Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia
Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia
In this paper, we evaluate the institutional and legal structure of the Colombian government. In particular, we want to assess how a system of institutional checks and balances can be structured to promote the rule of law, preserve property rights, and stimulate economic growth. The 1991 Constitution indeed makes commendable commitments to these objectives. Yet, due to its institutional structure, Colombia is governed in a manner that is both unchecked and unbalanced. The Colombian Constitution is an enormously long document that attempts to reassure all parties that the future will be to their liking. For example, Article 58, which permits uncompensated expropriation for reasons of “equity”, might be a substantial deterrent to investment. The nation’s long run economic health may be seriously impaired if peace is bought at the price of widespread concessions with regard to either the process of decision-making about the economy or to the specific content of future government economic policies. One may buy transitory tranquility, which may not translate in to lasting peace, at the price of long-term instability and turmoil. We make recommendations for institutional reform, which aim to mitigate clientelist and populist trends in Colombian politics. To enhance policymaking by reducing the scope for gridlock, we propose measures such as long-term appointments and ballot accountability that eliminate distortions to the voting incentives of both judges and lawmakers. Also, procedures are set forth to limit undue deliberations by the judiciary and to induce institutional status-quo bias. While we support constitutional provisions for the stability of a political process endowed with representativeness, we reject constitutional provisions that attempt to entrench one particular policy outcome. Stationary policy is likely to be both suboptimal and unsustainable in a stochastic and dynamic environment.
separation of powers, political representativeness, clientelism and gridlock
University of Southampton
Kugler, Maurice
4c79c98c-1810-4351-bf16-faeec2227e45
Rosenthal, Howard
786bd51f-d17e-400d-ac00-7fff9f4de878
2000
Kugler, Maurice
4c79c98c-1810-4351-bf16-faeec2227e45
Rosenthal, Howard
786bd51f-d17e-400d-ac00-7fff9f4de878
Kugler, Maurice and Rosenthal, Howard
(2000)
Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia
(Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 18)
Southampton, UK.
University of Southampton
34pp.
Record type:
Monograph
(Discussion Paper)
Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the institutional and legal structure of the Colombian government. In particular, we want to assess how a system of institutional checks and balances can be structured to promote the rule of law, preserve property rights, and stimulate economic growth. The 1991 Constitution indeed makes commendable commitments to these objectives. Yet, due to its institutional structure, Colombia is governed in a manner that is both unchecked and unbalanced. The Colombian Constitution is an enormously long document that attempts to reassure all parties that the future will be to their liking. For example, Article 58, which permits uncompensated expropriation for reasons of “equity”, might be a substantial deterrent to investment. The nation’s long run economic health may be seriously impaired if peace is bought at the price of widespread concessions with regard to either the process of decision-making about the economy or to the specific content of future government economic policies. One may buy transitory tranquility, which may not translate in to lasting peace, at the price of long-term instability and turmoil. We make recommendations for institutional reform, which aim to mitigate clientelist and populist trends in Colombian politics. To enhance policymaking by reducing the scope for gridlock, we propose measures such as long-term appointments and ballot accountability that eliminate distortions to the voting incentives of both judges and lawmakers. Also, procedures are set forth to limit undue deliberations by the judiciary and to induce institutional status-quo bias. While we support constitutional provisions for the stability of a political process endowed with representativeness, we reject constitutional provisions that attempt to entrench one particular policy outcome. Stationary policy is likely to be both suboptimal and unsustainable in a stochastic and dynamic environment.
More information
Published date: 2000
Additional Information:
JEL Classification: E61, H11, H77
Keywords:
separation of powers, political representativeness, clientelism and gridlock
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 33118
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33118
PURE UUID: c7755858-3185-4b18-9597-7bf18254dce8
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 19 Jul 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:42
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Contributors
Author:
Maurice Kugler
Author:
Howard Rosenthal
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