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The Diffusion of Externalities from Foreign Direct Investment: Theory ahead of Measurement*

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Abstract

In this paper a structural estimation framework is developed to assess whether inward foreign direct investment (FDI) generates technological externalities. The econometric model is implemented in an empirical investigation with data from Colombia's Manufacturing Census. So far, evidence of new technological opportunities for host-country firms arising from the operations of multinational corporations (MNCs) has been rather scarce. This is due to serious limitations in the way in which spillovers have been measured. In particular, empirical research has focused almost exclusively on *intra*-industry externalities while no allowance has been made for *inter*-industry technological externalities. But, in theory, the optimal location and organizational strategies by a MNC are chosen to minimize the risk of losing profits due to the leakage of technical information to potential competitors. Therefore, the host-country firms within the MNC subsidiary's sector will tend to experience limited technological gains ensuing FDI, whereas producers in other sectors may benefit, especially if the MNC outsources to local upstream suppliers. While FDI may substitute investment by domestic plants within the MNC subsidiary's sector, it can complement investment in other sectors. Hence, spillovers from FDI should be primarily *inter*-industry and not *intra*-industry. This conjecture is corroborated by testing of the mutisectoral model of FDI spillover diffusion on Colombian manufacturing data. Furthermore, both generic knowhow spillovers and linkage externalities are sizable.

Keywords: Generic technology; *inter*-industry spillovers; absorptive capacity.

JEL Codes: F21, F23, F43, O41, O34.

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1 Introduction

Foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) has grown without precedent recently, especially penetrating middle-income countries. During the 1990's, the growth of FDI flows trebled the growth in international trade. Most FDI flows occur among industrialized nations, as do international trade transactions. Yet, presently, the main source of international finance to developing countries is FDI. This trend has revitalized the ongoing debate over the economic impact of FDI on less developed countries.

In this paper we investigate empirically whether foreign direct investment (FDI) in a developing country generates positive externalities on local producers. Econometric evidence of their existence is rather scarce. We claim that this is because previous efforts to measure spillovers have not been comprehensive enough. Existing studies have not found evidence of improvements in domestic productivity ensuing FDI partly because no allowance has been made for *inter*-industry diffusion. Industrial organization considerations imply that externalities in the form of static *intra*-industry productivity improvements for host-country firms from manufacturing activities by multinational corporations (MNCs) should not be expected. Other things equal, MNC's locate their subsidiaries where rent erosion due to local competition is least likely. In general, the MNC's optimal organizational strategy is designed to minimize the risk of propagation of specific technical knowledge to potential competitors.

Hence, if there is leakage of technical knowledge from the subsidiary to domestic producers, such spillovers are most likely to generate productivity improvements in non-competing and complementary sectors. The diffusion of generic knowhow, namely technical information that can be deployed across sectors, probably does not represent a loss of rents to the MNC. It may even be beneficial if potential upstream suppliers become more efficient. In contrast, *intra*-industry productivity improvements for domestic producers would be observed, if at all, with a substantial lag. Thus, the scarcity of empirical findings of *intra*-industry spillovers stemming from FDI is not surprising. Proper measurement of technological externalities, allowing for *inter*-industry spillovers, requires a multisectoral dynamic framework, which has been lacking in the literature. An econometric framework is developed to explore whether FDI generates externalities on manufacturing in the host country. The sectoral panel database used was constructed merging data from the Colombian Manufacturing Census with FDI data, derived from Central Bank transaction records. We use the dataset (1) to estimate the extent of new technological opportunities for domestic manufacturers stemming from MNC operations and (2) to explore the determinants of whether ensuing adoption occurs.

Efforts have been made to understand and measure the potential effects of subsidiary operations by MNCs on the productivity of domestic enterprises in host less-developed countries. Existing studies, however, have failed to emphasize some crucial elements in the inquiry of the technological spillovers of FDI. In particular, the degree to which the use of the MNC's proprietary

technological information by indigenous competitors is excludable has not featured as a major determinant of spillover configuration. The latter has been primarily characterized as resulting from externalities beyond the control of those possessing technology and its recipients. Hence, the effect on domestic production possibilities, as well as industrial organization, regarding the appropriability afforded by FDI has not been incorporated in the analysis of the MNC's decision of what techniques to deploy. And, the adoption potential by enterprises in the host country has been presumed automatic, subject to skilled labor availability, and thus not included as a determinant in the industrial pattern of spillover diffusion.

There is a widespread opinion that one of the most efficient channels through which developing countries can gain access to superior technology is FDI (see e.g., Romer, 1993). However, econometric evidence that the activities of MNCs generate a positive externality on the efficiency of host-country producers is scarce. We argue that this could well be due to insufficient theory ahead of measurement. The MNC's strategy that minimizes rent erosion consists of limiting specific knowledge leakages to producers within its own industry. Yet, empirical studies have searched mainly for domestic *intra-industry* productivity enhancements in the data. Indeed, most recent empirical studies have found that local producers fare badly in the aftermath of FDI in their own sector. The result is not surprising if we take into account that the MNC requires incipient monopoly power to recover its sunk investment and will, thus, avoid strong competition. In equilibrium, the sectoral pattern of FDI is likely to feature concentration in industries where local firms in the subsidiary's own industry have limited *absorptive capacity* to adopt advanced techniques that could be imitated given the proximity of the MNC operation. As FDI is targeted to sectors in which the domestic competitive fringe is restricted by the scarcity of specific human capital and by limited access to equipment and machinery embodying frontier technology, *intra-industry* spillovers to domestic producers are unlikely even if MNC affiliates deploy novel techniques.

While theory suggests that *intra-industry* technological externalities stemming from FDI are very unlikely, at least in the short-run, it also suggests that *inter-industry* spillovers are likely to materialize. First, cost-reducing opportunities to producers in sectors other than the subsidiary's own do not induce rent losses to the MNC. The incentive to use resources for trade secrecy purposes so as to limit the diffusion of generic knowledge is small. Therefore, generic technology, which can be deployed in production across several sectors, is more likely to propagate than sector-specific technology. Second, the techniques that can be adopted from generic knowledge in manufacturing activities generally require less absorptive capacity than specialized high-tech processes.

For example, generic production techniques such as just-in-time-inventories (JIT) and total-quality-management (TQM) do not require the acquisition of new equipment and machinery, and can be deployed with limited resources. Some generic technologies, such as computer-automated design (CAD), need complementary equipment investments modest relative to product-specific manufacturing technologies (see e.g. Kaplinsky, 1995). Third, if outsourcing is profitable for the subsidiary, MNC management will encourage knowledge sharing with suppliers. This process yields *inter-industry* spillovers that should be observed as productivity improvements in upstream sectors. Hence, the

technical knowhow that is most likely to generate new technological opportunities for host-country producers is not industry-specific.

Beyond increasing domestic technological opportunities, there are several ways in which entry by MNC's can generate observed productivity gains for host-country producers. In particular, there are two types of pecuniary externalities stemming from the increased competition facing domestic producers. First, the setting up of the MNC subsidiary raises managerial incentives in host-country enterprises to make efficiency-enhancing investments because of the increased risk of a loss of market share. And second, there is a selection effect that increases average productivity of operating plants since only the fittest survive the subsidiary's competition. The pro-competitive impact of MNC entry is obviously *intra*-industry. It will tend to be deleterious to inefficient domestic producers who cannot challenge the MNC and lose market share until eventually closing down. To avoid rent loses, the MNC will target FDI to sectors in which this scenario is likely. Finally, there are linkage externalities. The expansion in the variety of available inputs, due to both the demand and supply effects of MNC entry, can induce efficiency gains for both input users and providers. Clearly, the process that establishes backward and forward linkages is multisectoral since upstream and downstream producers will generally operate in different industries.

These considerations imply that proper measurement of technological externalities arising from FDI requires a multisectoral dynamic framework that allows for *inter*-industry spillovers. The wide technological gap among producers in the home-country and host-country of FDI implicit in the above analysis is not strictly relevant to industrialized host-countries. Although the same strategic considerations highlighted in the present study could be relevant to analyze some aspects of FDI between industrialized nations, we focus on the case in which the host-country is less developed. Rather than doing an aggregated cross-country study as Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) already have done, we analyze industrial dynamics, in the presence of FDI, in a developing country using industrial panel data to derive aggregate behavior from heterogeneous sectoral adjustment.

Due to the dynamic nature of the diffusion process, we need to follow sectors longitudinally. Consequently, the information needed to analyze FDI spillovers includes a panel database with sufficient variables for productivity measurement, and also information on foreign ownership structure. We merged the data from the Colombian Manufacturing Census with Central Bank data on recorded FDI transactions. An interesting aspect about the Colombian case, beyond the availability of high quality data, is the liberalization of investment flows, which took place in 1991. Financial reform affected the foreign direct investment statute. Law 9 of 1991, eliminated restrictions affecting FDI, established national treatment, and eliminated the requirement of obtaining prior approval. Additionally, existing limits on the percentage of profits that foreign firms could transfer to headquarters were also eliminated.¹

¹ The present paper is the only one using plant data derived from the Colombian Manufacturing Census after 1991. Due to statistical reserve and confidentiality restrictions only sectoral analyses have been possible. By becoming a sworn agent of the Colombian Bureau of Statistics, the author was able to access plant-level information to build the database.

The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 reviews and discusses the related literature. The theoretical, qualitative and empirical research on FDI spillovers is surveyed. With regard to the sectoral pattern of spillovers, a synthesis of the implications of the literature is provided. In Section 3, the structural model is set up and the econometric framework derived. Section 4 provides the background facts, including a description of the data. Then, Section 5 the diagnostics and testing of the multisector econometric framework that characterizes the impact of FDI. The results obtained from measuring the technological gap and quantifying the interaction among MNCs and domestic owned producers are used to analyze the extent and determinants of spillovers. Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions and suggests directions for further research.

2 Related Literature

This section starts with a review of the theoretical literature on MNC strategy and the implication for the impact of FDI on the host country. The general presumption about the sectoral pattern of spillovers to domestic manufacturing that emerges from these models is one of absence of *intra*-industry externalities but a likely positive impact at the *inter*-industry level. Then, the classic paradigm about the determinants of FDI is presented and the prediction is borne out that the knowhow and designs that disseminate to domestic firms will be mostly *generic* that is deployable in a wide range of sectors, and not *specific* to the MNC's subsidiary industry. At the end of the section, a synthesis is provided of evidence from case studies, cross-section and panel data. The discussion of the econometric evidence documents how the higher propensity for *inter*-industry effects has not featured prominently in previous research efforts about the impact of FDI on domestic manufacturing in the host country.

2.1 Theoretical Background

A survey of the theoretical literature about the impact of FDI on host-country industrial organization reveals that the modeled mechanisms are more likely to operate at the *inter*-industry rather than the *intra*-industry level. First, there is a body of literature on the choice by the MNC to use FDI as a mode of market penetration. The strategic considerations due to the risks of imitation and eventual replacement faced by the subsidiary are introduced (see e.g. Helpman, 1984; Ethier, 1986; Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1998). Second, there are models about the pecuniary externalities from FDI via the backward linkages to input markets that MNC entry can generate (see e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1990; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1999). Finally, research has focused on the impact of entry by an enterprise with technological opportunities superior to local ones, such as a MNC, on incumbent domestic industry when different types of market structure prevail (see e.g. Bardhan, 1982; Varian, 1996).

First, the literature on the strategic considerations underlying optimal decision-making by the MNC shows that an important feature of the choices made by management is the minimization of the probability of imitation. With imperfect intellectual property rights, it is crucial for the MNC to exclude competitors in its industry from access to its technology. Organizational choices can be used to delay the possibility for enterprises with sufficient absorptive capacity to emulate the technology deployed through FDI. There are efficiency gains from transaction cost minimization afforded by resource transfer within the MNC in an incomplete contracts environment (Ethier, 1986). Also, economies of scope stemming from product-specific R&D can explain the vertically integrated nature of MNCs (Helpman, 1984). Trade secrecy and efficiency wages are also used to mitigate technology leakage from FDI. The dissipation of rents from knowledge capital when *intra*-industry spillovers materialize cannot be avoided but the MNC organizes production to maximize the imitation lag (Ethier and Markusen, 1996).

Another important decision by the MNC once it has chosen FDI into a wholly owned affiliate, rather than licensing or setting up a joint venture, is location. The MNC entry pattern that minimizes the probability of rent erosion due to imitation will be such that *intra*-industry spillovers are unlikely. The optimal location of production avoids proximity to potential competitors with absorptive capacity to copy the production process. The MNC will locate where potential rivals cannot erode its market share (Markusen and Venables, 1998). Since the MNC can benefit from knowledge diffusion when it reaches upstream suppliers, and it will not lose when generic knowledge reaches producers of non-competing goods, *inter*-industry spillovers to complementary and non-competing sectors are more likely.

Second, some of the literature on backward linkages emphasizes the static effect of the increased demand by the MNC for local intermediate inputs (Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1990). Other models that concentrate on the impact of MNC operations on the production possibilities of host country producers emphasize dynamic effect of the ensuing expansion of the demand for intermediate inputs and services. Not only do incumbent upstream sector producers benefit but also new firms may start providing goods or services that were previously unavailable in the host country. FDI fosters specialization by local suppliers. Thus, MNC operations can induce local availability of new intermediate services and inputs, and thereby a nexus between FDI penetration and growth in the productivity of downstream manufacturers (Markusen and Venables, 1999).

Hence, the impact of FDI goes beyond the change in utilization of the host-country factor endowment that improves allocative efficiency, the type of effect typically emphasized in trade theory, and may include improvements in technical efficiency. As the entry of the MNC induces the supply of new intermediate inputs, the productivity of downstream local firms can be enhanced due to a feasible increase in specialization (Romer, 1994; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). The direct demand effect on upstream sectors is primarily an *inter*-industry phenomenon. The indirect input-availability effect on downstream sectors is likely to be stronger at the *inter*-industry level than *intra*-industry. If outsourcing can benefit

the competitive fringe in ways that cannot be avoided through exclusive contracts, in-house supply will be chosen.

Finally, whether the potential benefits of FDI materialize or not depends on the market structure in the host country. When demand in the host country is inelastic because of reduced availability of substitute goods, FDI yields higher rents for the MNC as local presence facilitates market penetration. Then, limited domestic competition relative to international competition means that FDI is more profitable to the MNC. Furthermore, competition from imports limits the attractiveness of imitation for domestic enterprises (Bardhan, 1982). Other things equal, the MNC will seek to set up subsidiaries in countries in which the market structure yields less direct competition within its industry but in which upstream sectors are competitive. Hence, FDI will be associated with situation in which there are few direct competitors and many input suppliers resulting in limited *intra*-industry spillovers but a positive impact at the *inter*-industry level.

If the number of incumbent competitors for the MNC in the host country is sufficiently large, the pro-competitive impact of MNC entry will be small. The survival-of-the-fittest effect and the managerial incentives effect tend to be large only when there are few incumbents. The potential impact on cost reduction embedded by these two effects is important only for incumbent firms within the entrant's industry. When the gap among domestic and foreign technology is wide, local producers lose market share and profits, and may eventually have to shut down. The most likely empirically observable pattern when competition is scarce is a fall in productivity due to excess capacity initially and closure eventually.

However, the possibility of adoption of cost-reducing production processes afforded by the entry of a new subsidiary can represent important gains for incumbents. This imitation effect materializes only if rents can be generated before spillovers occur to cover the entry costs of the MNC. If the copying of its technology by local producers limits the appropriability of rents from its technology, the MNC will not enter (Varian, 1996). MNC entry leading to imitation is profitable to the subsidiary only if spillovers are *inter*-industry but not *intra*-industry.

The models in the literature imply that *inter*-industry positive externalities to host-country producers are much more likely than *intra*-industry gains in productivity ensuing FDI. For the MNC, technological spillovers from FDI represent a benefit when they diffuse upstream but a loss when they diffuse within the subsidiary's industry. Similarly, given the choice of an optimal market penetration strategy by the MNC, pecuniary externalities in both input and output markets are likely to benefit producers in sectors different than the subsidiary's. As outlined in the introduction, and as will be evident from the following discussion of the empirical evidence, the higher propensity for *inter*-industry effects has not featured prominently in previous research efforts about the impact of FDI on domestic manufacturing in the host country.

2.2 Qualitative Interpretations

Here, an outline is provided of the foundations, in the early literature on FDI determinants, supporting the notion that MNC strategy and absorptive capacity requirements are limiting factors to *intra*-industry spillovers but less so to *inter*-industry spillovers. The central feature of financing new production operations via FDI, as opposed to using portfolio capital flows, is the retention of ownership and control of an asset essential in the manufacturing process. As the prevalence of multinational market presence by corporations in the form of FDI has risen over the past few decades, the incentives underlying this mode of organizing productive activity are being progressively better understood.

To put the above considerations in context, we introduce the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) theory of FDI and use it as a framework to characterize the rationale of the strategic disclosure choice by the MNC management. The classic economic theory about the logic of direct investment emphasizes the triumvirate of ownership, location and internalization. The manifold of sources conjectured to motivate investment involving control of assets, rather than alternative arm's length contractual arrangements, has led the OLI theory to be characterized as the eclectic framework for FDI. The classic analysis characterizes the necessary conditions under which the set up of an affiliate or subsidiary emerges endogenously as more profitable to the MNC than either exporting or licensing as ways to exploit a rent-yielding asset (see e.g. Dunning, 1977).

In particular, *ownership* of a productive asset conferring an efficiency edge is required if the subsidiary is to overcome the costs associated with alien status relative to the local competitive fringe. Also, for foreign *location* of manufacturing to dominate exporting some comparative advantage in production or distribution relative to home country operation must emanate from subsidiary location of production. Finally, given that it is advantageous for the MNC to operate abroad in some host country, there has to be a gain from *internalization* by exploiting the productive assets within organizational confines rather than through an arm's-length arrangement such as licensing. Thus, only if all of these three characteristics prevail regarding MNC technology and organization will FDI be the most profitable method to set up production. While earlier theories focused on these multiple factors motivating FDI, later on internalization was put forth as the linchpin underlying the incentive for the direct control by MNCs of productive assets (see e.g. Caves, 1982). The focus on internalization highlights the efficiency gains from *intra*-organizational transacting and contrasts with the view that MNCs mainly seek monopolistic rents.

Hence, the emerging perspective from more recent research features market imperfections due to economies of scale and scope leading to higher productivity in large organizations rather than market concentration emanating from sheer monopolistic power due to lack of competition. For example, Helpman (1984) models economies scope stemming from shared headquarter service inputs as the

explanation for MNC organizational logic. Also, Ethier (1986) focuses on the efficiency gain from transaction cost minimization afforded by resource transfer within the corporation in an incomplete contract framework. Associated with the retention of asset control by the investors, FDI involves the reallocation of intangible as well as tangible factors of production. This mode of investment avoids the dissipation of rents accruing to intangible assets. The ensuing transfer of technical knowledge is *intra*-organizational. Potential *ownership* advantages materialize to the extent that diffusion is contained through *internalization*. Spillovers are returns from intangible assets for which the MNC are not rewarded. The increased excludability associated with management control increases the scope for the appropriability of benefits to outsiders.

The preference by MNCs to profit from their intangible assets via direct use rather than licensing reflects the strategic benefits of maintaining secrecy of proprietary information. When intellectual property rights are poorly protected, as in many less developed countries, such benefits are exacerbated. To the extent that technical knowledge is not patented it may be due to either specificity or genericity. Regarding the first case, arm's-length information exchange is strategically unprofitable. Canonical state-of-the-art, or high-tech, innovations generate very specialized technologies with narrowly defined functions. These tend to be industry specific productivity enhancing improvements on manufacturing techniques, which yield an edge over the competitive fringe. The disclosure associated with patenting can be detrimental in that it may give access to immediate competitors to information crucial in their innovative efforts. Since there is potential for information instrumental to competitors to be revealed through the use of patents, which is not subject to legal protection, the rent destruction associated with such spillovers often warrants a strategy of trade secrecy.² Hence, advanced technologies tend to be tightly protected through embodiment and encryption in as much as possible.

In the second case of absence of patentability, that of genericity, the problem with arm's-length technology transfer is also related to lack of excludability. But the issue in this context is not leakage to competitors but rather the inability to control downstream users. With generic technologies the difficulty stems from incomplete contracts. In particular, as generic technological knowhow can by definition be deployed in several different activities, its spot exchange is precluded by the impossibility of specifying a contract that deals satisfactorily with all potential contingencies. It is too costly to foresee all the cases under which a generic technique could be used. The existence of prohibitive transaction costs makes direct asset use and ownership more profitable than contracting.³

² Jensen(1982) argues that even if not much technical knowledge were shared through the patent content, the information revealed as to the feasibility of the new technology would benefit competitors by mitigating uncertainty about profitability.

³ In the case of some production techniques, such as computer-automated design (CAD) and local-area networks (LAN), internalization is possible via the sale of complementary equipment or software. But, in the case of total quality management (TQM) or just-in-time inventories (JIT), this is very difficult. For example, the demonstration effect of generic organizational knowhow on local enterprises from MNC subsidiaries is not amenable to user control.

Although FDI limits the transfer of comparative advantage to the competitive fringe, there remain some mechanisms through which technology can leak out. The MNC has an incentive to choose modes of production which entail high associated disembodiment and redeployment costs of the underlying technique. The main channels through which the technology may reach potential competitors are reverse engineering and employee turnover. The former implies some deciphering of complex code. The MNC has an interest in engaging in encryption, which raises the human capital requirement for technology disembodiment. Also, there is an incentive to pay efficiency wages to limit the scope for defection by employees who hold technical knowledge that can be redeployed.⁴

The sectoral and dynamic pattern of foreign investment technological spillovers is determined largely by the scope that the MNC has to exclude use of its proprietary technology by others and thereby appropriate the benefits. The choice of the MNC to perform the transaction of technology inside the organization reflects the strategic desire to limit the diffusion of its technical knowledge. Thus, the MNC will only have an incentive to operate in a host country in which there are few spillovers to local producers within its own industry. If technological externalities materialize, they would most likely be limited to other industries. The diffusion pattern of FDI spillovers will tend to be *inter-industry*. And, to the extent that it is *intra-industry*, it has to be so with a long enough propagation lag, which allows the MNC incipient incumbency to recover the sunk costs of FDI. Then, the knowhow and designs that disseminate will be mostly *generic*, that is deployable in a wide range of sectors, and not *specific* to any industry.

Since technological spillovers are impossible to contain entirely, due to demonstration effects and employee mobility, there must be some factor that limits the propagation of the MNC's technology. Indeed, the assimilation of technical knowledge is costly. Its adoption requires substantial investments by the plant changing its production process. The specialized human capital and state-of-the-art equipment required to adopt new techniques constitute the *absorptive capacity*. If the MNC transfers novel techniques to its subsidiaries, as the OLI theory implies, then it must be that absorptive capacity is scarce in the host country. Otherwise, given the highly imperfect intellectual property rights in developing countries, the deployed knowledge could become easily available to competitors. Without a restriction for the adoption by domestic plants of the MNC affiliate's specific technology, the MNC would not be able to overcome the disadvantages of alien status vis-à-vis local competition. For FDI to be profitable in less developed host countries, the likely limiting factor of technological dissemination is scarce absorptive capacity.

⁴ If FDI takes place, technical knowledge must be at least partially excludable from competitors. Otherwise rent dissipation would be complete and the investment would generate losses. In this context, if there is scope for strategic investments that raise the adoption costs of the MNC's techniques to outsiders, there may still be transfer of high performance technologies even if constraints on absorption capacity build-up are not binding. Incorporating this possibility among the choices at the disposal of the MNC would allow for the explicit treatment of trade secrecy.

2.3 Empirical Evidence

Due to data limitations, until recently, empirical evidence on FDI spillovers was made up of case studies. The picture that emerged from the early literature has been important in guiding progress in the theory of FDI. The evidence has provided us with information about the mechanisms whereby MNC entry and presence can affect host-country industrial organization in the host-country. This research emphasized linkages, labor turnover and demonstration effects. Recently database development has afforded the possibility of econometric testing on spillovers. And, only very recently, dynamic analysis has been conducted as panel data has replaced cross-section data.

2.3.1 Case Study Evidence

The main ways in which MNC affiliates help local suppliers are by providing information on quality standards and increasing the supply of human capital through training. Also, knowledge about how to gain access to wider markets seems to disseminate. There is evidence from case studies this type of information sharing in many countries.⁵ A study based on a survey of MNC affiliates in developing countries, found that one third of intermediate inputs is purchased from host-country suppliers (Reuber et al., 1973). An analysis of the practices of three MNCs (GM, ITT and Pfizer) in various countries shows that information sharing to be important (Behrman and Wallender , 1976). Studies about this pattern in particular countries confirm this finding. In Australia, quality control is greatly beneficial to the GM affiliate suppliers (Brash, 1966). In Argentina, MNCs induced host-country suppliers to adopt techniques used by home-country suppliers (Katz, 1969). The same pattern is observed in the Philippines (Watanabe , 1983). On the dynamic pattern of how linkages are set up in Irish manufacturing from 1952 to 1974, there is evidence that the demand for local inputs by MNCs increases with the age of the subsidiary plant (McAleese and McDonald, 1978). In India, information sharing is part of the outsourcing practices by one MNC subsidiary and a joint venture (Lall, 1980).

With regard to training and the role of employees as facilitators of technological dissemination, the spread of management practices from the US to Europe, and more recently from Japan, has been materialized largely due to the mobility of managers (Caves, 1996). Evidence of intensive training in MNC subsidiaries and the ensuing switch to locally owned operations is found in studies of middle level managers in Hong Kong (Chen, 1983), in Kenya (Gerschenberg, 1987) and in Latin America (Katz, 1987).

The evidence on technological externalities hints at the importance of strategic factors. Technologies transferred to MNC affiliates are younger than those licensed, and there is a lag in the

imitation by local competitors of the affiliates' technology imports (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). Demonstration effects from of MNC presence are an important factor in the development of the manufacturing export sector in Hong Kong in the 1960s (Riedel, 1975). In a study of the semiconductor industry, MNC entry is pinpointed as the conduit for the introduction of US innovations to European firms (Tilton, 1971). An additional interesting effect is that MNC subsidiaries are important not only for the diffusion of their production techniques, but more generally because they strengthen international communications channels, which makes demonstration across international borders possible (Swan, 1973). In this case, the propagation of generic techniques leading to lower communication costs would yield *inter*-industry spillovers. Finally, there is evidence that the importance of MNC presence for manufacturing in less-developed countries stems from the elimination of x-inefficiency in management (Pack, 1974).

2.3.2 Evidence from Cross-section Data

Initial efforts to conduct econometric testing of FDI spillovers were limited in scope due to lack of data. In particular, only cross-section databases were available, or in the best of cases collections of cross-sections for a few years. Therefore, it was not possible to follow over time what the impact of MNC entry and permanence was on domestic enterprises. Since technological diffusion is essentially a dynamic phenomenon, the conclusions that can be drawn in these studies based solely on contemporaneous effects have serious limitations. In particular, these findings are plagued by simultaneity and endogeneity biases. Therefore, it is not possible to establish causality with any confidence. Yet, this early econometric literature is important as a first approximation to quantify the mechanisms documented in case studies.

The econometric examination of spillover patterns started with the use of cross-section sectoral data. Pioneering studies searched for intra-industry spillovers in Australia and Canada respectively (Caves, 1974; and, Globerman, 1975). The approach was to estimate sectoral production functions, with the share of MNC affiliates as an explanatory variable. In both cases, there is a positive correlation between domestic enterprise productivity and subsidiary productivity. Although this pattern is consistent with FDI externalities, the aggregated results lack statistical power to discern the causal nature and magnitude of spillovers. Mexican data reveal the same pattern (Blomstrom and Persson, 1983).

Subsequent analysis conjectured that spillovers are more likely in some industries than others. In concentrated industries, where there is a wide technology gap between local producers and MNCs,

⁵ An excellent and comprehensive survey is provided by Blomstrom and Kokko (1998).

externalities from MNC presence are unlikely to materialize. Indeed, it is found that in Mexican manufacturing, there is a positive correlation between foreign presence and local productivity in sectors where the market share of MNC affiliates is not too high (Kokko, 1994). A similar pattern for Uruguayan manufacturing is found (Kokko, Tansini and Zejan, 1996).

Finally, there is evidence that the incentives for the MNC to transfer state-of-the-art technology are higher when the host-country competitive fringe faces lower barriers to entry. Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan (1992) find that in consumer good industries, with relatively low intensity in complex technology and with low capital requirements, MNCs deploy more advanced technologies to overcome the disadvantages of alien status. The way for MNCs to outdo competitors is to keep one step ahead. In principle, as the authors conclude, a more competitive local market structure leads to an increase in the potential for spillovers due to the increase in technology flows. However, the authors do not test whether it is the case that there is adoption of these more advanced techniques.

2.3.3 Evidence from Panel Data

By and large the few panel studies about FDI spillovers in less developed countries find the absence of a positive *intra*-industry productivity effect (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Harrison, 1996; Hoekman and Djankov, 1998; Aitken and Harrison, 1999).⁶ The empirical pattern uncovered where increases in MNC market share are detrimental to local producers in the subsidiary's industry is denoted "enclave formation." These results are not surprising in light of the above discussion of the theoretical literature, which predicts *inter*-industry rather than *intra*-industry spillovers. However, none of these studies considers the empirical possibility of *inter*-industry externalities in the econometric estimation. It is revealing that the one study that considers the diffusion of generic rather than industry-specific technology finds evidence consistent with FDI spillovers. The operation of export oriented MNC subsidiaries in Mexico is associated with a higher propensity for domestic enterprises to enter foreign markets (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997). The finding highlights the potential positive effect on host-country manufacturing of the diffusion of MNCs' generic knowhow about "export quality" production, including information on standards, market access and distribution channels.

There is a failure in the literature to identify the source for the absence of spillovers. The missing observable improvements on the productivity of host-country enterprises in the wake of FDI could be caused by lack of novel technique utilization by MNC subsidiaries, by successful MNC strategy to contain potential competitors to its subsidiaries, or by the lack of indigenous absorptive capacity necessary for new technology adoption.⁷ In the latter case, even if the domestic human capital

⁶ The empirical findings are derived respectively from panel data of manufacturing plants in Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, the Czech Republic and Venezuela.

⁷ Borensztein et al. (1998) found that FDI is associated with higher productivity only when the host-country has human capital above a threshold level. Also, evidence on aggregate productivity consistent with FDI spillovers found for Australia (Caves, 1974) and Canada (Globerman, 1975) may stem from availability of absorptive capacity.

stock is sufficient to absorb the new technique, limited access to specialized equipment and machinery, which partly embodies best practice, could preclude adoption by domestic producers.

For example, as the domestic human capital stock rises, the MNC will be able to produce at a relatively lower cost. But also, rent losses become more likely due to the possibility of technological diffusion to competitors. To the extent that excludability of technical knowledge is costly, only if the competitive fringe is constrained in some aspect of absorptive capacity, will the MNC find it profitable to deploy its specialized production processes. In the countries where there is evidence for absence of spillovers scarce absorptive capacity is likely to be a binding constraint in the adoption of specialized techniques.

The probable cause limiting the ability for domestic entrepreneurs to adopt new technologies is the unfeasibility to acquire equipment and machinery. It may be due to restrictions in both financing and importing.⁸ As discussed above, this will be a problem mostly for specific as opposed to generic technologies.⁹ In this context, the implication of absence of *intra*-industry spillovers is not that knowledge transfer associated with FDI is negligible but rather that there is a need to facilitate access to domestic investment in equipment and machinery. While the policy recommendation not to subsidize FDI is not necessarily wrong, it is more appropriate to recommend capital and labor market policies that facilitate absorptive capacity build-up. Therefore, it is important distinguish why we do not observe FDI spillovers beyond pointing out their absence.

The reported evidence about FDI spillovers in Cote d'Ivoire, the Czech Republic, Morocco and Venezuela constitutes the first systematic effort to measure externalities from MNC activities using longitudinal data. The general finding of spillover absence contrasts with previous evidence of spillovers in cross-sectional data. However, the exclusively *intra*-industry character of possible externalities allowed in the specification of the empirical estimations is very limiting. While the positive contemporaneous correlation between sectoral productivity and sectoral FDI flows in cross-sectional data could reflect a causal relation in either direction, the negative correlation in panel data confirms one of the implications from the theoretical literature.

However, it would be even more informative to allow for *inter*-industry spillovers to verify empirically whether panel data confirms the sectoral pattern predicted by theory about the impact of FDI on host-country industrial organization. When spillovers are not found at all, it is also informative to explore the cause of their absence. In contrast to previous empirical research about FDI spillovers

⁸ This may explain why otherwise identical software engineers working in Bangalore, India, earn about 10% of the salary of those working in Palo Alto, California; or, why the same type of employees in Intel Corp. earn 20% in Malaysia of what they would be paid if based in the US.

⁹ While generic technologies, such as computer-automated design (CAD) and local area networks (LAN), require some machinery, it is more accessible than the labs or high-accuracy equipment used with specialized technologies e.g. computer numerically controlled (CNC) equipment for assembly requires specifically tailored design, maintenance and training.

based on longitudinal data, in this paper, the estimation of the extent of new technological opportunities for domestic manufacturers stemming from MNC operations includes potential effects both within the subsidiary's sector and across other sectors. The structural estimation framework allows for the both the technological spillovers and the pecuniary externalities highlighted in the discussion of the related literature. Furthermore, once the extent of spillovers in each sector is measured, an exploration of the determinants of whether ensuing adoption occurs is performed.

3 The Model and the Estimation Framework

In this section a stochastic multisectoral dynamic general equilibrium model is set up in which firm-level investments can generate spillovers both within and across sectors. The characterization of externalities, in the model, is based on the Arrow-Romer specification of Marshallian externalities leading to aggregate increasing returns. Productivity of manufacturing in any sector can be potentially influenced by investment in other sectors heterogeneously. The possible sectoral configurations of externalities from investment by MNC subsidiaries that results from our reduced form are very general. While the microfoundations of the diffusion pattern of FDI spillovers laid out in the last section are not directly built into the model, the analytic solution which leads to the structural estimation framework allows for both *inter*- and *intra*-industry externalities. The reduced form derived parametrizes the impact of both linkage and technological externalities. First, the technology and preferences are set up. Then, the dynamic programming problem is solved and the competitive equilibrium with externalities is characterized. Finally, conditions to rule out indeterminacy are identified to derive the balanced growth path and the estimation framework.

3.1 Building Blocks

The model is one of competitive equilibrium with endogenous technological change.¹⁰ Knowledge is an input with increasing marginal productivity created as an observable by-product of investment by individual firms (Romer, 1986). The model is multisectoral and allows for both learning by doing and learning by observing, within as well as across industries. There are complementarities among the investment paths of various manufacturers because the knowledge from accumulated experience disseminates. Learning from production generates technological progress that diffuses and generates increasing returns external to the firm. When new knowledge is sector specific, the increasing returns are internal to the industry. If new knowledge is generic and can be deployed across industries, it can

¹⁰ The sectoral structure is based on the models of Long and Plosser (1983) and Neusser (1997).

generate aggregate increasing returns and endogenous growth. Furthermore, backward and forward linkages appear when output from one sector serves as an input in building capital in another sector. These linkages provide a potential diffusion channel of sector-specific knowledge through embodied aggregate productivity rises.

3.1.1 Technology

In each period t , with $t \in \{1, \dots, \infty\}$, n sectors manufacture distinct products indexed by $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. There is perfect competition and the production function for each product is given by,

$$Y_{it} = F(K_{it}, H_{it}, X_{it}, \xi_{it}) = \xi_{it} E_i K_{it}^{\alpha_i} H_{it}^{1-\alpha_i} X_{it} \quad (1),$$

where K_{it} and H_{it} are the stocks of physical and human capital respectively. The human capital stock is fixed and X_{it} captures technological spillovers to be specified below. At each time t , there is a realization of the technology shock vector $\xi_t = (\xi_{1t}, \dots, \xi_{nt})'$. The assumption with respect to factor shares is that $0 > \alpha = \text{diag}(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n) > I_n$.¹¹

The motion equation for capital accumulation is given by,

$$K_{it+1} = G(K_{it}, I_{1it}, \dots, I_{int}, \eta_{it}) = D_i K_{it}^{d_i} \prod_{j=1}^n I_{ijt}^{\delta_{ij}} \eta_{it+1} \quad (2),$$

for $i = 1, \dots, n$, where K_{it} is given and I_{ijt} denotes gross investment in good j for accumulation of capital for the production of good i . The production function for the capital stock $G(\cdot)$ is linearly homogeneous in $\{I_{ijt}\}_{j=1, \dots, n}$ and the current capital stock K_{it} .¹² Accumulation is also subject to productivity shocks represented by a n -dimensional stochastic process $\eta_{it} = (\eta_{1t}, \dots, \eta_{nt})'$.

Define the matrices $\mathbf{d} \equiv \text{diag}(d_1, \dots, d_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{\delta} \equiv \{\delta_{ij}\}$. Hence, constant returns in accumulation

¹¹ Note that $A \leq B$ if $a_{ij} \leq b_{ij}$ for all (i, j) ; $A < B$ if $A \leq B$ and $A \neq B$; and, $A \ll B$ if $a_{ij} < b_{ij}$ for all (i, j) .

¹² Hence, $d_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} = 1$ for all i .

imply that $d + \text{diag}(\delta\iota) = I_n$ where $\iota = (1, \dots, 1)'$. If $\delta_{ij} = 0$, good j is not needed to construct capital in sector i . The matrix δ characterizes the structure of backward and forward linkages among sectors. A large δ_{ij} magnifies the benefit of higher efficiency in production sector j for capital accumulation in sector i . The assumption is that for each i , there is at least some j such that $\delta_{ij} > 0$. Therefore, $\delta > 0$ and $\iota \gg d\iota = \iota + \delta\iota \geq 0$. If for some j , $\delta_{ij} = 0$ for all i , then j is a pure consumption good.

The accumulation specification follows Lucas and Prescott (1971), and as a reduced form allows for decreasing returns, say due to adjustment costs. The parameter family δ can also be interpreted as measures of the relative quality between newer and older capital.¹³

Externalities are specified in the Arrow-Romer fashion as,

$$X_{it} = \prod_{j=1}^n K_{jt}^{ij} \quad (3),$$

where the matrix $\gamma \equiv \{\gamma_{ij}\} \geq 0$ and γ_{ij} is a measure of the technological spillover emanating from investment in sector j to productivity in sector i .

3.1.2 Preferences

The intertemporal preferences of the representative agent over the stochastic sequences of the consumption profile $\{C_t\}_{t \geq 0} = \{(C_{1t}, \dots, C_{nt})'\}$ are to choose the plan that maximizes the expected utility functional $E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t)$, with $\beta < 1$. Also, assume that instantaneous utility is separable over goods,

$$U(C_t) = \sum_{j=1}^n \theta_j \ln C_{jt},$$

¹³ If $d = 0$, so that $\sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} = 1$ for all i , obsolescence sets in one period, as in the case analyzed by Long and Plosser (1983).

with $\theta_j \geq 0$. If this condition is binding, then good j has no value for direct consumption. Suppose that at least some j has consumption value and $\theta_j > 0$. In particular, $\theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n) > 0$.

3.1.3 Resource Balance

The model is closed with the appropriate resource balance conditions. We assume that the rate of transformation among consumption and investment is perfect so that,

$$C_{jt} + \sum_{i=1}^n I_{ijt} = Y_{jt} \quad (4),$$

for each sector j . With respect to the initial capital stock $K_0 = (K_{10}, \dots, K_{n0})$, an even distribution among consumers is assumed.

Human capital is normalized so that,

$$\sum_{i=1}^n H_{it} = 1 \quad (5).^{14}$$

Both technology shocks follow Markov processes. Specifically, their joint evolution is subject to a stable autoregressive process of order p :

$$\Phi(L) \begin{pmatrix} \ln \xi_t \\ \ln \eta_t \end{pmatrix} = (I_{2n} - \phi_1 L - \dots - \phi_p L^p) \begin{pmatrix} \ln \xi_t \\ \ln \eta_t \end{pmatrix} = \mu + \omega_t \quad (6),$$

where ω_t has distribution $WN(0, \Psi)$ (i.e., a vector of white noise perturbations with a joint normal distribution). The set $\{\phi_k\}_{1 \leq k \leq p}$ is a collection of $2n \times 2n$ matrices and $\mu \geq 0$ is a vector of constants with $2n$ elements, and L is the lag operator (e.g., $L^\tau Z_t = Z_{t-\tau}$).

3.2 The Competitive Equilibrium with Externalities

The solution strategy we follow is the one proposed by Romer (1986). The competitive equilibrium is computed in two phases. First, the optimal policy rules for investment in each sector and the

¹⁴ Human capital is not accumulated and is supplied inelastically.

consumption profile chosen by the representative agent are derived taking the path of externalities as given. Second, the sectoral capital accumulation path, given the aggregate externalities implied by individual optimal decisions, is characterized on the basis of the policy rules derived in the first phase. It is verified that the sectoral paths satisfy the resource balance conditions to insure that there is mutual consistency among the aggregate equilibrium and individual optimality.¹⁵

The state of the economy in period t is given by just by the sectoral capital stocks as the technology shocks of the preceding p periods are white noise,

$$S_t = (K_{1t}, \dots, K_{nt})'$$

The externality pattern in period t is given by,

$$X_t = (X_{1t}, \dots, X_{nt})'$$

where $X(\cdot)$ is a function of the capital stock vector which depends of the state of the economy and the technology shock to accumulation,

$$X_{t+1} = X(K_{t+1}) = X(K_t, \eta_{t+1})$$

With this notation in hand, the first step consists in solving the Bellman Equation of the representative agent's problem at each point in time. To solve the problem first we note that the above functional is stationary,

$$V(S; X) = \max_{(I_{ij}, H_i)} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n \theta_j \ln(C_j) + \beta E V(S'; X') \right\} \text{ s.t. } C_j + \sum_{i=1}^n I_{ij} \leq Y_j \quad (7),$$

where the expectation is formed with regard to the technology shocks and primed variables are next period's.

¹⁵ The log-linear structure of the problem implies that expectational indeterminacy is not an issue. See e.g. Boldrin and Rustichini, (1994) and Benhabib and Farmer (1994).

In particular,

$$V(S_t; X_t) = \max_{(I_{ijt}, H_{it})_{1 \leq i, j \leq n}} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n \theta_j \ln(Y_{jt} - \sum_{i=1}^n I_{ijt}) + \beta \int V(S_{t+1}; X_{t+1}) Q(S_t, X_t) dS_{t+1} \right\} \quad (8),$$

where $Q(\cdot, \cdot)$ is the transition function implied by the Markov process of the shocks to production and accumulation.¹⁶

A log-linear solution is conjectured in terms of the variables in S_t ,

$$V(S; X) = b_0 + b_1 \ln K_1 + \dots + b_n \ln K_n \quad (9),$$

to verify that it satisfies the first order necessary conditions of the Bellman Equation.

Then, from the first order necessary conditions the following optimal policy rules for investment and consumption are obtained,

$$I_{ij} = \frac{\beta b_i \delta_{ij}}{\theta_j + \beta \sum_{i=1}^n b_i \delta_{ij}} Y_j = \varphi_{ij} Y_j \quad (10)$$

$$C_j = (1 - \sum_{i=1}^n \varphi_{ij}) Y_j = \frac{\theta_j}{\theta_j + \beta \sum_{i=1}^n b_i \delta_{ij}} Y_j.$$

From the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation we can obtain the private shadow price of sectoral capital as,¹⁷

$$b_i = \frac{\alpha_i \theta_i}{1 + d_i - \beta \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j \delta_{ij}} \quad (11),$$

¹⁶ Note that in this problem, $X(\cdot)$ is exogenous.

¹⁷ See e.g. Lucas, Stokey and Prescott (1989).

which is completely independent of the extent of knowledge spillovers. Since agents take externalities as given, the private value of capital investment is lower than the social value. On the balanced growth path of the competitive equilibrium with externalities accumulation is suboptimal (Romer, 1986). These solutions imply the following reduced form of the accumulation path,

$$K_{it+1} = D_i \prod_{j=1}^n \left(\frac{\beta \delta_{ij} b_i}{\theta_j + \beta \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{ij} b_i} \xi_{jt} K_{jt}^{\alpha_j} H_{jt}^{1-\alpha_j} X_{jt} \right)^{\delta_{ij}} K_{it}^{d_i} \eta_{it+1} \quad (12).$$

The Cobb-Douglas technology implies that the allocation of human capital is stationary. In particular,

$$H_i = \frac{(1-\alpha_i)(\theta_i + \beta) \sum_{l=1}^n \delta_{lj} b_l}{\sum_{j=1}^n (1-\alpha_j)(\theta_j + \beta) \sum_{l=1}^n \delta_{lj} b_l} \quad (13).$$

Changes in productivity due to technology shocks are exactly offset by changes in prices that preserve the marginal revenue product unchanged.¹⁸

The reduced form of the capital accumulation process can be viewed as an operator that transforms $X()$ into the corresponding competitive equilibrium. Concavity guarantees that the operator has a unique fixed point. The fixed point is found identifying the path of the capital stock vector resulting from the optimal policy rules in (10) with the given externalities being replaced by the multisector effects from the actual capital accumulation choices.

On the equilibrium path, future sectoral capital stocks are determined by the primitive parameters characterizing preferences and technology, by the capital vector from the previous period,

$$K_{it+1} = D_i \prod_{j=1}^n \left[\left(\frac{\beta \delta_{ij} b_i}{\theta_j + \beta \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{ij} b_i} \right)^{\delta_{ij}} \xi_{jt}^{\delta_{ij}} K_{jt}^{\delta_{ij}\alpha_j} H_{jt}^{\delta_{ij}(1-\alpha_j)} \prod_{l=1}^n K_{lt}^{\delta_{ij}\gamma_{jl}} \right] K_{it}^{d_i} \eta_{it+1} \quad (14),$$

for each i .

¹⁸ See e.g. Long and Plosser (1983).

Proposition 1 The logarithm of the state variable, namely the sectoral capital vector, can be characterized by the following first-order differential equation,

$$\Delta k_{t+1} = c_k + (A - I_n)k_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad (15),$$

in which c_k is a n -dimensional vector of constants, A is a $n \times n$ matrix of constants and ε_{t+1} is a n -dimensional vector of MA(1) processes.

Proof: See the Appendix.

Therefore, $\{k_t\}_{t>0}$ has the structure of a vector-autoregressive process except that the innovation is not white noise. In fact, the innovation is a MA (1) process and therefore $\{k_t\}_{t>0}$ is a vector autoregression (VAR) with components following ARMA (1,1) processes. Since the physical capital stock is the only reproducible factor of production, its motion equation determines the dynamics of the economy. In particular, aggregate growth depends on both sector specific incentives for investment, such depreciation and the output elasticity with respect to capital, as well as on the structure of sectoral interdependence. The *inter*-industry effect arises because of both linkages to upstream sectors and technological spillovers.

The characteristics of the matrix A determine the growth pattern of the system. For example, if A is a negative matrix, the economy will converge to a stagnation equilibrium. Analogously, if the elements of A were of such magnitude that Δk_t expands without bounds, the economy would go on an explosive path. The strength of multisectoral externalities has to be limited. For example, if $\alpha_i = 1$ for some sector i , so that it has an *AK* technology, nonexplosive equilibrium is possible only in the absence of externalities. But, if $\alpha_i < 1, \forall i$, balanced growth implies the existence of some technological externalities.¹⁹

¹⁹ The algebraic properties of the growth process are discussed in detail in the appendix. In the proof of Proposition 1, it is shown that $A \equiv d + \delta(\alpha + \gamma)$.

To insure that there is convergence to a balanced growth path, we need that the diagonal elements of A are strictly positive,

$$a_{ii} = d_i + \delta_{ii}\alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}\gamma_{ji} > 0 \quad (16).^{20}$$

This inequality is violated if and only if simultaneously there is instantaneous depreciation ($d_i = 0$), the good is not needed for its own production ($\delta_{ii} = 0$), and for each sector j , either the good either does not generate externalities ($\gamma_{ji} = 0$) or is not necessary in capital accumulation ($\delta_{ij} = 0$).

3.3 The Balanced Growth Path

In order to explore the impact of FDI on the technological opportunities of host-country manufacturing across sectors, it is necessary to tie capital accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) dynamics. To do so, the corresponding VAR and vector error correction representation (VECR) are derived to characterize both cointegrating and causal relations among investment and technical progress. The diffusion of externalities from FDI implies its causation, in the Wiener-Granger sense, of TFP growth in domestic manufacturing across sectors.

In particular, establishing a long run pattern of coevolution between capital accumulation by MNCs in some sectors and productivity in others is not sufficient to conclude that spillovers take place. It could be that the high productivity of domestic manufacturers reflects abundance of factors in which the MNCs' technologies are intensive, thereby stimulating FDI inflows. To provide evidence corroborating the importance the diffusion of externalities from FDI, the causation of higher cross-sectoral local productivity by FDI must be shown.

3.3.1 Cointegration

For the estimation, we note that the stochastic process $\{y_t\}_{t > 0}$ has the same number of stochastic and deterministic trends and therefore the same number of cointegrating relations as $\{k_t\}_{t > 0}$.

²⁰ The off diagonal elements are given by $a_{ij} = \sum_{l=1}^n \delta_{il}\gamma_{lj}$.

Furthermore, the total factor productivity process in logarithmic form,

$$\{z_t\}_{t>0} \equiv \{y_t - \alpha k_t - (1-\alpha)h\}_{t>0},$$

where $h = (\ln H_1, \dots, \ln H_n)$ can be related to capital accumulation as follows,

$$z_t = y_t - \alpha k_t - (1-\alpha)h = \ln \xi_t + e + \gamma k_t \quad (17),$$

where lower-case variables are logarithms of upper-case ones.

Furthermore, when the sectoral capital stock and TFP observations are stacked up, the system can be written as,

$$\begin{pmatrix} I_n - AL & 0 \\ -\gamma & I_n \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} k_t \\ z_t \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} c_k \\ c_z \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} I_n & \delta L \\ 0 & I_n \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \ln \eta_t \\ \ln \xi_t \end{pmatrix} \quad (18),$$

where $c_z \equiv e = (\ln E_1, \dots, \ln E_n)$, and in particular,

$$\begin{pmatrix} k_t \\ z_t \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} c_k \\ c_z \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} A & 0 \\ \gamma L^{-1} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} k_{t-1} \\ z_{t-1} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_t \\ \ln \xi_t \end{pmatrix} \quad (19).$$

This expression implies a cointegrating relationship among capital accumulation and productivity. The multisectoral structure of investment is linked to the dynamics of economic growth. In particular, in the VECR below it will be apparent that the reduced form of the structural model implies causation of higher domestic productivity growth by FDI inflows but not viceversa. Backward and forward linkages among sectors impact aggregate physical capital accumulation through pecuniary externalities. Also, both learning by doing and demonstration effects captured by *inter*-industry spillovers generate technological externalities, which drive productivity growth. These implications will be explored econometrically.

3.3.2 Causality

The causality analysis of the cointegrated system is based on the approach due to Johansen (1991). Assume that the $2n$ -dimensional stochastic process $\{X_t\}$ is generated by a Gaussian k -th order VAR. By making the appropriate definitions, the VAR derived in (20) above can be written as:

$$\Lambda_t = \kappa + \Pi(L)\Lambda_{t-1} + u_t = \begin{pmatrix} \Lambda_{1,t} \\ \Lambda_{2,t} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} c_k \\ c_z \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{11}(L) & \pi_{12}(L) \\ \pi_{21}(L) & \pi_{22}(L) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Lambda_{1,t-1} \\ \Lambda_{2,t-1} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} u_{1,t} \\ u_{2,t} \end{pmatrix} \quad (20),$$

where κ is a vector of constant drifts, $\pi_{ij}(L)$ are polynomials of order $k-1$ in the lag operator L , and Λ_1 and Λ_2 are the sectoral capital stock and productivity vectors. From this expression we can obtain the VECR, which is the Wold representation,

$$\Delta\Lambda_t = \kappa + \Psi(L)\Delta\Lambda_{t-1} + \Pi\Lambda_{t-k} + u_t = \begin{pmatrix} \Delta\Lambda_{1,t} \\ \Delta\Lambda_{2,t} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} c_k \\ c_z \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \psi_{11}(L) & \psi_{12}(L) \\ \psi_{21}(L) & \psi_{22}(L) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Delta\Lambda_{1,t-1} \\ \Delta\Lambda_{2,t-1} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{11} & \pi_{12} \\ \pi_{21} & \pi_{22} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Lambda_{1,t-k} \\ \Lambda_{2,t-k} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} u_{1,t} \\ u_{2,t} \end{pmatrix} \quad (21),$$

and can be used to establish the causal structure of the system. The structural model implies that FDI spillover diffusion will lead to Wiener-Granger causality by FDI inflows of productivity across sectors. To establish that the comovement among the investment patterns of MNCs and the TFP of domestic manufacturers is due to the diffusion of externalities from FDI, the null hypothesis $H_0 : \pi_{21}(L) = 0$ must be rejected.²¹ Before describing the data below and performing the cointegration and causality analysis, a further decomposition provides insight into the nature of capital accumulation.

Proposition 2 Balance growth induces unit roots in the process $\{k_t\}$ so that it is I(1). Hence, after a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, the evolution of $\{k_t\}$ can be represented as,

$$k_t = k_0 + Cc_k t + C \sum_{\tau=1}^t \varepsilon_{\tau} + \Theta(L)\varepsilon_t - \Theta(L)\varepsilon_0 \quad (22),$$

where $\Theta(L)u_t$ is stationary, as u_t is I(0).

Proof: See the Appendix.

In synthesis, $\{k_t\}$ has three parts: a deterministic linear trend; a multivariate random walk with

a stochastic trend; and, a stationary component. When $b' C = 0$, $\{b' k_t\}$ is a stationary process as the stochastic and deterministic trends disappear with the transformation. In the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987), b is a cointegration vector. Also, the mean growth rate is thus given by $C\alpha$. Let the vectors α and β be $2n$ dimensional and both different from zero such that $\Pi = \alpha\beta'$. If $\alpha' \perp \mu$ equals zero no growth occurs. If equation (23) is multiplied by β' from the left both the linear trend and the multivariate random walk vanish because $\beta' C$ equals zero, demonstrating the stationarity of $\{\beta' X_t\}$.

Finally, under the assumptions that imply balanced growth, when the matrix A is expressed in block diagonal form a number of the block matrices will have unit characteristic roots. The sectors corresponding to such blocks constitute the engine of growth. The nature of economic growth is determined by the structure of the matrix C . In particular, a necessary condition for the j th sector to expand in equilibrium is that the j th row of the matrix is positive.²² If FDI finances investment in sectors that are part of the engine of growth, there will be *inter*-industry spillovers to those sectors that are not isolated.

4 Industrial Evolution and MNC Operations in Colombia

In this section, the nature of the merged data is explained. Also, summary statistics are provided. Then, some industrial dynamics indicators are summarized on turnover rates and the age distribution of plants. Finally, the productivity measurement methodology is developed and discussed.

4.1 The Data

The data set developed for the present study merges information from two sources: the Colombian Manufacturing Census and the records that those MNCs engaging in FDI in Colombia are legally bound to register at the Central Bank. The Census is based on annual surveys by the National Statistics Bureau of Colombia of firms with more than ten workers. Data are recorded on each plant's geographic location, industry, age, capital structure, investment flows, expenditures on labor and materials, and value of output sold. The variables in the plant-level panel database yield a wide range of observable characteristics. These manufacturing data have been used by Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) and Roberts and Tybout (1996) to explore Colombian export dynamics. The records of individual FDI transactions are kept in the Central Bank and the variables derived from them are the

²¹ A test of short-run causality would use $H_0 : \psi_{21}(L) = 0$ as the null hypothesis.

amount of the transaction, the country of origin and the identity of the recipient firm.

4.1.1 The Manufacturing Census

The Census covers manufacturing plants since 1974 until 1998. For each plant there is information on (1) employment and employee compensation of different types of workers, (2) book values, purchases and sales of different types of capital inputs, (3) sales, production and value added and (4) information on other plant characteristics including location and age. Each plant has an identification code, which allows for plants to be tracked over time.

On average plants in the sample are small. Over the period of the Census, 58% of the plants have less than 50 employees and 34% have less than 20 employees. Only 7% of the plants have more than 200 employees. The smaller plants tend to exhibit the highest turnover. The plants continuously present in the sample account for an average share of the workforce over 1974-1991 of 63% and an average share of the product of 71%. This implies that larger plants are more stable and tend to have higher production per worker.

The geographic distribution of plants over metropolitan areas is also very stable. Plants are concentrated in the two largest cities, which are in the interior Andean region. On average over the years, 32% of plants have operated in Bogota and 19% in Medellin. Of the remainder, Cali, the largest city in the Pacific region, has been host to 11% of the manufacturing plants and 7% of the plants have located in the two largest cities in the Caribbean region, Barranquilla and Cartagena. Hence, we have that 51% of the plants in the Census are in the two largest cities and 69% in the five largest metropolitan areas.

Over the period of study, the industries with the largest number of plants, according to the ISIC 3 digit groupings, have been food, beverages and tobacco (31), textiles and apparel (32) and metal products (38). However, the trend has a clear break in 1991 when international trade and foreign investment were liberalized. In the textile and metal products industries, there were widespread shutdowns. In textiles, foreign competition drove many local producers into bankruptcy. In basic metals, tariff-jumping FDI ceased because of the possibility of importing. Foreign owned operations were closed. In contrast, the number of establishments in the food industry grew in spite of the competition from foreign products. In fact, this industry was recipient of substantial inflows of FDI.

For the years from 1976 to 1979 we have a variable that reports the year in which operations began. For plants that are not observed over this period, we determine the age according to the first

²² In the set of Eigen vectors of the unit characteristic root $\{x^{(1)}, \dots, x^{(o)}\}$, $x^{(k)} \neq 0$ iff sector k accesses sector j .

year in which the plant appears. The number and percentage of plants older than 20 years grows steadily from being about 16% of the total in 1974 to 38% in 1998. The proportion of plants younger than 5 years remains nearly constant about 29%. Therefore, the attrition rate some plants has grown over time, especially of those between 10 and 20 years old. This rise in the failure rate beyond the initial stages of development of the plant is consistent with two mechanisms that select productive plants: firms learn about their efficiency over time (see e.g. Jovanovic, 1982; and Hopenhayn, 1992) and stronger competition due to increasing openness of the Colombian economy.

The joint distribution of plants according to age and employment was characterized over five year intervals. The average plant employment rises with age. In particular, the plants with more than 100 employees are mostly older than 10 years. Also, 68% of plants older than 15 years have more than 50 employees. The pattern that emerges is one in which surviving plants grow over time. This is consistent with both selection mechanisms highlighted above.

4.1.2 The FDI Data

The series for sectoral FDI are built on the basis of transaction records kept at the Central Bank's International Exchange Department. These records contain information on all direct investments made by foreign corporations in Colombia since the 1970's. The information available includes the amount of the transaction in US dollars, the country where the investing firm is based and the identity of the firm in which the investment is being made. Hence, not only can the yearly inflows of FDI be classified by sector and country of origin but also the firms in the Manufacturing Census which have been recipients of FDI can be identified. This disaggregation is very important in the measurement of how MNC's impact domestic industrial organization.

The sectoral and geographical patterns of FDI inflows to Colombia have shown a fair amount of change during the period of study. This reflects both industrial evolution and important policy regime shifts over the past two decades. During the 1970's, an average of 73% of FDI inflows were targeted to manufacturing. Investment was concentrated in chemicals (35), equipment and machinery (38), basic metals (37) and food (31). About half of these inflows originated in the US with the remainder coming almost all from Europe. In the 1980's, mining attracted more than double the amount of FDI than did manufacturing. Within the manufacturing industry, FDI concentrated in the same four sectors as it had in the previous decade. The geographical pattern of FDI also changed. The source of most FDI was still the US with the rest originating in Europe but the US share rose to an average of 92%.

After the market oriented reforms of 1991, FDI inflows have risen. The industries that have registered the highest growth in FDI inflows are banking and manufacturing. The deregulation of the

financial system coupled with the removal of restrictions in the transactions by MNCs lead to a tidal wave of investment by foreign banks. In manufacturing, the inflows of FDI grew exponentially over the five years after the reforms with a fourfold increase of FDI in 1998 relative to 1991. While investment from abroad disappeared in basic metals, it surged in the paper and publishing sector. Also, FDI increased rapidly in, chemicals, equipment and machinery as well as food processing.

The pattern of geographic origin of FDI changed substantially in the 1990's relative to the previous two decades. The share of FDI from the US fell although the level of FDI inflows to Colombia originating in the US rose somewhat. The fall in the US share of FDI, to its observed value in the 1970's, was made up by staggering increase in both the share and level of FDI originating in the Caribbean. The US share was 48%; the Caribbean share 31% and the European share 17%. Since the Caribbean share originates mainly from countries that are tax havens and which are used for purely financial transactions, it is not clear how the removal of barriers to FDI has induced changes to this geographic pattern.

4.2 The Measurement of Technical Efficiency

In the measurement of technical efficiency as a residual, we have to remove from the productivity estimate all contributions that are not technological. The contribution of various factors in the production of output is to be decomposed. Both the labor force and the capital stock contribute to production depending upon their quality. The quality of the inputs corresponds to attributes embodied in them and not strictly to the production technology in use but is not observed directly. Although the quality of inputs and the technology are distinct, there is an identification problem in discerning them quantitatively from the productivity residual because they both are decided as part of the plant's optimal plan.

But, even if human and physical capital are measured without error, to estimate technical efficiency from the productivity residual account must be taken for returns to scale and capacity utilization (See e.g. Hall, 1988). If these are not controlled for, changes in production may be wrongly attributed to changes in technology. Another potential source of bias in productivity measurement is the imputation of factor shares as elasticities normally performed in constructing Divisia indices.²³ When input markets are imperfect, factor shares do not necessarily reflect input product elasticities. Since labor and capital markets are not likely to be perfect in Colombia, technical efficiency is estimated from a production function framework. Indeed, average factor remunerations do not match elasticities.

²³ The technique used fits a quadratic time trend for the productivity process and the estimation follows Tybout (1992).

The labor share for various types of workers is such that the marginal revenue product of labor is greater than the wage plus other compensation.

4.2.1 Human Capital

We weigh workers in different categories by their relative wages to adjust for quality, thus obtaining a human capital index (See e.g. Griliches and Ringstad, 1971). The labor force of the plants in the Census is classified in five categories: management, nonproduction employees, local technicians, foreign technicians, and production workers.

The estimation of the human capital index consists of a weighted average of workers by categories where the weights are given by the ratio of per capita wages in the category to per capita wages for production workers. In estimating the index, an implicit assumption is that the labor market values workers according to their productivity or ability to transform inputs into value added. Even if the labor market is not perfectly competitive, it is plausible to assume that wages and productivity are linked.

4.2.2 Physical Capital

Throughout the period 1974-1998, we consider four types of physical capital: buildings and structures; transport equipment; machinery and equipment; and office equipment.²⁴ The perpetual inventory methodology was used to construct capital stocks. Constant depreciation rates were imputed based on assumptions about the useful lifetime of different types of capital. In particular, the expected lifetime of buildings was set to be 50 years, of transport equipment as well as machinery to be 20 years, and for office equipment the assumption was of 10 years before scrappage.²⁵ For the initial value of capital we used the book value reported in the first year of the sample.

The method assumes perfect substitutability across vintages of capital and constant decay of the capital stock. Therefore, the retirement rate of machinery is independent of the age distribution of

²⁴ Land is not used because its valuation is affected by aspects irrelevant to the production process, which are likely to introduce noise in our estimation.

²⁵ Harberger (1969) obtained these estimates for Colombian manufacturing. For the US, Hulten and Wycoff (1981) have estimated yearly depreciation rates of 0.036 for buildings and 0.1179 for equipment. Using a perpetual inventory methodology, expected lifetimes of 30 years for buildings and 8.5 years for equipment result. The respective figures derived by Harberger for Colombia are reasonable if we take into account that obsolescence sets in much slower in developing countries.

the capital stock. Technical obsolescence induced by innovation is not taken into account. The physical stock of capital not only deteriorates due to wear and tear but also loses value as the vintage is older. However, as Hulten and Wykoff (1981) have shown, there is an identification problem in trying to separate these effects econometrically even if we had the asset prices of each vintage for different types of capital.

Thus, we use the plants' initial operations date to get an idea of the importance of the vintage effect. Other things equal, if the vintage effect were dominant, newer plants should have more modern capital in operation even taking into account retooling and scrapping by old firms, the older plants' machinery should still be older. And, if the vintage effect were strong enough, it would show up in the productivity differential across plants. Yet, it is not the case that productivity is higher among younger plants.

Our calculations reveal that since 1975 until 1996 there have been changes in the composition of investment. Out of total real net investment the share of machinery has risen steadily from 68% to 81%. The share of office equipment has also increased from 5 % to 11%. In contrast, the share of both transport equipment and structures has fallen. The former had a drop in participation from 13 % to 2 %. The investment in building and structures went from accounting for 14 % of real net investment by manufacturing plants in the census to account for 6 %. This pattern is revealing of the importance of embodied technology. The intensity of use has shifted from physical plant and transportation to equipment and computers. Investments in the latter categories are the most likely to report productivity improvement and the distribution of investment suggests it.

4.2.3 Capacity Utilization and Returns to Scale

Slackness in the use of installed capacity should be associated with lower than usual energy consumption. Deviations from the secular quadratic trend give an indication of the intensity of production for the year in consideration. We use this observation to control for capacity utilization by detrending on the basis of energy use. Production is adjusted multiplying output by the ratio of actual energy use over energy use predicted from the quadratic trend.

In order to measure returns to scale, we estimate the product elasticities of human capital, physical capital and materials. We cannot reject the restriction that the elasticities add up to one in any given year at the 1 % level. Hence, there is no adjustment made for returns to scale. The maintained

assumption is that the production function is homothetic with respect to plant size in input use. Our point estimates based on a loglinear production function are that the capital elasticity is 0.258, the labor elasticity 0.412, and the intermediate input elasticity 0.356.

The estimated elasticities are very important because we will not use factor shares to estimate technical efficiency as in the total factor productivity literature. When input markets are imperfect, factor shares do not always fully reflect input product elasticities. Since labor and capital markets are not likely to be perfect in Colombia, the estimated elasticities are used in order to calculate technical efficiency.

4.3 Basic Indicators of Industrial Dynamics

Several indicators of industrial dynamics were estimated. First, we have entry and exit rates in manufacturing. Then, we examine transition rates that trace the evolution of firms within the productivity distribution. Next, we describe how plant age is linked to productivity. Finally, we decompose aggregate growth in terms of the reallocation, turnover and technological effects.

4.3.1 Entry and Exit

Entry and exit rates are fairly low as compared to those observed in industrialized countries, if we use strict definitions, where entry corresponds to completely *de novo* operations and exit to a definite closing of operations. If we use broader definitions of entry to include reopenings and exit to include transitory shutdowns, as do Roberts and Tybout (1996), the estimated entry and exit rates are more in line with those observed internationally. As in most countries, including the US, plant turnover is concentrated among small plants. The market share of a balanced panel of plants in the database, since 1974 until 1998, is 68 % on average with a minimum of 57 % and a maximum of 77%. The employment share is of the same order of magnitude.

The entry rate, including reopenings, hovers around 10% but in 1982 and 1992 has rather high peaks. Both years are recessionary and yet the respective entry rates are 48% and 59%. The high entry rates observed are due to variations in the sampling and plant identification methodologies. Accordingly, in 1981 the exit rate, including transitory shutdowns, is 49% and in 1991 it is 51%.

Hence, across periods the sample changes with about half of the plants being replaced in both 1981 and 1992. Since the analysis focuses primarily on linkage externalities and technological spillovers

of FDI, the best way to draw robust conclusions about industrial dynamics over 1974-1998 is to work with a balanced panel with all plants that stay in the sample throughout the period. As pointed out above, the plants that stay dominate aggregate manufacturing dynamics and account for more than two thirds of total output, employment and investment.²⁶

4.3.2 Evolution of the Productivity Distribution

We have five-year transition matrices of how the distribution of plants according to technical efficiency evolves. Using the methodology suggested by Baily, Campbell and Hulten (1992), we classify plants by quintiles according to their productivity and trace where they ranked five years before. Therefore we can assess whether or not there is persistence in the relative performance of plants. Indeed we find that there is persistence in performance across time indicating the importance of permanent unobserved characteristics. Plants tend to stay within their quintile and very rarely move two or more quintiles.

4.3.3 The Relationship among Plant Vintage and Productivity

The matrix relating technical efficiency and age is consistent with either a selection effect, whereby the firms that survive to be older are more efficient, or a learning effect. Plants older than 10 years on average constitute 38% of all plants and younger than 5 years are 46%. Yet of the plants in the top productivity quintile 92% are 10 years or older and in the second quintile 70%. In contrast, plants 5 years or younger are 67% of those in the bottom quintile and 71% of those in the penultimate quintile.

Newer plants are relatively inefficient and only with age do they become relatively proficient. If there is a vintage effect in terms of installed capital, it seems to be of a limited magnitude. As pointed out, the observed pattern is consistent with selection and learning effects. In Jovanovic's (1982) model, both effects interact as plants learn their type and self-select. But as Ericson and Pakes (1988) point out, if productivity enhancing and learning investments are feasible, the distribution of plants is not determined just by the initial draw and there is scope for improvement over time.

²⁶ The effect on turnover among domestic plants of the exposure to foreign competition is not addressed. However, the entry and exit of MNC subsidiaries is taken into account when measuring the diffusion of externalities from FDI.

4.3.4 The Decomposition of Sectoral Productivity Growth

We decompose aggregate productivity change among the share reallocation effect, the turnover effect, and technical change. As we discussed above the entry and exit rates in some years, in particular 1981 and 1992, are problematic. Thus, the turnover effect may be measured with some error. However, the econometric analysis shall be concentrated on the reallocation and the technological effects.

Up to 1992, we do not observe a significant difference between the technical efficiency of entering plants and quitters. Furthermore, the market share of firms that enter and exit is low. But in 1992, besides our large observed share of plants that enter and exit, there is a steep rise in the attrition rate of inefficient plants and also an increase in the productivity of the entering cohort. According to our decomposition, the productivity improvements observed stem mostly from the turnover effect rather than from share reallocation or technical change.

While the market share effect accounts for 52% of productivity change before 1992, it accounts for only 34% after 1992. Similarly, technological change and learning account for 37% before 1992 and only for 28% after 1992. Hence the share of aggregate growth in efficiency explained by turnover goes from 11 % to 38 %. To what extent these changes are due to sampling variations or to the impact of market oriented reforms is a crucial issue that has to be tackled in future research.

5 Technological Opportunities and FDI

In this section, the empirical results with respect to the diffusion of externalities from FDI are analyzed. First, the stationarity of the sectoral series for productivity and capital formation is assessed. Then the evidence on cointegration among FDI and TFP across sectors is used to ascertain the configuration of spillovers. Next, follows a discussion of the implications of the evidence for absorptive capacity and diffusion. Finally, the findings on causality among FDI and *inter*-sectoral TFP are used to reject the alternative hypothesis to FDI spillovers, also consistent with the cointegration evidence, that FDI flows and sectoral productivity patterns are driven by a common factor but are not interdependent.

5.1 Capital Formation and Productivity Growth

In Table 1, the sectoral average growth rates in the 1974-1998 period of the capital formation and TFP series, for both domestic manufactures and MNCs, are presented. By and large the growth rates are

positive. Among domestic producers, aggregate investment has grown yearly by more than 3% but TFP just over 1%. Average yearly investment has been even across sectors. In terms of productivity, the two domestic leading sectors have been paper products and food and beverages. The slowest sectors in productivity enhancement have been basic metals and textiles. Among MNCs, capital and especially productivity have grown much faster over the 25 years of the sample. FDI has been concentrated in four sectors, namely food and beverages, chemicals, basic metals and equipment and machinery.

The first stage in the estimation consists of assessing the stationarity of the series. If the series have unit roots, then it is appropriate to proceed with the co-integration analysis. The Dickey-Fuller statistics with a time trend are computed. The results are presented in Table 2. With few exceptions the null hypothesis of nonstationarity cannot be rejected. At the sectoral level, only for three series can this null hypothesis be rejected leading to the conclusion that the generating process is stationary.²⁷

Given the nonstationary nature of the capital accumulation and TFP series, the VAR analysis is based on Johansen's (1991) dynamic characterization of cointegration relationships. The length and frequency of the series do not permit a simultaneous analysis of all sectors, due to insufficient degrees of freedom. The implemented methodology consists of estimating all possible bivariate VARs and performing a cointegration test of the reduced system. The motivation is that all sectors connected through spillovers and linkages share a stochastic trend.

5.2 Spillover Configuration

In Table 3, the long run relationships between capital accumulation and productivity growth within and across sectors, among domestic plants only, are characterized empirically. It is surprising that there is complete absence of a common trend among capital formation in the chemical sector and productivity in the wood sector. This is perhaps due to the fact that the former is dominated by MNC subsidiaries. These industries together with the nonmetallic mineral sector seem isolated from the growth dynamics linking the other sectors.

In general, a common trend is observed linking capital formation and productivity growth within sectors. This observation could reflect a selection effect whereby capital intensive technologies exhibit the highest TFP growth. However, the comovement is also consistent with the existence of

²⁷ The autoregression lag order was found using the procedure designed by Ng and Perron (1995). Starting with a high order, a conventional t-test is used to discard lags insignificant at the 10% level. This procedure is less biased than AIC.

positive accumulation externalities among domestic producers in the same sector. On the other hand, the evidence rejects the possibility of external increasing returns across sectors.

Now that the nature of sectoral interdependence among domestic firms has been established, the impact of the presence of MNC subsidiaries can be established. In Table 4, the impact of FDI on domestic productivity is summarized both at the *intra*- and *inter*-industry levels. The observed pattern reveals that while MNC activities are substitutes for domestic manufacturing within the subsidiary's sector, they can complement manufacturing in other sectors. In particular, the hypothesis of no cointegration between FDI financed capital formation and domestic manufacturing TFP cannot be rejected at the *intra*-industry level but it is widely rejected at the *inter*-industry level. This finding corroborates the conjecture that FDI may crowd out domestic investment within the sector of the MNC but can provide positive externalities across other sectors.

The evidence on cointegration is consistent with *intra*-industry external increasing returns in domestic capital formation and *inter*-industry spillovers from FDI. To assess the generality of this finding, each sample is pooled and panel cointegration tests are performed. First, for investment by domestic manufacturers, each bisectoral pairing of the capital stock and TFP in each year is taken to be generated by a common process across sectors. Likewise, each bisectoral pairing of FDI financed capital formation and TFP across years is pooled in a common sample. The results in Table 5A show that the cointegration for domestic investment in *intra*-industry observations, which account for 12.5% of the sample, cannot be generalized. In contrast, the cointegration for FDI in *inter*-industry observations can be generalized. Across sectors there is evidence of comovement between investment by MNCs and the productivity of domestic manufacturing enterprises over the 25 years of the sample.

The diffusion of externalities from FDI is widespread across sectors. The FDI that generates positive spillovers in the greatest number of sectors is concentrated in the following industries: paper, chemicals, metallic machinery, basic metals y nonmetallic minerals. The sectors that seem most prone to benefit from the presence of MNCs are: paper and printing as well as food, beverages and tobacco. Although the growing trend in the productivity of MNC subsidiaries indicates that they implement better techniques over time, domestic producers within the subsidiaries' sector seem unable to benefit from spillovers of sector specific technical knowledge deployed via FDI.

On the other hand, the evidence of *inter*-industry spillovers is consistent with the diffusion of generic knowledge. This pattern emerges when the absorptive capacity of domestic manufacturers lags behind that of MNCs. In this case, the adoption by host-country competitors of sector specific

technologies deployed through FDI is not feasible. But, the adoption of generic technologies by host-country manufacturers, which does not represent a loss of market share to the MNC, is viable as the absorptive capacity requirement is modest.

5.3 Absorptive Capacity and the Diffusion of Externalities

In this section, the relative growth in the absorptive capacity of domestic manufacturers compared to that of MNCs is assessed. If the absorptive capacity of the host-country competitive fringe stagnates, the MNCs can use this lag to exclude others from using their sector specific knowledge by deploying sufficiently advanced technologies. When domestic competitors cannot reverse engineer and adopt profitably the MNCs' core technologies, they cannot appropriate benefits from FDI spillovers. Hence, the optimal strategy to deploy FDI will lead to choices of location and technology that rule out *intra*-industry spillovers but allow for *inter*-industry spillovers. Below, an assessment is made as to whether the cointegration evidence of the latter diffusion pattern of externalities from FDI could indeed be due to a widening gap in absorptive capacity between host-country manufacturers and MNCs.

First, note that labor productivity will remain unaffected by TFP growth if physical capital and human capital per worker both stagnate. In particular, if increasing labor productivity is accounted for solely by TFP growth, then inputs per worker, namely physical and human capital, must be stationary. Without resources to transform technological improvements into value added, the adoption of new techniques has no impact on production opportunities for manufacturers. Absorptive capacity growth is reflected by the expansion of labor productivity beyond improvements in technology.²⁸ The following proposition captures the econometric implications of how physical and human capital accumulation per worker determine the relationship between average labor productivity and TFP.

Proposition 3 Absorptive capacity is stationary if the logarithms of labor productivity and TFP are perfectly cointegrated. Both human capital per worker and physical capital per worker stagnate, and improvements in the state of technology do not yield higher growth of value added per worker.

Proof: See the Appendix.

²⁸ As derived in the Appendix, this observation leads to a definition of absorptive capacity as a weighted average of physical capital per worker and human capital per worker, where the weights are the shares of the respective inputs.

In table 5B, the results of the panel cointegration tests for labor productivity and TFP within sectors reveal stationarity of absorptive capacity for host country manufacturers and nonergodicity for MNCs. While the domestic manufacturing capabilities to adopt new technologies have remained stagnant, those of MNCs have expanded over time. The evidence shows a widening gap in absorptive capacity that can account for the sectoral diffusion pattern of FDI spillovers apparent from the cointegration evidence. In particular, the absence of diffusion of sector specific technology that could result in *intra*-industry spillovers coupled with the prevalence of *inter*-industry externalities, likely due to the dissemination of generic knowhow, point to limits in absorptive capacity in host-country manufacturing.

5.4 FDI as a Source of New Technological Opportunities

The evidence on cointegration corroborated the presumption that the absence of *intra*-industry spillovers is consistent with presence of *inter*-industry externalities. Furthermore, the results from the panel cointegration test confirmed that the scope for the former is limited by absorptive capacity. The comparison between the technologies of foreign and domestic firms reveals a gap. Also, there appears to be an impact of the demand of MNCs for intermediate inputs on the productivity of local firms. The results are consistent with both the theoretical and empirical literature on externalities from FDI. Furthermore, by emphasizing the sectoral diffusion pattern of externalities, as well as the role of absorptive capacity, the empirical methodology developed contributes to the measurement of FDI spillovers by focusing on the neglected *inter*-industry externalities. The latter can reverse the conclusion from purely *intra*-industry studies that FDI crowds out domestic investment. In particular, the finding of comovement among sectoral FDI and productivity in other sectors is consistent not only with *inter*-industry externalities but also with some common factor stimulating FDI inflows and TFP growth. To assess whether FDI generates new technological opportunities across manufacturing, the causality from sectoral FDI to TFP across sectors is tested in terms of the predictive power of each variable on the other.²⁹

Wiener-Granger causality from $\{ k_{it} \}$ to $\{ z_{jt} \}$ amounts to a nonzero coefficient in the VECM in equation (20) emanating from the polynomial $\pi_{21}(L)$ in the bivariate VAR represented in equation (20). The null hypothesis of no causality can be tested by standard methods (e.g. by an F-test) if the VAR is stable. With integrated processes the situation becomes intractable because the asymptotic

²⁹ The concept of causality used was introduced by Granger (1969) and further elaborated by Sims (1972).

distribution of the test statistic is in general nonstandard and involves nuisance parameters (Toda and Phillips 1991; 1993). Fortunately, the problem simplifies as $\{k_{it}\}$ and $\{z_{jt}\}$ are both one-dimensional and cointegrated, so that bi-sectoral causality tests can be performed. In this circumstance, the conventional Wald test statistic converges to a χ^2 distribution under the null hypothesis of no causality (Toda and Phillips 1991; 1993; Sims, Stock, and Watson 1990) such that conventional testing procedures can be applied. The same hold for a test of reverse causality. To establish whether the comovement among the investment patterns and the TFP of domestic manufacturers is caused by external increasing returns from capital formation generally, and the diffusion of FDI externalities in particular, the issue of simultaneity must be dealt with.

The null hypothesis $H_0 : \pi_{12} = 0$ must be tested.³⁰ If the latter hypothesis is rejected, causality from FDI to TFP across sectors implying *inter*-industry spillovers cannot be ascertained. In this case, all that would be known is that FDI and TFP can be used to predict each other in a cross-sectoral fashion. For example, domestic efficiency in one sector, indicated by a high TFP could be associated with FDI if the domestic sector provides an intermediate input to MNCs. However, if it the null hypothesis that domestic productivity in sector i cannot predict FDI inflows to sector j is not rejected, while FDI inflows to sector j predict TFP growth in sector i , then cross-sectoral comovement in FDI and TFP is likely to stem from the diffusion of externalities from the operations of MNCs.

First, the results reveal no causality from domestic capital formation to within sector TFP, with the sole exception of the nonmetallic minerals industry. Hence, the evidence points to higher technological development being associated with higher capital intensity rather than external increasing returns from domestic investment. Second, there is comovement among FDI and TFP in 59% of all possible bisectoral pairings. In these cases, when capital formation by MNCs in one sector is cointegrated with TFP in another sector, in 71% of the bivariate series FDI Granger-causes domestic productivity improvement.

Over time, FDI inflows generate TFP growth across sectors but not within sectors.³¹ Although only generic and not specific technical knowledge from MNCs diffuses, FDI generates manufacturing productivity rises. To rule out simultaneity as an explanation for this pattern, reverse causality tests were performed. Of the bisectoral series in which FDI and TFP are cointegrated, only in 11% does domestic

³⁰ A test of short-run causality would use $H_0 : \psi_{12}(L) = 0$ as the null hypothesis. See equation (21).

³¹ Only in the machinery and equipment sector is there evidence of a positive *intra*-industry association among FDI and domestic TFP. The evidence points to simultaneity for generating this fact.

productivity predict FDI and in 9% there is evidence of Granger-causality in both directions. Hence, the evidence of generalized *inter*-sectoral TFP growth ensuing FDI cannot be explained away by simultaneity.

5.5 The Magnitude Technological Spillovers

The evidence discussed so far strongly supports the conjecture that there is diffusion of *inter*-industry externalities from FDI. Here, technological spillovers are measured by estimation of the structural parameters of the production function. In particular, equation (17) can be expressed as,

$$z_{it} = e_i + x_{it}^F + \ln \xi_{it} = e_i + \sum_{l=1}^n \gamma_{li}^F k_{lt}^F + \ln \xi_{it} = e_i + \sum_{l=1}^n \frac{\partial x_{it}}{\partial k_{lt}^F} k_{lt}^F + \ln \xi_{it},$$

in which domestic TFP is decomposed in terms of a sectoral constant, FDI spillovers and a technological shock.³² The matrix γ^F maps the sectoral allocation of FDI financed capital formation into the impact if spillovers on domestic sectoral TFP. It is estimated by the partial canonical correlations among the vector of deviations of domestic TFP from the sectoral average and the sectoral vector of capital financed with FDI.³³ The estimated matrix in Table 9 quantifies the spillovers already found through diagnostics tests. The fitted elasticities of TFP with respect to FDI range from 28% to 1.5% with several sectors close to 20%. All the significant positive estimates correspond to instances of *inter*-industry spillovers and constitute 41% of all potential cases.

Another interesting aspect of the diffusion of FDI externalities is to explore if the *inter*-industry spillovers found translate into higher manufacturing growth. To answer this question we can decompose the motion equation (15) of the state variable to differentiate the impact of the allocation of domestic investment from that of FDI. The impact across sectors of capital formation by MNCs in sector j on growth in sector i is given by, $a_{ij}^F = \sum_{l=1}^n \delta_{il} \gamma_{lj}^F = \sum_{l=1}^n \frac{\partial k_i}{\partial I_{il}} \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial k_j^F}$.³⁴ Hence, spillovers

translate into growth if the sectors to which externalities diffuse provide inputs to other industries. In other words, forward linkages and spillovers are complements in the generation growth.

³² Potential externalities from other domestic producers are not included as the cointegration and causality tests cannot reject the insignificance of external increasing returns, both within and across sectors, ensuing domestic investment.

³³ Johansen (1988) sets up the estimation as a reduced rank regression.

³⁴ The *intra*-industry effect is $a_{ii} = d_i + \delta_{ii}(\alpha_i + \gamma_{ii}) + \sum_{l \neq i} \delta_{il} \gamma_{li} = d_i + \delta_{ii}(\alpha_i + \gamma_{ii}) + \sum_{l \neq i} \frac{\partial k_i}{\partial I_{il}} \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial k_i}$.

6 Conclusions

In theory, there are three channels through which FDI can generate productivity growth for host-country producers. These are technical knowledge spillovers, linkage externalities and competition. Case studies show examples in which each of these channels impacts domestic manufacturing. Econometric analyses have tried to ascertain the generality of these examples. Empirical cross-country estimations reveal contemporaneous correlations among FDI inflows and domestic productivity consistent with the diffusion of externalities from MNC operations. However, this evidence is also consistent with the concentration of FDI in countries where productivity is high in general, and manufacturing TFP in particular, even if FDI had no impact on domestic producers. For example, this could happen if human capital abundance attracts FDI inflows.

To deal with this simultaneity problem, longitudinal econometric analysis is needed. Recently, the availability of panel databases has made it possible to explore in more detail the extent of spillovers. By and large, the new evidence is focused on the rejection of *intra*-industry FDI spillovers. One study finds evidence of diffusion of generic knowledge, namely spillovers of exporting knowhow (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997). Although most recent findings seem at odds with the previous literature, both theoretical and empirical, they are in fact consistent with existing models and evidence. In particular, the absence of *intra*-industry FDI spillovers does not rule out the prevalence of *inter*-industry spillovers. On the basis of both the optimal location strategy by the MNC to minimize market-share loss and the low absorptive capacity requirement for the adoption of generic technical knowledge, theory predicts that in equilibrium only *inter*-industry FDI spillovers materialize. Externalities across sectors could explain evidence of contemporaneous correlation among FDI flows and TFP growth.

Ignoring the possibility of the diffusion of externalities across sectors may lead to the conclusion that FDI substitutes domestic investment. The evidence that there is no diffusion of externalities within sectors is important because it indicates that MNCs have some control to exclude use of their technology and thereby appropriate the benefits. The evidence in the present paper shows not only that there are limited *intra*-industry externalities but also that there are widespread *inter*-industry spillovers from FDI. Hence, while FDI seems to afford excludability of its knowhow to the MNC, this excludability is partial in that it applies only to specific but not to generic technologies. The absence of a positive impact from FDI on the domestic competitors of MNCs stems from the lack of dissemination of sector-specific technologies. The prevalence of a positive impact among other domestic producers in general is due to the diffusion of generic technical knowledge spurred largely by linkage effects. Hence,

the structural econometric framework used to analyze Colombian manufacturing data in this paper delivers results that match the presumption of FDI spillovers in the literature as well as the recent findings of absent *intra*-industry externalities in many countries. Although recent longitudinal analyses seemingly pointed in the opposite direction because of neglect of the possibility of externalities across sectors, the conjecture that FDI complements domestic investment through spillovers is borne out by the evidence in this paper.

In a normative context, the desirability of FDI as a market penetration strategy depends on the industrial organization in the host country. Also, the presence of MNC subsidiaries can impact the market structure of the domestic industry. On the one hand, the entry of foreign firms can have a predatory effect at the *intra*-industry level if inefficient producers are driven out of business. On the other hand, it could also provide a stimulus at the *inter*-industry level if there is an expansion in the demand for locally manufactured intermediate inputs. The predatory effect can improve long run efficiency only if there is a competitive fringe that disciplines the MNC subsidiary. As already discussed, the headquarters' strategy in choosing the optimal location will be to minimize the probability of market share loss subject to the availability of human capital. FDI can be a mechanism to seek monopolistic power while lowering production costs. If the costs of acquiring equipment and machinery embodying state-of-the-art technology are prohibitive or liquidity constraints on host country entrepreneurs are binding, the MNC subsidiary may emerge as a monopoly with limited incentives to introduce new techniques. In this case, competition is possible only if either FDI is unregulated or there is free international trade. Otherwise, there is no market discipline making it costly for the first mover or incumbent subsidiary to neglect productivity enhancing investments and engage in monopolistic practices.

Within the estimation framework sectors can be classified according to their growth properties: sectors that are part of the engine of growth; sectors that are not part of the engine of growth but are linked to it; and sectors that are isolated from the growth process. The leading sectors are catalysts for growth. Other sectors generate industrial development only indirectly. Meanwhile, the isolated sectors are unable to profit from linking with the engine of growth sectors. The impact of FDI depends on the characteristics of the sectors in which the multinational corporations concentrate. Inward foreign investment has the potential to be an engine of growth if it goes to leading sectors. If the inflows of investment go to sectors, which demand goods from leading sectors as inputs in capital accumulation, the presence of multinational corporations generates pecuniary externalities. Even if the foreign investment does not generate technological externalities, it can promote the sectors that constitute the engine of growth through upstream input demand. When FDI goes to leading industries, the

operations of multinational corporations generate growth through *forward linkages*. In this case inward investment can enhance technological opportunities in other sectors. When investment is targeted to sectors that demand goods from leading sectors we have *backward linkages*, which stimulate the engine of growth. Finally, if FDI concentrates in sectors in the periphery of industrial development, it can be a hindrance to growth if it absorbs resources from other sectors causing *Dutch disease*.

The industries that least benefit from FDI are food, basic metals and non-metallic minerals. The sectors that are able to benefit the most from FDI spillovers are paper and wood. The only sector that exhibits *intra*-industry spillovers is machinery and equipment. The FDI that generates the widest scope of technological opportunities to domestic manufacturers is concentrated in the chemicals and food sectors. While FDI may be not concentrated in the sectors with the most potential to provide widespread positive externalities, the presence of MNCs has generated neither a predatory influence on domestic competitors nor generalized Dutch disease. The findings complement the existing literature by showing that measurement of the diffusion of externalities from FDI requires a framework that accounts for sectoral interdependence among domestic and foreign producers. The *intra*-industry effect of FDI is part of the story about the impact on host-country manufacturing. With regard to spillovers, the greatest impact of MNCs is across rather than within the subsidiaries' own industries. The results show the prevalence of *inter*-industry externalities from FDI. Given the magnitude of current FDI inflows to less developed countries, this new evidence on the impact of MNC activities on host-country manufacturing is important.

7 References

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8 Appendix

8.1 Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1 Writing the capital stock vector whose components are determined by (14) in logarithmic form, the following expression follows,

$$k_{t+1} = c_k + [d + \delta(\alpha + \gamma)]k_t + \ln \eta_{t+1} + \delta \ln \xi_t ,$$

and, $k_{t+1} = c_k + Ak_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}$, where c_k is a constant vector determined by the technology and preference primitives, the matrix in the equation is appropriately defined as $A \equiv d + \delta(\alpha + \gamma)$ and the error term vector as $\varepsilon_t \equiv \ln \eta_t + \delta \ln \xi_{t-1}$. Then, (15) obtains by differencing.

□

Proof of Proposition 2 First, the following assumptions are made: (i) The initial values $\{\Lambda_{-k+1}, \dots, \Lambda_0\}$ are considered to be fixed constants, and (ii) the roots of the characteristic polynomial are strictly outside the unit circle or equal to one; i.e. $|I_2 - \Pi(z)z| = 0 \Rightarrow |z| > 1$ or $z = 1$.

These are consistent with the reduced form (19) of the model derived above and satisfy the Granger Representation Theorem, which allows to write down the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of the process $\{X_t\}$ as,

$$\Lambda_t = \Lambda_0 + C\kappa t + C \sum_{\tau=1}^t u_{\tau} + \zeta_t ,$$

where $\{\zeta_t\}$ is a mean zero stationary process constructed from $\{u_t\}$, whose first n elements are represented in (22) and,

$$C = \beta_{\perp} [\alpha'_{\perp} (\Gamma(1) - I) \beta_{\perp}]^{-1} \alpha'_{\perp} ,$$

which is exactly the sum of the coefficient matrices in (21), the Wold representation of $\{\Delta \Lambda_t\}$, where \perp denotes the orthogonal complement of the space generated by the column vectors of the corresponding matrix, and $\Pi = \Pi(1) - I$. The vectors α and β are $2n$ dimensional and both different from zero such that $\Pi = \alpha \beta'$. If $\alpha'_{\perp} (\Psi(1) - I) \beta_{\perp}$ is nonsingular, the process $\{\Delta \Lambda_t\}$ is stationary (Johansen 1991, p. 1559).

□

Proof of Proposition 3 The production function in equation (1) can be written as,

$$Y_{it} = F(K_{it}, H_{it}, X_{it}, \xi_{it}) = \xi_{it} E_i K_{it}^{\alpha_i} (\bar{H}_{it} L_{it})^{1-\alpha_i} X_{it},$$

where \bar{H} is human capital per worker and L is the number of workers.

Also, let $Z_{it} \equiv \xi_{it} E_i X_{it}$ be the state of technology. Hence, the impact of a change in the state of technology on average labor productivity may be written as,

$$\frac{\partial(Y_{it} / L_{it})}{\partial Z_{it}} = (K_{it} / L_{it})^{\alpha_i} (\bar{H}_{it})^{1-\alpha_i} \quad (A1).$$

Analogously to equation (22), $z_t = \ln(Z_{1t}, \dots, Z_{nt})$ can be expressed as,

$$z_t = y_t - \alpha k_t - (1-\alpha) \bar{h} + l \quad ,$$

using lowercase letterds for logarithmic vectors.

Now, labor productivity in logarithmic form is derived from the production function as,

$$\lambda_t \equiv y_t - l = z_t + \alpha(k_t - l) + (1-\alpha)\bar{h} \quad (A2).$$

Let the vectoral logarithmic expression of (A1) be given by,

$$v_t \equiv \ln \left(\frac{\partial(Y_{1t} / L_{1t})}{\partial Z_{1t}}, \dots, \frac{\partial(Y_{nt} / L_{nt})}{\partial Z_{nt}} \right),$$

and from (A1) and (A2),

$$v_t = \alpha(k_t - l) + (1-\alpha)\bar{h} = \lambda_t - z_t.$$

Hence, $\{v_t\}$ is stationary if the logarithms of labor productivity $\{\lambda_t\}$ and TFP $\{z_t\}$ are cointegrated with cointegration vector $(1, -1)'$.

□

8.2 The Algebraic Properties of Balanced Growth

The structure of the model satisfies the Perron-Frobenius Theorem from which the results below are derived (Berman and Plemmons, 1979, pp. 26-33). A is a non-negative matrix. Its spectral properties are such that the nonnegative octant of \mathbb{R}^n is left invariable. In particular, implies that A and its spectral radius $\rho(A)$ has the following properties:

Property 1: A is non-negative. I.e, $a_{ij} \geq 0, \forall i, j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, and $A \neq 0$. Then $\rho(A)$ is an Eigen value and a non-negative Eigen vector, $x \geq 0$, associated with $\rho(A)$ exists.

Property 2: A can be reduced to block triangular form by reorganizing the sectors:

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} A_{11} & 0 & \dots & \dots & 0 \\ \cdot & A_{22} & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 0 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ A_{m1} & A_{m2} & \cdot & \cdot & A_{mm} \end{pmatrix},$$

where each block A_{ii} is square and irreducible.

Property 3: The sum of rows and columns of A , r_i y g respectively, satisfy the following conditions:

$$\min_i r_i \leq \rho(A) \leq \max_i r_i$$

$$\min_i g \leq \rho(A) \leq \max_i g$$

Equilibrium growth is only possible if $\rho(A) \geq 1$ given that $\{\varepsilon_i\}$ is a stationary process. Excluding the possibility of explosive Eigen values, $\rho(A) = 1$ is the only case compatible with balanced growth. The only equilibrium is one with balanced growth if both explosive and stagnating paths are ruled out. The following condition guarantees homogeneity of degree one with respect to the reproducible factor.

Assumption 1: $\rho(A) = 1$.

From Property 3, we know that this assumption imposes bounds on the strength of the externality. If there were no interindustry externalities ($\gamma = 0$), the sum of rows and columns respectively would be:

$$r_i = d_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} \alpha_j \quad \text{and} \quad c = d_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ji} \alpha_j.$$

As $\alpha_i \leq 1$, Property 3 can be satisfied when $\rho(A) = 1$ if $\alpha_i = 1$, for some i . But if $\alpha_i < 0, \forall i$, the assumption implies the existence of externalities ($\gamma > 0$). The externality cannot be so strong that either $r_i > 1$ or $c > 1$ thus violating Property 3. To insure that there is convergence to a balanced growth path, a further assumption is needed.

Assumption 2: The sum of diagonal elements of the each component of the block is positive. For each block A_{kk} an element exists a_{ii} such that,

$$a_{ii} = d_i + \delta_{ii} \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} \gamma_{ji} > 0.$$

This inequality is violated if simultaneously there is total depreciation ($d_i = 0$); the good is not needed for its own production ($\delta_{ii} = 0$), and for each sector j , and either the good either does not generate externalities ($\gamma_{ji} = 0$) or is not necessary for capital accumulation ($\delta_{ij} = 0$). The condition in this assumption must be satisfied only for one element of A_{kk} and is therefore minimal. Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that $\rho(A) = 1$ is the only Eigen value on the unit circle. Thus, we exclude possible solutions with periodic endogenous cycles.

Lemma 1: Under assumptions 1 and 2, if λ is an Eigen value with $|\lambda| = 1$, then,

$$\lambda = \rho(A) = 1.$$

The unit Eigen value induces unit roots in the process $\{k_t\}$ and therefore $\{\Delta k_t\}$ is stationary if the largest block of the Jordan canonical form of A corresponding to the Eigen value $\rho(A) = 1$ is one dimensional.

Lemma 2: There exists a non-singular matrix P such that the Jordan canonical form of P can be written

as, $\begin{pmatrix} I_m & 0 \\ 0 & J \end{pmatrix} = P^{-1}AP$. There exists also a matrix C , $(n \times n)$, with the following characteristics,

- (1) C is non-negative,
- (2) C is of rank m ,
- (3) $b'C = 0 = Ca$,
- (4) The columns (rows) of C are right (left) Eigen vectors of A associated with the value $\rho(A) = 1$,
- (5) C is idempotent, so that $C'C = C$.

The matrix $(I_n - A)$ in the representation $\{\Delta_k\}$ is nonsingular with rank $n - m$ and with one last assumption the industrial structure can be linked to the growth pattern.

Assumption 3: The rank of $(I_n - A)$ is the same as the rank of $(I_n - A)^2$.

Under assumptions 1, 2, y 3, there are $e \leq m$ diagonal blocks with unit Eigen values. The sectors corresponding to such blocks drive growth. There are e sectors that constitute the engine of growth. The nature of economic growth is determined by the structure of the matrix C . In particular, a necessary condition for the j th sector to expand in equilibrium is that the j th row of the matrix is positive. Let $\{x^{(1)}, \dots, x^{(e)}\}$ be the set of Eigen vectors of $\rho(A)$. The k th element of $\{x^{(1)}, \dots, x^{(e)}\}$ is strictly greater than zero if and only if sector k has access to the engine of growth sector j .

8.3 The Estimation

From plant-level data of the Annual Manufacturing Census a panel of 10 sectors (ISIC 3-digit level) for the period from 1974 to 1998 was constructed. Plants are classified as domestically-owned or MNC subsidiaries. The latter are those for which the largest source of financing is FDI. The sectors are labeled as follows, where the first category encompasses all below:

- (1) MAN = manufacturing
- (2) FBT = food, beverages & tobacco;
- (3) TEX = textiles;
- (4) WOD = wood;
- (5) PAP = paper & printing;
- (6) CHE = chemicals, rubber, & plastics;
- (7) NMM = non-metallic minerals (except oil);
- (8) MTL = basic metals;
- (9) MEM = Metallic equipment & machinery;
- (10) OTR = other manufacturing

Table 1 - Average Growth Rates: 1974-1998

| Sector | Domestic Capital Stock | Domestic TFP | MNC's Capital Stock | Foreign TFP |
|--------|------------------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|
| MAN | 3.1 (0.6) | 1.2 (0.4) | 3.7 (0.9) | 5.2 (1.4) |
| FBT | 3.3 (0.5) | 2.8 (0.5) | 5.2 (1.1) | 4.6 (0.8) |
| TEX | 2.4 (1.1) | 0.7 (0.6) | 1.2 (1.2) | 4.7 (1.0) |
| WOD | 3.6 (0.7) | 1.2 (0.9) | 3.5 (1.1) | 3.9 (0.9) |
| PAP | 2.7 (1.0) | 3.3 (0.4) | 3.8 (1.0) | 4.2 (0.5) |
| CHE | 3.2 (1.9) | 1.8 (1.0) | 4.8 (1.5) | 4.3 (0.6) |
| NMM | 2.1 (1.1) | 2.1 (0.7) | 3.4 (0.9) | 3.8 (0.6) |
| MTL | 1.3 (0.8) | 0.4 (0.7) | 4.8 (1.1) | 2.9 (0.8) |
| MEM | 3.2 (0.7) | 1.5 (0.6) | 4.4 (0.9) | 1.4 (0.5) |
| OTR | 2.8 (0.5) | 1.7 (0.4) | 2.6 (0.8) | 3.3 (0.4) |

Notes: Percentage average growth rates with standard errors are reported in parenthesis. They are corrected for autocorrelation using the quadratic-spectral kernel with pre-whitening, as suggested by Andrews and Monahan (1992). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

Table 2 – Stationarity of the Series

| Sector | Domestic Labor Productivity | Domestic Capital Stock | Domestic TFP | MNC's Labor Productivity | MNC's Capital Stock | MNC's TFP |
|--------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| MAN | -3.36 [*] (2) | -3.76 (4) | -3.40 [*] (2) | 2.80 (3) | 0.40 [*] (2) | -2.31 (3) |
| FBT | -1.07 (1) | -2.46 (3) | -1.76 (2) | -1.75 (4) | -2.38 (4) | -2.66 (2) |
| TEX | -2.32 (3) | -1.64 (2) | -2.10 (1) | -1.01 (4) | -2.84 (1) | -2.21 (4) |
| WOD | -1.60 (4) | -0.90 (2) | -3.17 (3) | -3.65 [*] (1) | -2.23 (2) | -2.92 (3) |
| PAP | -1.95 (3) | -2.16 (4) | -1.37 (1) | -0.73 (3) | -3.28 (2) | -1.55 (3) |
| CHE | -3.46 [*] (1) | -2.68 (3) | -3.20 (4) | -1.50 (2) | -2.56 (3) | -2.64 (4) |
| NMM | -2.69 (2) | -1.78 (2) | -2.48 (3) | -1.28 (1) | -3.00 (1) | -3.02 (1) |
| MTL | -2.07 (4) | -2.84 (3) | -1.98 (2) | -2.48 (3) | -3.05 (3) | -2.50 (2) |
| MEM | -1.97 (3) | -1.09 (1) | -1.75 (2) | -2.96 (4) | -1.27 (2) | -2.05 (4) |
| OTR | -3.23 (3) | -4.33 [*] (2) | -2.86 (3) | -3.26 (1) | -2.32 (1) | -2.28 (2) |

Notes: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test statistics here are for the null hypothesis that the series in question have no unit roots. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. The lag length selection is data dependant and yields the order of the autoregressive polynomial indicated in parenthesis, following Ng and Perron's (1995) procedure. All regressions include a constant and a linear time trend.

Table 3 - Cointegration between Investment and Technical Progress among Domestic Producers within and across Sectors

| Domestic Sectoral TFP | Sectoral Capital Stock Financed Domestically | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--|-----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | FBT | TEX | WOD | PAP | CHE | NMM | MTL | MEM |
| FBT | 13.21 * | 12.75* | 7.63 | 6.01 | 7.30 | 6.10 | 5.24 | 8.13 |
| | (2) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (3) | (1) | (2) |
| TEX | 8.28 | 16.05 ** | 7.15 | 8.04 | 6.66 | 5.54 | 1.66 | 10.24 |
| | (1) | (3) | (4) | (2) | (1) | (2) | (4) | (2) |
| WOD | 6.82 | 5.91 | 11.47 * | 17.41** | 7.99 | 8.38 | 9.35 | 7.71 |
| | (2) | (4) | (1) | (3) | (2) | (4) | (3) | (4) |
| PAP | 7.58 | 6.46 | 14.22* | 10.84 | 6.33 | 6.14 | 8.07 | 7.90 |
| | (3) | (3) | (2) | (2) | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) |
| CHE | 8.73 | 13.67* | 13.08* | 8.71 | 12.29 * | 5.27 | 5.30 | 22.66** |
| | (4) | (1) | (4) | (3) | (4) | (3) | (2) | (3) |
| NMM | 16.97** | 7.36 | 13.29* | 11.93 | 11.81 | 14.54 * | 13.24* | 19.93** |
| | (2) | (3) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (4) | (2) |
| MTL | 6.89 | 16.32** | 5.64 | 12.70* | 9.09 | 20.31** | 15.30 * | 5.40 |
| | (1) | (4) | (3) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (1) | (2) |
| MEM | 12.75* | 11.33 | 7.92 | 16.55** | 4.67 | 15.24* | 8.21 | 19.64 ** |
| | (2) | (3) | (4) | (2) | (1) | (4) | (3) | (3) |

Notes: The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. The order of the underlying VAR is in parenthesis. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. The critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).

**Table 4 - Cointegration between FDI and Local Productivity Growth
within and across Sectors**

| Domestic Sectoral TFP | Sectoral Capital Stock Financed through FDI | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | FBT | TEX | WOD | PAP | CHE | NMM | MTL | MEM |
| FBT | 2.44 (3) | 8.38 (4) | 16.17** (2) | 23.41** (2) | 13.92* (1) | 10.67 (3) | 9.40 (2) | 12.59* (1) |
| TEX | 6.42 (2) | 8.41 (3) | 13.90* (2) | 12.73* (3) | 14.06* (1) | 8.41 (2) | 11.10* (4) | 7.07 (3) |
| WOD | 13.58* (1) | 18.92** (4) | 7.80 (4) | 19.32** (3) | 7.80 (2) | 13.99* (1) | 18.38** (3) | 9.35 (3) |
| PAP | 12.52* (3) | 11.95* (3) | 16.39** (4) | 7.03 (1) | 16.56** (2) | 16.04** (2) | 8.92 (1) | 12.33* (2) |
| CHE | 12.68* (2) | 15.74* (1) | 16.07** (3) | 13.79* (4) | 11.69 (3) | 7.45 (4) | 20.13** (1) | 12.38* (4) |
| NMM | 18.43** (4) | 5.27 (2) | 14.08* (3) | 9.42 (2) | 6.11 (4) | 5.02 (1) | 11.68* (3) | 13.13* (1) |
| MTL | 15.24* (3) | 17.49** (4) | 9.74 (1) | 8.25 (2) | 12.64* (3) | 8.02 (2) | 5.77 (3) | 8.34 (2) |
| MEM | 19.04** (2) | 11.95* (2) | 18.69** (4) | 9.35 (3) | 13.07* (1) | 19.23** (3) | 8.55 (4) | 14.34* (3) |

Notes: The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. The order of the underlying VAR is in parenthesis. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. The critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).

Panel Cointegration Evidence

Table 5A – Spillover Configuration

| Test Statistic | Sectoral domestic capital formation and domestic TFP across all sectors | Sectoral FDI financed capital stock and domestic TFP across all sectors |
|---------------------|---|---|
| Autoregression Test | -19.43 | -31.53** |
| t-test | -7.04 | -9.72** |

Note: The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration among the capital formation and productivity series for in the sample of all bi-sectoral possible pairings. The critical values are obtained by interpolation from the small sample Monte Carlo study in Pedroni (1995). The 5 and 10 % critical values for the autoregression test are -30.60 and -28.53 for the first column, and for the second column -30.37 and -28.32 respectively. For the t-test the 5 and 10 % critical values are -8.31 and -7.96 for the first column, and -8.46 and -8.09 for the second column. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.

Table 5B – Absorptive Capacity and Technology Diffusion

| Test Statistic | Labor productivity and TFP within sectors among domestic firms | Labor productivity and TFP within sectors among MNCs |
|---------------------|--|--|
| Autoregression Test | -25.25 | -33.81** |
| t-test | -7.04 | -8.69* |

Note: The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration among the labor productivity and TFP series within each sector for a sample pooling all sectors. The critical values are obtained by interpolation from the small sample Monte Carlo study in Pedroni (1995). The 5 and 10 % critical values for the autoregression test are -35.62 and -30.81 for the first column, and for the second column -32.78 and -29.34 respectively. For the t-test, the 5 and 10 % critical values are -9.08 and -8.25 for the first column, and -9.31 and -8.52 for the second column. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.

**Table 6 – Evidence on whether Domestic Investment Generates
External Increasing Returns**

| | FBT | TEX | WOD | PAP | CHE | NMM | MTL | MEM |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| FBT | 4.04 | 3.52 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| TEX | N/A | 2.38 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| WOD | N/A | N/A | 1.70 | 7.96** | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| PAP | N/A | N/A | 4.22 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| CHE | N/A | 2.03 | 1.67 | N/A | 2.68 | N/A | N/A | 5.36* |
| NMM | 1.41 | N/A | 3.44 | N/A | N/A | 5.02* | 2.69 | 1.93 |
| MTL | N/A | 1.56 | N/A | 2.30 | N/A | 3.27 | 4.11 | N/A |
| MEM | 1.72 | N/A | N/A | 3.45 | N/A | 2.19 | N/A | 3.83 |

Note: The null hypothesis is that there is no causality from domestic investment in the column sector to domestic productivity in the row sector. When both series are cointegrated, the null hypothesis of no causality converges to Chi-square and can be tested with the F-statistic. If the series are not cointegrated, the test is not applicable. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.

Table 7 – Causal Evidence of *Inter-Industry Spillovers from FDI*

| | FBT | TEX | WOD | PAP | CHE | NMM | MTL | MEM |
|-----|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| FBT | N/A | N/A | 4.98* | 4.01 | 7.30* | N/A | N/A | 2.48 |
| TEX | N/A | N/A | 4.75* | 9.82** | 8.24** | N/A | 1.66 | N/A |
| WOD | 5.88* | 10.06** | N/A | 12.34** | N/A | 7.59* | 11.47** | N/A |
| PAP | 4.23* | 12.55** | 5.09* | N/A | 8.22* | N/A | N/A | 5.13* |
| CHE | 9.90* | 1.40 | 10.12** | 4.28* | N/A | 3.46 | 7.27* | 3.94 |
| NMM | 6.39* | N/A | 2.81 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 3.13 | 1.76 |
| MTL | 0.74 | 6.65* | N/A | N/A | 9.09* | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| MEM | 5.69* | 11.28** | 4.91* | N/A | 4.67* | 1.04 | N/A | 12.87** |

Note: The null hypothesis is that there is no causality from FDI in the column sector to domestic productivity in the row sector. When both series are cointegrated, the null hypothesis of no causality converges to Chi-square and can be tested with the F-statistic. If the series are not cointegrated, the test is not applicable. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.

**Table 8 – Evidence on Possible Simultaneity in the Relationship
between TFP and FDI across Sectors**

| | FBT | TEX | WOD | PAP | CHE | NMM | MTL | MEM |
|-----|-------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| FBT | N/A | N/A | 1.02 | 2.74 | 4.11 | N/A | N/A | 3.35 |
| TEX | N/A | N/A | 4.03 | 3.96 | 0.88 | N/A | 5.47* | N/A |
| WOD | 2.31 | 0.59 | N/A | 10.74** | N/A | 1.68 | 1.92 | N/A |
| PAP | 3.15 | 4.07 | 7.86* | N/A | 2.29 | N/A | N/A | 8.91* |
| CHE | 3.36 | 2.87 | 1.40 | 9.05* | N/A | 0.98 | 4.13 | 11.58** |
| NMM | 1.74 | N/A | 4.62 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 3.41 | 2.97 |
| MTL | 2.40 | 4.03 | N/A | N/A | 0.89 | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| MEM | 3.55 | 0.96 | 1.77 | N/A | 2.31 | 3.69 | N/A | 10.24** |

Note: The null hypothesis is that there is no causality from domestic productivity in the row sector to FDI in the column sector. When both series are cointegrated, the null hypothesis of no causality converges to Chi-square and can be tested with the F-statistic. If the series are not cointegrated, the test is not applicable. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.

Table 9 – The Magnitude of Technological Spillovers

| | FBT | TEX | WOD | PAP | CHE | NMM | MTL | MEM |
|-----|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| FBT | .017 (.021) | .008 (.010) | .015 [*] (.006) | .024 (.037) | .109 ^{**} (.046) | .066 (.058) | .032 (.029) | .178 ^{**} (.081) |
| TEX | .023 (.035) | .012 (.011) | .020 [*] (.009) | .146 ^{**} (.028) | .086 ^{**} (.017) | .071 (.063) | .044 (.042) | .083 (.076) |
| WOD | .026 [*] (.012) | .041 ^{**} (.016) | .035 (.028) | .218 ^{**} (.075) | .057 (.081) | .069 (.039) | .090 [*] (.037) | .074 (.055) |
| PAP | .063 [*] (.029) | .057 ^{**} (.018) | .283 ^{**} (.051) | .002 (.063) | .119 [*] (.044) | .052 (.074) | .061 (.092) | .028 (.026) |
| CHE | .042 (.089) | .083 (.124) | .095 (.063) | .131 ^{**} (.093) | .026 (.021) | .019 (.015) | .004 (.013) | .057 (.052) |
| NMM | .017 [*] (.007) | .037 (.048) | .022 (.011) | .024 (.035) | .013 (.047) | .086 (.052) | .079 (.069) | .041 (.028) |
| MTL | .003 (.052) | .064 ^{**} (.030) | .010 (.019) | .048 (.054) | .096 ^{**} (.034) | .008 (.018) | .062 (.072) | .018 (.031) |
| MEM | .026 [*] (.012) | .051 ^{**} (.017) | .072 [*] (.029) | .056 (.038) | .047 [*] (.021) | .081 (.055) | .016 (.046) | .059 ^{**} (.014) |

Note: The estimates are based on partial canonical correlations between domestic TFP in the row sector and FDI in the column sector. The procedure used is described by Johansen (1988). Standard errors are in parenthesis. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.