A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma
A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.
84-105
Ely, Jeffrey C.
6c05937e-0d4a-4cee-b510-a5c8db010c03
Välimäki, Juuso
d9473b09-7596-44dd-ab49-6904c9585e69
2002
Ely, Jeffrey C.
6c05937e-0d4a-4cee-b510-a5c8db010c03
Välimäki, Juuso
d9473b09-7596-44dd-ab49-6904c9585e69
Ely, Jeffrey C. and Välimäki, Juuso
(2002)
A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
Journal of Economic Theory, 102 (1), .
(doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2774).
Abstract
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.
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Published date: 2002
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Local EPrints ID: 33053
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33053
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: c6d4fb7e-0644-44d5-94d6-aa446c86556a
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Date deposited: 15 May 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:41
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Author:
Jeffrey C. Ely
Author:
Juuso Välimäki
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