in the LMF than in the CF, and the level of employment in the LMF may be higher or lower than in the CF. Monopsony power is also seen to have interesting implications for models of membership contraction in LMFs.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1016/0167-7187(84)90033-X
ISSNs: 0167-7187 (print)
ePrint ID: 33041
Date :
Date Event
March 1984Published
Date Deposited: 12 Dec 2007
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:18
Further Information:Google Scholar

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