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A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma

Record type: Article

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.

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Citation

Ely, Jeffrey C. and Välimäki, Juuso (2002) A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma Journal of Economic Theory, 102, (1), pp. 84-105. (doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2774).

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Published date: 2002

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33053
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33053
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: c6d4fb7e-0644-44d5-94d6-aa446c86556a

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Date deposited: 15 May 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:54

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Contributors

Author: Jeffrey C. Ely
Author: Juuso Välimäki

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